By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
As the Israeli Defense Forces prepare for what could be a massive ground invasion of Gaza on a scale not seen in decades, war commanders are likely to be studying the history of conflict in the region and looking closely at Ukraine to gather insight on how best to destroy Hamas.
There are several critical variables at play with this scenario relating to both current warfare in Ukraine and the previous IDF-Hamas conflict in 2008. Lessons from both combat scenarios seem to clearly suggest a number of critical tactics and combat variables, such as the likely if not inevitable Hamas use of anti-armor weapons to cripple any IDF advance. Certainly Hamas fighters, known in recent years to combine both terrorist and conventional warfare tactics into what was call a “hybrid” kind of war strategy, have likely been observing Ukraine as well. One factor which has become quite clear and generated global attention among combat thinkers is the successful application of anti-armor weapons. Ukrainian use of Javelin, Carl Gustaf and NLAW anti-armor weapons shocked the world by truly “destroying” Russia’s incoming mechanized armor invasion. This success was a combination of advanced weaponry and tactical proficiency, as anti-armor weapons have increased in range, targeting precision and explosive power, yet they were adeptly employed by Ukrainians conducting hit-and-run kinds of ambushes and leveraging bridges, roads and narrowly configured passageways to surprise and destroy vulnerable attacking armor. Ukrainians used dispersed, dismounted formations, terrain, elevated building and an overall application of tactical surprise to obliterate hundreds of Russian tanks and anti-armor.
Not only is Hamas likely to have been observing this, but the terror group has a history of employing a type of “hybrid” attack style merging terrorist tactics with conventional attacks with weapons such as anti-tank guided weapons. ATGMs, rockets and other advanced conventional weapons were used with some effect against invading IDF armor in the 2008-2009 conflict. These scenarios were well-articulated in an interesting 2009 essay called “Back to Basics” written by the US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The essay, which catalogs a detailed history of combat between both the IDF and Hezbollah as well as multiple engagements with Hamas in Gaza, explores in-depth analysis of the warfare tactics employed on both sides. The IDF has likely studied this very carefully, as the 2009 study describes Hamas’ “hybrid” type of warfare tactics. The authors of “Back to Basics” explained that, by 2008, Hamas had indeed not only acquired large numbers of small arms and sniper rifles from Russia and Iran, but also had accumulated a formidable arsenal of anti-armor weapons such as SA-7s and RPG-29s, grenades and anti-tank-guided missiles. Given the state of commercial technology and weapons proliferation, Hamas is now likely to be armed with ATGMs with a higher-level of precision than may have been the case in 2008. These weapons, according to the study, were supplemented by an elaborate mixture of terrorist tactics to include the use of “extensive tunnels, IEDs, underground shelters and ambush points.”
Overall, however, Hamas’ groups of fighter might lack the tactical proficiency to truly challenge IDF soldiers in any kind of close-in fight, combat scenarios likely to happen to some degree.
Interestingly, as of 2009, the “Back to Basics” US Army authors estimated there were roughly 20,000 Hamas fighters, yet only a few of them proficient with modern combat tactics. The study explains that only a small fraction of Hamas fighters were extensively trained in combat tactics in Syria, Iran or Lebanon. Nonetheless, the war analysts studying the Hamas-IDF war were clear that some of Hamas’ ability to use anti-armor weapons and “hybrid” tactics took an unanticipated toll upon IDF armor. Thus, the study’s “Back to Basics” title makes a specific reference to a growing need, particularly in the case of Hamas, to blend counterterrorist and counterinsurgency tactics with some conventional “Combined Arms Maneuver.” Strict counterterrorism operations, many of which require clearing homes and areas, dismounted patrols and relatively unencumbered movement of armored forces … did not work as anticipated against Hamas in 2008 and likely will not work now. IDF commanders are likely acutely aware of this and might be well advised to leverage new generations of fighter-jet and aerial sensors to find, see and destroy Hamas positions from the air having established air superiority. As far back as 2009, a small group of the study’s authors and Army experts explained to me at Ft. Leavenworth’s Combined Arms Center that a principle finding of the “Back-to-Basics” study was that indeed insurgents and terrorists with “hybrid” capabilities such as Hamas need to be attack with a blend of traditional Combined Arms Maneuver and counterterrorism.
However, this is not uncomplicated either, as the “Back to Basics” study points out, because Hamas uses the standard and well known terrorist tactic of staging military operations in mosques, schools, hospitals and other areas where civilians lives would be destroyed by attacks. Air sensors, precision weaponry and targeting guidance on platforms such as Israel’s F-35I Adir are likely to introduce an entirely new generation of air-attack technology than may have been available in 2008. Drones, satellites, fixed-wing surveillance planes and even small, handheld drones are also much more advanced and capable of providing IDF forces with breakthrough levels of targeting and ISR, as has been shown in Ukraine. This kind of attack can also be fortified by long-range precision ground fires, however, Hamas may not have a large number of advanced air-defense systems. If they have acquired capable air defenses from Iran or other providers, IDF commanders are likely to use Ukrainian tactics and attack launchers and Hamas fortifications with precision ground rockets. IDF will likely use a combination of both.
Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization and the Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
