By Mark Episkopos, Managing Editor, Center for Military Modernization
The looming threat of a full-scale Chinese attack on Taiwan stands as one of the gravest national security challenges confronting the U.S. With Taiwanese manufacturers producing over 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors, a Chinese takeover of the island would wreak havoc on U.S. supply chains and is devastating in its economic consequences alone. It would gravely diminish American defense and geopolitical posture in the theater where the future of the international order will be decided in coming years and decades: the Asia-Pacific region.
Experts disagree on China’s timetable for seizing Taiwan, with some arguing that it is not inevitable and perhaps not even likely in the foreseeable future. Others take a much less sanguine view, forecasting a Chinese assault on Taiwan by 2027 and as early as 2025. Whichever camp one finds themselves in, there is widespread agreement that the U.S. must do more to deter and defeat a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
There are two main military components to this task. The first is providing Taiwan with everything it needs before China invades. As a 2023 Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) report correctly observed, there is no “Ukraine model” for Taiwan. Russia has been unable to interdict the transport of goods from Poland to Ukraine, leading to an uninterrupted flow of western military aid to Kyiv that continues to the present day. But the Taiwan scenario is that of a maritime conflict that’s characterized by an entirely different set of salient circumstances, many of which inherently favor Beijing. China can effectively seal off the island, meaning that Taiwan must be equipped with what it needs to fend off a Chinese attack before hostilities begin.
The second component is procuring the specific weapons needed, and in sufficient quantities, to ensure an effective U.S. response. The Ukraine War, though an imperfect analogy to the Taiwan situation, offers a realistic preview of just how fast an armed conflict with a great-power adversary will deplete key U.S. munitions stockpiles. It is therefore crucial to enter this conflict with adequate stocks of standoff cruise missiles– as the CSIS team noted, LRASMs are of particular importance. Deficits of these key missiles would quickly force the U.S. to rely on shorter-range missiles, forcing U.S. aircraft to fly within range of Chinese air defenses. The Air Force needs to invest in dedicated anti-ship capabilities to support the kinds of missions crucial to winning a fight over Taiwan. This could mean expanding LRASM production or developing and acquiring alternative platforms with possibly lower attrition rates, such as hypersonic weapons.
“We need better weapons to attrit those ships,” said Gen. Kenneth Wilsbach, Pacific Air Forces Commander, according to USNI News. “One thing that people often don’t think about with respect to air superiority is weapons to be able to kill ships.” More F-35 fifth-generation stealth fighters, which are also being operated in increasing numbers by Japan and other U.S. allies in the region, would improve the Air Force’s ability to conduct and sustain air superiority missions. It remains to be seen if the upcoming sixth-generation B-21 strategic bomber can be procured in sufficient quantities to make a difference in Taiwan. In the meantime, as noted by Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), efforts should be made to ensure that the DoD’s “divest to invest” strategy does not excessively shrink present U.S. capabilities to project power in the Asia-Pacific region.
Concerns over specific weapons, though important, belie a bigger challenge: we cannot achieve a sufficient degree of readiness for a Taiwan contingency without taking bold steps to restore America’s hobbled industrial base. Accomplishing this in a cost-effective way requires creative thinking and political courage in abundance, but the costs of inaction could prove much greater.
Mark Episkopos is the new Managing Editor of the Center for Military Modernization. Episkopos is a journalist, researcher, and analyst writing on national security and international relations issues. He is also a Ph.D. candidate in history at American University.
