
By Kris Osborn, Warrior
(Washington DC) Perhaps an entire annex of documents and even small libraries could be filled with essays, news reports, speculative analysis and research-driven assessments regarding the People’s Liberation Army’s well-known “carrier killer” missiles reported to hold US Navy carriers at great risk of destruction in the Pacific.
Tests of these weapons, known respectively as the DF-21D, DF-17 (hypersonic) and DF-26, have been cited in Chinese government-backed newspapers such as the Global Times as precision-guided, long-range anti-ship missiles capable of tracking and hitting US carriers. This threat has generated volumes of discussion about the vulnerability of aircraft carriers, the ranges at which they could operate in a possible military conflict and the maturity and effectiveness of US Navy layered warship defense technologies.
Carriers Obsolete?
Some observers have raised the often-discussed issue of a PRC “anti-access/area-denial” strategy and speculated as to whether carriers themselves were simply too vulnerable in a modern threat environment to operate effectively. Are carriers obsolete? Are more new ultra-long-range drones needed? Are future maritime power projection platforms likely to be smaller, faster and dispersed to improve survivability?
While there are certainly many considerations and future options likely being evaluated by the US Navy, the prevailing consensus among service leaders is that, to a large extent, carriers are going nowhere. Perhaps they can and will be supplemented by other platforms capable of projecting 5th-gen airpower? Perhaps new generations of drones will change attack possibilities? Perhaps many defensive measures necessary to address this threat are being developed?
The US Navy has displayed confidence that indeed its carriers can operate “anywhere” at “anytime” that is needed to support operations, and the service has been making major breakthroughs in the realm of ship defenses in recent years. Many details related to warship defense technologies are not available to the public, yet the service does discuss the rapid arrival of laser, EW and drone countermeasures capable of mitigating, thwarting, or simply stopping Chinese carrier-killer missiles.
US Navy Ship Defenses
Can the arrival of advanced EW systems detect an electromagnetic signal of a PLA missile at stand-off ranges and “jam” its signal to throw it off course or disable its electronic guidance system? Can ongoing efforts to “power-scale” laser weapons and arm destroyers and cruisers, protecting carriers in a carrier strike group with a new generation of precise, high-speed interceptor weapons able to track and “incinerate” incoming PRC anti-ship missiles?
Drones to the Rescue
Perhaps the fast growing use of US Navy drones on carriers could achieve the effect of greatly extending air campaign attack ranges, enabling carriers to maintain power projection at ranges beyond the reach of China’s missiles. The arrival of the MQ-25 Stingray unmanned refueler, as well as many yet to arrive carrier launched drones, could greatly impact this equation. Newer forms of beyond the horizon networking being advanced by the US Navy are also designed to impact threats presented by PRC anti-ship missiles, as the service can increasingly use aerial platforms such as the E2-D Hawkey, F-35 and a number of unmanned systems to, in effect “see” Chinese anti-ship missiles from “beyond the radar horizon.” A US Navy technology capable of this called Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air has been deployed on US Navy destroyers for many years now. NIFC-CA is an integrated multi-domain meshed defensive network in which aerial “gateway” nodes able to detect threats beyond the radar aperture are able to relay threat details to surface-based command and control in position to quickly launch advanced SM-6 interceptor weapons able to track and “destroy” high-speed incoming Chinese missiles at much greater ranges than would otherwise be possible.
The ability of the US Navy to track PLA “carrier-killer” missiles is also being rapidly enhanced by the accelerated arrival of Medium and Low-Earth Orbit satellites. These sensor “nodes” are going up by the hundreds, and they are engineered to be better networked, lower altitude and capable of higher throughput than traditional GEO satellite systems. This means potential threats are increasingly more likely to be detected sooner and threat track data can more quickly and accurately transition from one radar field of regard to another. This is extremely significant, because hypersonic weapons are known to travel so quickly from one “field” to another that it becomes difficult if not impossible to establish the kind of continuous “track” necessary to intercept them. The advent of larger numbers of meshed satellite nodes at lower altitude can naturally address and potentially ameliorate this challenge.
This debate about carriers is well known, as the DF-26 operates with a reported range of 2,000 miles and the PLA’s DF-17 is cited as an extremely threatening hypersonic weapon.
Carrier Killers Support Chinese Carriers
Alongside this well-known discussion about the vulnerability of carriers related to the PRC’s “carrier-killer” missiles, there are lesser known variables related to these weapons. For instance, how might carrier killer anti-ship cruise missiles support Chinese carriers in a maritime warfare engagement against the US Navy and its allies in the Pacific? Certainly such weapons might offer a protective “envelope” through which China’s carriers could project power. However, the relevance of this question hinges greatly upon the range, accuracy and networking systems woven into US surveillance and weapons.
Should US 5th-gen aircraft operate with an ability to attack from beyond the range of carrier-killer missiles, Chinese carriers would in fact be quite vulnerable to US air attack. Secondly, while the PLA is quick to showcase possible new 6th-generation airframes for ocean-launched attack missions and is progressing with its J-31 carrier-launched 5th-generation aircraft, the PLA simply does not have an impactful ocean-launched 5th-generation air attack capability. The PLA Air Force’s J-20 is land launched and less capable of sustaining power across a vast Pacific ocean environment. Given this, Chinese carriers would likely be challenged to substantially threaten US assets and forces from the air.
Kris Osborn isPresident of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University