By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
Pacific-focused wargaming has consistently found that any attempted Chinese “annexation” or “take-over” of Taiwan would likely begin with a massive salvo of incoming ballistic missiles intended to destroy air defenses, degrade assets and essentially “soften” island defenses in advance of a larger attack.
How effective might this be? China is certainly known to operate a massive arsenal of ballistic missiles and the island of Taiwan is only 100 miles from mainland China, well within range of many missiles. In a tactical sense, the intent would likely be to overwhelm air defenses, radar and surveillance systems with a massive incoming “wave” of attacking missiles.
While there are many defensive techniques, weapons and countermeasures in place to withstand a large-scale Chinese ballistic missile attack, a significant new research essay from the China Aerospace Studies Institute at Air University found that US and allied bases throughout the Pacific are in fact quite vulnerable to Chinese missile attacks.
“U.S. Air Force bases are vulnerable to PLA long-range missiles, drones, and hypersonics, especially in Japan,” the CASI essay, called Charting the Course: How the PLA’s Regional and Global Strategies Should Influence the US Air Force’s Lines of Effort,” states, adding “The PLA’s ability to conduct strikes on bases inside the first and second island chain cannot be overstated.”
The CASI essay says the US Air Force needs to increase defensive collaboration with Japan to implement more “enhanced, multi-layered defensive strategies…F-16…. And short, medium and long-range defense systems.”
“Collaboration with Japan on missile defenses and integrated C4ISR systems is crucial. Enhanced, multi-layered defensive strategies, including F16s, short-, medium-, and long-range defense systems, and disruption of adversary mid-course guidance are needed to counter PLA threats and protect operations.
Protecting US Bases In The Pacific
Research from the RAND Corporation last year specifically took up the question of how a US-allied coalition and Taiwan might survive a “barrage” of attacking missiles from China. The RAND wargame made a series of key recommendations which, if implemented, would massively improve prospects for a successful defense. These recommendations included a range of suggestions such as drones, networking, real-time translation, sea mines, decoys and efforts to “disrupt” China’s networking. RANDs recommendation about disrupting China’s networking and missile guidance systems corresponds to the CASI essay which cites the importance of “disruption of adversary mid-course guidance.” This could include interceptor missiles or not kinetic disruption such as the use of EW.
One critical finding of the RAND wargame pertains to base defense, because without using the recommended countermeasures to blunt or mitigate a Chinese missile attack, large numbers of 5th-generation aircraft were destroyed by missiles before having a chance to take off. When RAND wargamers implemented the suggested recommendations, much greater numbers of aircraft on bases avoided being hit and remained functional and able to take off. This suggests that advanced defensive networking, among other things, can bring paradigm-changing improvements to base defense. Maintaining a large number of operational ground-based F-35s able to remain intact by withstanding an incoming salvo would prove critical to efforts to establish the air superiority necessary to stop a Chinese invasion.
Interestingly, RANDs findings regarding base defenses align in concept with CASI’s analysis which also states that specific countermeasures such as “integrated C4ISR,” methods which would include the use of protected sensors and concealed Command and Control along with drones and satellites to improve detection using what the CASI essay describes as an adaptable “Agile Combat Employment” concept to “harden, bury and disperse” key facilities.
“To enhance base resiliency, the U.S. Air Force must harden, bury, and disperse key facilities to complicate PLA targeting and improve sustainability. Developing a distributed, concealed command-and-control network, akin to the U.S. Air Force’s Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept, is crucial for maintaining operational control amid missile threats and extensive ranges in the Pacific,” the CASI essay says.
