there is a much larger and critical explanation for this failure
by Scott Rutter, Warrior Land War Analyst
When a tragedy happens, such as the horrific crash of the Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter crash with the American Airlines Bombardier CRJ700 Regional Jet, there is a concerted effort to understand why. We are reminded of the randomness of life, how someone with their whole life ahead of them could innocently get up one morning and then be killed, there were 67 such people that day. We pledge change will occur and the cause or blame will be pieced together through an extensive and thorough investigation. In this case, careful review will be made of the role of the air traffic controllers, activities of the pilots to try desperately to understand how they both failed to divert, and the systems in the passenger plane and helicopter that did not engage to prevent this crash. It’s a large and important undertaking and this discussion does not diminish the need for this detailed review.
However, let us look at this event from another lens. The Black Hawk is a helicopter developed for tactical movement on the battlefield. It has been deployed in numerous enemy environments and conflicts tasked with transporting troops, equipment and supplies safely in and out of the zone.
At the time of the crash with the American CRJ700 in January 2025, the helicopter was flying a training mission in the Washington DC corridor, a heavily transited area for air traffic into Reagan National. This type of mission is not difficult or dangerous for the crew. In terms of the training engaged in by the Black Hawk crew, the activity on that day had no more additional risk than their training for military environments. The weather was clear and despite it being a busy air traffic corridor, there was nothing unusual in the environment of operation. Some recent reports have indicated that there could have been altitude errors as the helicopter was flying higher than their limit for that location and a potential altimeter failure on the Black Hawk. Others have indicated that the Black Hawk crew did not hear the air traffic controllers. Still others have faulted the night vision goggles that the helicopter crew may have been wearing. There is a lot to uncover, and it will likely take at least a year to comb through all the potential causes.
We cannot lose sight that this was a military combat system and whatever the NTSB outcome states, there is a much larger and critical explanation for this failure. To honor the victims and not insinuate blame on the Black Hawk pilots, it’s important to understand what was really missing on that day. If we drill down into the moments before the crash, we can visualize a regional commercial airplane weighing 75,000 pounds which had slowed into a cleared descent into Reagan National on a clear night. Coming at it directly was a Black Hawk helicopter which was approximately 64 feet long, width of about 7 feet and 16 feet tall, with rotors. Neither pilot was able to divert fast enough for reasons that may be uncovered by NTSB. The problem is that the Black Hawk had a system failure that was out of the control of the pilot crew. How can that be possible?
Based on my direct combat experience as a commander in Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom the one thing that is a certainty is that whatever you trained, no plan survives first contact with enemy. The Commander must have the situational awareness that once you engage with the enemy, the initial plan can be adjusted and sometimes completely changed. That capability is significantly increased when the equipment is specifically designed to handle edge or unplanned events providing extreme situational awareness, meaning that not only do leaders and staff need to be able to engage and adjust with the environment, but the equipment also can’t be “dumb.” All elements of the unit must be working together leaning on the ingrained, drilled human training and the maneuverability of the equipment through changes in the fight after first contact. The better the equipment or system is at adjusting to changes on the battlefield, the greater the lethality of the unit. From a military operational perspective, you can’t separate the human from the machine. On the battlefield, they must work as a single unit in motion with a mission to destroy the enemy.
When the Black Hawk was performing this training mission, it encountered an edge case, and the system failed. Not only did the direct Black Hawk equipment likely fail in some way, but the entire Defense procurement system failed. And that’s the real system failure that killed 67 people that day. The Black Hawk is an amazing piece of equipment developed and used throughout the 1970s-2000s. For the last 20 years, the pace of innovation has slowed so significantly on this equipment due to the failure of our Defense procurement system to ensure that the latest innovations and technology are available to our military. It can take 5-10 years to award a new program, build equipment, test and deploy and then it is put in service for 20-40 years in contracts that are awarded as time and materials, with major cost overruns and little incentive baked in for innovation. The cost for these helicopters can be $5-$10 million and it is very difficult for smaller companies with new technology to get a seat at the table or attract interest from ingrained prime contractors. In this entire investigation of the cause of this crash, there is really no discussion regarding the AI capabilities of the Black Hawk. There are US companies that are deploying new technology today that can provide operators with real time threat identification allowing for autonomous environmental surveillance, tracking and threat indicators. Go ask Alex Karp at Palantir or Palmer Luckey at Anduril if they have a solution for this Black Hawk system failure. We can’t expect the most innovative companies in Silicon Valley and throughout the US to bring their technology to the fight if the Defense procurement system makes it so difficult. Black Hawk pilots must make critical decisions with rapid response times, in training and on the battlefield. There is no excuse that advanced AI technology was not deployed on this equipment. Had it been chances are this would never have happened.
This was not just a fatal and horrible airline crash, destroying the lives on board and those of their loved ones and friends. This was total failure of our government procurement process of advanced military combat systems to support our Warfighters. While we must ensure safety of the equipment, the services must also force innovation, become comfortable with rapid change and disrupt the status quo that produces outdated equipment that falls short of the goal of ensuring the lethality and preparedness of our military. The US has the most advanced technology and the smartest engineers in the world and the government needs to attract these companies and take a sledgehammer to the current Defense procurement legacy. This is the only way to ensure our Warfighters are equipped with the situational awareness in battle to ensure the enemy is destroyed. The system can no longer fall short, producing “dumb” equipment and solutions, as the pace of innovation has increased exponentially. Our adversaries will overpower us if we don’t understand what really failed in this crash, the system.
Silver Star Recipient Lt. Col. Scott Rutter commanded the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, 3ID (M) destroying Republican Guard Forces as Baghdad International Airport during the combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom I (2003). Scott is an Entrepreneur and Founder and President of the Valor Network, a Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small Business that is one of the largest Telemedicine/Teleradiology providers to medical facilities in the Department of Defense, Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Homeland Security.