
By Peter Huessy, Senior Fellow, NIDS
Introduction:
Over the next two decades the US is planning to fully modernize its nuclear capable deterrent. From 2025-2045 most of this will be completed, including a new bomber, submarine and land based missile Triad elements as well as upgrading our nuclear command and control and replacing aging and legacy warheads.
The force modernization will be the first comprehensive upgrade in nearly four decades as US legacy systems range from 40-70 years when they are planned to be replaced. The US is often accused of starting an unnecessary “arms race” and if shown sufficient restraint would be able to provide incentives for both China and Russia to similarly reduce their planned nuclear force modernization. This is untrue as the US has shown restraint a number of times in the past and both Russia and China continue to build. In particular there was no increase in US strategic forces that caused China’s “breath-taking” strategic nuclear force expansion.
Opponents of missile defense often site US missile defense deployments as the rationale particularly for China’s nuclear build-up, while other nuclear critics have repeatedly proposed to eliminate the Sentinel ICBM and LRSO programs within the USAF. The ICBM Ear is producing the following charts to illustrate the scope of the US nuclear force upgrades and modernization, compared to that of Russia and China.
Background:
The Air Force has stated that it is planning to replace the aging AGM-86B ALCMs with a new advanced AGM-181 Long-Range Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile. The Air Force is in the midst of two B-52 upgrade projects. The B-52 Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) seeks to create a new version of the aircraft—the B-52J—with eight Rolls Royce F-130 engines. The service anticipates modernizing 51 B-52s by FY2032 and the remaining 23 aircraft in FY2033.
The US Air Force currently operates a fleet of 19 B-2A bombers (all of which are nuclear-capable) and 76 B-52H bombers (46 of which are nuclear-capable) and a total of no more than 60 bombers operate within the parameters of the 2010 New START agreement. An estimated 780 nuclear weapons, including approximately 500 air-launched cruise missiles, are assigned to the bombers, but only about 300 weapons are thought to be deployed at bomber bases. Each bomber is assumed to carry 8-24 weapons including cruise missiles or gravity bombers. B-52s only carry nuclear cruise missiles—8-20. Twenty B21 new bombers will replace the B-2 bombers and are assumed to be placed into the nuclear role consistent with the New START agreement.
The USA will build and deploy 600 ICBM and SLBM missiles (400 Sentinel and 192 D-5 missiles). The Sentinel can carry upwards of 3 warheads while the Life Extended D-5 can carry as many as eight warheads. The Columbia class submarine carries 16 missiles while the current Ohio class submarine can carry as many as 20 missiles.
This analysis assumed the US will have 60 bombers with no more than 780 cruise missiles and gravity bombs in the nuclear inventory. That implies an average of three nuclear strategic bombers a year over the next two decades and nearly 40 nuclear weapons a year available, including new LRSO cruise missiles replacing the legacy ALCMs. Although the deployed cruise missiles are estimated to be roughly 528 in total.
The Ohio class submarine has 20 missiles each while the new twelve Columbia class submarine will carry 16 missiles. Added together the US is thus building roughly 70 new SNDVs or Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles annually but only 30 long range intercontinental ballistic missiles for deployment. Actual deployments of the ICBMs and SLBMs/Submarines don’t actually occur until the 2030s while the new strategic bomber is undergoing test flights this decade with an estimated 2027 IOC. So far, the administration’s force structure goal remains at New START and 2022 NPR numbers of around 1800-2200 strategic nuclear warheads on land based missiles, sea based missiles and strategic bombers.
What are Russia and China doing?
Russia has deployed nearly 90% of its planned modernized nuclear force. If that build was spread out over twenty years it would average the deployment of an average of 65 strategic range and nuclear armed cruise missiles per year or SNDVs and in the range of 200+ warheads a year also each year for 20 years.
China is building to a total of 92 SLBM and 700 ICBM missiles and as many as 2332-7000 ICBM and SLBM warheads by 2035-45 or implying a build of nearly 40 a year for strategic range missiles and upwards of 350 warheads a year.
Conclusion:
The United States has the goal of deploying (in the field and ready to be operational) 1550-1800 warheads, exactly the number we deploy today under the terms of the 2010 New START treaty. However one wishes to characterize such an effort, it is not arms racing.
Russia and China appear to be deploying or have deployed in some cases at least 105-135 new long range missiles annually compared to 33 for the USA and some 350 warheads annually compared to 90 warheads for the USA.
The “arms race” has Russia and China building 400+% more nuclear capable platforms per year than the United States and 389% more warheads per year—on average if spread out over the period 2025-45.
With that perspective the answer to the question of who is doing the arms racing and to where becomes obvious.
Throughout the year, the US bomber force provides the US a signaling device to where we demonstrate the US commitment to allied extended deterrent. Here the US air breathing deployments are in some cases greater than for Russia and China. However, when comparing the deployment of ICBM and SLBM “fast flyers” as Ambassador Ron Lehman calls them, the US is certainly not leading any arms race but has shown over the past near four decades remarkable restraint in US nuclear sustainment and modernization. If anything, the US is now arms catching-up as opposed to arms racing. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown explained: “We build, they build. We stop; they build.”