By Peter Huessy, Senior Fellow, NIDS

THE THREAT

Admiral Charles Richard when commander of the US strategic Command explained that every time he received another briefing on China’s nuclear buildup, the previous estimates had doubled while the time it was taking China to build had been cut in half. The nuclear opponents and the abolitionists ignored these warnings and concluded such projections were highly exaggerated.

But in fact, the Admiral nailed it. A new Pentagon report warns China will reach 1500 nuclear warheads not in 2035 as previously thought but now in 2030. Air Force Gen. Kenneth F. Wilsbach warned China’s “nuclear modernization and expansion will increase its ability to target our homeland with longer-range systems that can reach the continental United States, a primary reason to invest in Golden Dome.” Wilsbach further explained that China’s diverse nuclear arsenal gives the CCP leaders “options at every rung of the conflict” the key being warheads. And huge new missile fields in China have room for 300 missiles and potentially thousands of warheads. As the Strategic Posture Commission explained, the current US force structure “effectively accounts” for the current nuclear threat environment but is not sufficient for the future.

While the US is rebuilding its own nuclear Triad of bombers, land based and submarine launched missiles, some opponents of US nuclear modernization have called for alternative strategies, including eliminating all our land based ICBMs or our submarines and submarine missiles. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) for example believes submarine based warheads at sea are hard to count and should thus be eliminated, while the Arms Control Association wants to kill all American land based missiles because the silos in which they are deployed can be targeted.

If the US were to take down either of these Triad legs, deterrence would still require the United States to maintain the current level of missile warheads. And what would be the impact of such strategies if the US nuclear forces needed to expand? In short if we adopted the FAS or ACA idea of deterrence and maintained only what their new force structure allows, how does the US sustain the status quo or an uploaded force?

America’s 400 new Sentinel missiles could deploy from 400-1200 warheads. Ninety-nine percent would be on alert at any one time. The cost of this system is projected to cost $141 billion including new missiles, silos, cabling and other infrastructure, plus the $15 billion for the warheads. The 12 new Columbia submarines will each hold 16 D-5 missiles and each missile could hold as many as 8 warheads. The cost of the submarines is $130 billion plus $30 billion for upgrading the D-5 missiles and $18 billion for the warheads. Both planned systems are projected to remain in the US nuclear deterrent until 2080, costing an average of some $6.6 billion a year.

THE NEW START STATUS QUO

To deploy 1490 New START Treaty Allowed (NSTA) warheads but only with ICBMs, and assuming each missile would deploy 1-3 warheads, requires 100-1090 more ICBMs or from $35B-$420 billion. This plan would save the full cost of the Columbia class submarine and D-5 missiles of $160 billion but for a net cost as high as $260 billion. Now, nearly all such missiles would be on alert, but without submarines, not a highly survivable force.

Even if the least expensive path were followed, the US would have a zero upload capability as the US would be stuck at the 2010 New START arms treaty, leaving the US on the short end of the international strategic warhead balance by a factor of 3/1 to 6/1. On top of which the US would be one technology failure away from unilateral nuclear disarmament. [Even if the United States kept 60 strategic bombers with nuclear capability, any first strike from an enemy could eliminate much of the remaining airborne force unless maintained on alert or continuously airborne.]

If the United States wanted to deploy all 1490 NSTA warheads with submarines alone, we could load the 12 Columbia submarines with 16 missiles and a maximum of 8 warheads a missile. That force would have almost 1024 missile warheads on alert if at sea 67% of the time, and 768 on alert warheads if at sea 50% of the time. The number of additional submarines needed would be 4-6 if at sea 50% of the time, costing another $52-84 billion for the submarines, (only available post 2042), and $18 billion for more D-5 missiles and $14 billion for more warheads.

However, the US would have a zero upload capability. And be one technology failure away from unilateral nuclear disarmament. And with very little diplomatic leverage to seek effective and reasonable arms control limits. While the US would save the cost of Sentinel, $141 billion, it would require new submarines, D-5 missiles and D-5 warheads to be built costing near $110 billion.

UPLOAD REQUIREMENT

But maintaining the NSTA level of warheads reflects a 2010 strategic environment that has since changed markedly. China is projected to have 900 (150%) more warheads just by 2030. The New START treaty may be extended to February 2027, but while Russia is a party to the agreement, China is not. Russia has a very rapid upload capability to 2700-3200 warheads (which may already have been started) and a total nuclear warhead force that could easily reach a minimum of 4000 long range strategic nuclear warheads.

The path to upload to our current capability but to do so only with silo ICBMs or sub SLBMs is very costly and would take decades longer than the currently planned nuclear modernization plan.

For example, to deploy 400-1200 on alert warheads at sea to replace the four hundred Sentinel (each missile can hold 3 warheads) would require anywhere from an additional 600-2400 total SLBM warheads, on alert from 50%-67%, with 80-300 more D-5 missiles. That implies  building 5-18 more Columbia class submarines than currently planned, costing (in today’s dollars) $80-$240 billion in additional expenditures, plus $14 billion for the added D-5 missiles and $18 billion for more warheads. These added nuclear modernization costs of $272 billion are only offset by the $141 billion saved by jettisoning Sentinel. Letting Minuteman III atrophy saves relatively little---some $2 billion a year until the missile goes out of service.

Alternatively, the United States could replace the required on alert SLBM warheads with only ICBMs. Assuming each Sentinel would carry 3 warheads, matching the maximum deployment with 2700 on alert ICBM warheads—matching the current combined upload capability of our ICBMs (1200) and SLBMs (1536)—would require as many as 900 ICBMs each with 3 warheads. The cost of such a force would be an additional $175 billion plus $30 billion for more warheads. The US on the other hand would save $160 billion in jettisoning 12 submarines and their associated D-5 missiles, for a net loss of $45 billion. But on the downside, the US would have a zero buildup capability, would be one technology failure away from disarmament, and with a relatively vulnerable nuclear force which would make a very tempting target for our enemies.

CONCLUSION

Strategies relying on only one key leg of the current nuclear TRIAD, whether sea based submarines or land based silo missiles, would maintain the status quo at an additional cost to the US Treasury of up to $150 billion while also significantly worsening US strategic deterrence. The consequence of the US sticking with an SLBM or ICBM force only means any future required increase in the US strategic deterrent would require hundreds of billions of additional defense dollars and decades to produce, all the while with the US facing a deteriorating strategic nuclear environment.

In all cases, the United States would also be without an upload capability and thus unable to respond to a surge in Russian or Chinese nuclear deployments. The United States would also be perilously close to one technology failure away from unilateral nuclear disarmament while offering the President significantly restricted options available for deterrence.

On the other hand, keeping the current TRIAD nuclear deterrent saves cumulatively some $740 billion compared to alternative strategies examined here, is very flexible in dealing with crisis stability, and allows the US to match our future deterrent needs quickly and effectively.