China has asserted its famous “nine-dash-line” claim suggesting it owns the entire area encompassing the South China Sea
China has asserted its famous “nine-dash-line” claim suggesting it owns the entire area encompassing the South China Sea
By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
Dual carrier air attack operations, forward positioning of ISR and bombing assets, the addition of new bases in the Philippines and the creation of specially configured US Marine Corps amphibious Littoral Units – are all specific measures the Pentagon continues to take as a way to “deter” China from quickly and suddenly taking over the South China Sea.
Parts of the long disputed Spratly Islands are claimed by Taiwan, Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and others, yet for decades China has asserted its famous “nine-dash-line” claim suggesting it owns the entire area encompassing the South China Sea. The Nine-Dash-Line Chinese territorial claim has origins from decades ago, yet the claim has been deemed inaccurate and unlawful by the UN Universal Law of the Sea Convention. China, however, says its territorial claim precedes the arrival of the UNLOS Convention and is actually more legitimate. An interesting essay by Air University explains that “
“The Nine-Dash line is an area outlined in and encompassing most of the SCS.7 It is so named because, on most maps, it is literally an outline of nine dashes creating a semicircular area stretching from the Gulf of Tonkin, south past Vietnam to Malaysia, and then northeast past the Philippines to just east of Taiwan.8 This area represents China’s territorial claims in the SCS, based on a similar line on a map issued and used by the Republic of China in 1948 to claim sovereignty and maritime rights in the SCS,” The Air University essay writes.
Longstanding Tension
The area remains contested until this day, despite the fact that it encompassess exclusive economic zones of several SouthEast Asian Countries. There has been an ebb and flow of tensions over the years, yet the issue is far from resolved.
For instance, the US Navy has conducted many Freedom of Navigation Operations, called FONOPS, designed to sail warships within the 12 mile radius of an island. This is the distance out to which, according to the Universal Law of the Sea Convention, a country’s land territory extends. By sailing within a 12 mile boundary, therefore, the US Navy sought to send a message that it does not recognize China’s territorial claims as lawful or legitimate.
China has also expanded its presence in the region in several key respects. Years ago, a US Navy P-8 Surveillance plane captured video of what the Pentagon called “land reclamation,” essentially a Chinese effort to engage in phony island building to add “land mass” to island areas in an effort to make territorial claims.
Risk of War
Along with Taiwan, many continue to regard the South China Sea as a remaining flashpoint and risk area for potential conflict or miscalculation. The US Marine Corps, for example, is building a new light amphibious warship for island hopping types of operations wherein forces and weapons will need to quickly transit from ship-to-shore-to-ship and engage in littoral, multi-domain warfare. This is part of why the Corps is creating specially configured “littoral units” prepared for island hopping warfare and forming “Stand In” forces capable of holding areas and operating within close proximity to coastal areas and enemy fire.
China, however, has massively increased its presence in the South China Sea and even copied US “dual-carrier” training exercises in the Pacific. At one point in recent years, the PLA Navy sailed two aircraft carriers through the South China Sea together operating in close coordination with one another. This took place not long after the US Navy performed air-campaign attack drills with two aircraft carriers synchronizing sortie rates and maintaining connectivity. Such an approach can massively increase the scale and scope of any potential air campaign by essentially “doubling” the sortie rate.
China has also at times placed weapons, radar and even fighter aircraft in disputed areas of the South China Sea. The continued PLA presence in and near the area can present great risks to the US and SouthEast Asian nations wishing to claim territory in the region. The PLA could, perhaps by design, be planning to create a no-access area for US and allied forces to operate.
Taiwan: Does China's proximity suggest that America can't help or stop an invasion?
Pentagon reports on China have for years been citing what it refers to as a “fait accompli” Chinese threat wherein the People’s Liberation Army uses speed and proximity to quickly annex Taiwan before a US-allied force can respond.
The concept is clear, as it refers to how the PRC might use proximity and surprise attack to overwhelm Taiwanese defenses and “occupy” the island with intense rapid operations. Most public reports, published wargames and expert assessment seem to posit that China would likely fire a “salvo” of ballistic missiles to blunt, soften or destroy Taiwanese defenses before aunching a coordinatedl, multi-domain amphibious attack on the island. Speed, surprise and a mixture of air, surface and mobile ground forces might seek to take over Taiwan quickly, making it too costly and dangerous for a US-allied force to “extricate” a large embedded Chinese force with a counterattack. Thus a Chinese occupation of Taiwan would become a “foregone conclusion,” something which the US and the West could simply have to “accept” as a new status quo.
Taiwan 100 Miles from China
Being merely 100-miles from the SouthEastern Chinese coastline amounts to a tactical scenario wherein the PLA could easily fire short, medium and long-range ballistic missiles at Taiwan and use its force of J-20 stealth aircraft to support from the air. While only land-launched and potentially challenged to operate extensively throughout a largely maritime Pacific, PLA Air Force J-20s could easily reach skies above Taiwan from the mainland.
The Pentagon seems to recognize all of this, as the concept has been discussed for several years in DoD’s annual Pentagon China report called Military and Security Developments Regarding the People’s Republic of China. This threat scenario is undoubtedly aligned with the Pentagon’s deterrence posture in the Pacific, a strategy which has heavily emphasized “forward presence,” intensified allied cooperation and numerous joint, multi-national war preparation exercises throughout the region.
The US has not only been solidifying and increasing military-to-military cooperation and training with Australia, Japan and The Philippines but formally establishing new bases, adding headquarters and generating new “structure” and command and control synergy among US-allied forces in the Pacific. The US has for years based one of its aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships in Japan as well.
US Pacific Expansion
The US has in recent months added new military bases in The Philippines, established a new joint US-Japanese headquarters and intensified surface warfare interoperability between US and Japanese carriers and F-35s. The Pentagon has also not only moved air assets to Guam but recently based a US Navy Virginia-class submarine there as well.
Much of this appears clearly aimed at “force multiplying” kinds of initiatives, yet it also seems clearly focused on pure speed. Simply explained, a way to thwart, stop, interrupt or simply destroy a surprise Chinese attack on Taiwan is to…respond fast and be within striking range. This is likely why the US focuses so heavily upon forward presence in the Pacific and regularly conducts patrols, war preparation exercises and maintains a large force in the region. Looking at clear geography, parts of the Southern Japanese islands are roughly 500-miles away from Taiwan, and well-placed carriers, attack submarines and amphibs could help ensure F-35 5th-generation air power operates within reach of skies above Taiwan.
Keen Sword
The US and Japanese have just recently conducted a joint command and control warfighting exercise in the Pacific designed to solidify multi-national interoperability in the realm of fire-control, ballistic missile defense and collective forward force presence. Specifically, an exercise called “Keen Sword” used computer simulation to verify the ability for the US and Japanese Self-Defense Forces to actualize the Pentagon’s “Combined Joint All Domain Command and Control,” according to a significant Lockheed Martin description.
“During this exercise, the Virtualized Aegis Weapon System (VAWS) successfully supported the 3rd Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) during a naval special warfare mission to strike a land target. Aegis showcased its flexibility and interoperability by providing and receiving digital fire coordination direction among land and maritime shooters. VAWS eliminated the need for manual operations by transmitting detailed fire control orders digitally, across existing military service databases to include Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System to coordinate simulated fires,” the Lockheed essay explains.
Stopping Chinese Invasion
Could these assets mobilize and respond quickly enough to stop a “fait accompli?” This seems to be the operative question, as the US and its allies would appear to have a distinct advantage in the air, given the size and reach of its 5th-generation air attack. A Chinese amphibious assault would have little chance of success without an ability to provide air support, and forward positioned F-35s could potentially “mass” quickly should they be within a few hundred miles. However, the timing and success of a defensive operation would likely rely upon successful air, surface and space surveillance as such ISR assets could likely “see” or “detect” any kind of massive Chinese amphibious assault preparations. Should US and allied forces in the Pacific “see” any kind of large-scale massing of Chinese Air Force and Naval power within quick reach of Taiwan, there might be an opportunity to ensure defensive forces get there “fast-enough” to stop a “fait-accompli.”
Such a deterrence posture is not without complexities, however, given the scope and frequency with which PLA Navy and Air Force units conduct drills, amphibious warfare exercises and air incursions into Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone. China’s sheer proximity does seem to greatly amplify the threat posed to Taiwan.
Why does China want 6 aircraft carriers?
There is little mystery surrounding China’s well-known and documented ambition to build a large, global fleet of at least six aircraft carriers, as it is something which is already well-underway. The People’s Liberation Army - Navy has already operated three aircraft carriers on the ocean simultaneously, as its third and newest “Fujian” carrier conducted sea-trials while the Chinese Liaoning and Shandong conducted patrols in the Pacific.
Three carriers on the sea simultaneously would seem to indicate early phases of what appears to be a large-scale Chinese ambition to project multi-theater, global naval and air power. The concept is as clear and self-evident as it may be concerning to the Pentagon. The PRC is moving quickly to expand its influence and reach beyond being a regional “Pacific” power and instead working to rival the US Navy as a pre-eminent global force capable of projecting power across and within multiple theaters around the world simultaneously.
The US, for example, can operate one or two carriers in the Pacific while also maintaining a carrier presence in the Mediterranean and other global hotspots. A PLA ability to operate in a similar fashion brings military and geopolitical implications and it will enable China to strengthen and expand its growing global influence.
PLA Global Ops
The PRC is already known to be conducting large scale economic and political influence operations in key places such as the African and South American continents, therefore adding a carrier presence would introduce unprecedented military dimensions to these well-known ongoing efforts. For example, in recent years, China has built a forward-operating military base near the U.S. military’s facility in Djibouti, located in the Horn of Africa. In a related effort, Beijing’s one-belt-road initiative seeks to establish access and lines of influence from Western and Southern China into India and the Middle East.
The 2024 Pentagon’s annual China report explained that the PLAN is conducting far-sea carrier training operations at further distances off its coast in key areas near the Philippines. Sure enough, not long after the US Navy conducted aligned dual-carrier sortie coordination drills in the Pacific, the PLA Navy did the same thing. This suggests that not only is the PRC looking to copy US reach and influence but also mirroring US tactics and training as well. Chinese government-backed newspapers such as the Global Times regularly showcase PLA multi-domain task force kinds of training and efforts to copycat the Pentagon’s Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2) command and control system.
Should China wish to support its growing military presence in certain places, such as the Middle East, or expand its allied relationships, it will need forward-deployed navy power projection.
Build Carriers Fast Enough?
There are two clear yet contradictory elements to this; in one sense, China is far from being able to maintain a global presence in any way comparable to the US.
China’s well known carrier-construction efforts only seem to be expanding, and they are fortified by the PRC’s often discussed civil-military fusion enabling streamlined and synergized government and industry efforts to prioritize and fast-track shipbuilding.
As part of this, China is adding new shipyards and building carriers and warships at a staggering pace. It is unclear how many years the PLAN may take to operate a carrier fleet the size of the U.S. Navy, as there may be many estimates. The threat, however, is likely not lost on the Pentagon.
Kris Osborn is the Military Technology Editor of 19FortyFive and President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.