By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization (Washington DC) The Chinese military and China’s state-backed newspapers regularly hype and test-fire their famous so-called carrier killer [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2020/11/chinas-df-21d-and-df-26b-asbms-is-the-u-s-military-ready/] anti-ship missiles. These weapons are ostensibly capable of destroying aircraft carriers with precision-guided firepower from distances as far as 2,000 miles. MOVING PAST A2/AD The existence of these weapons — the DF-21D [https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-21/] and DF-26B [https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/dong-feng-26-df-26/] — played a major role in the development of the anti-access/area-denial [https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/moving-beyond-a2-ad] strategic framework. The U.S. wants to ensure that carriers and other platforms can attack and destroy enemy targets from great distance in a very high-threat environment. Far-reaching, precise anti-ship missiles, however, seem to threaten that mission. The Pentagon, and certainly the U.S. Navy, have for years now taken this threat quite seriously, even though much is likely still unknown when it comes to the reach, guidance technology, and accuracy of these missiles, let alone their ability to hit moving targets. In response to China’s A2/AD strategy, the Navy has clearly expressed that it can and will operate anywhere it needs to when conducting combat operations [https://warriormaven.com/china/navy-ship-defenses-counter-chinese-carrier-killer-missiles-df26] and projecting maritime power. There are likely some interesting and important reasons why Navy leaders feel the need and confidence to make these comments — recognizing that of course many elements of ship-defense technology are not available for security reasons [https://news.yahoo.com/chinas-military-us-aircraft-carriers-150356998.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall]. In recent years, the Navy has made rapid, breakthrough progress in the realm of layered ship defenses [https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/news/2019/04/23/securing-high-seas] — progress that means ships can increasingly see and seek to destroy potentially catastrophic threats from beyond the horizon. Carrier Strike Groups, for instance, now operate with new generations of long-range sensors able to relay distant threat data to the ship commanders in position to take defensive action. LAYERS OF DEFENSE A now-deployed technology [https://news.yahoo.com/challenge-future-us-navy-aircraft-123202412.html?fr=sycsrp_catchall] called Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air [https://news.usni.org/2016/06/22/nifcca-expands-sm6-f35] uses Hawkeye surveillance planes and even F-35s to function as an aerial relay node able to detect threats beyond the reach of ship radar. NIF-CA uses an airborne gateway as a sensor to send threat data down to the ship while the attacking missile is at much safer ranges. The aerial sensor then cues ship-based fire control to launch an SM-6 interceptor [https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/sm-6/] to fly up and intercept the missile. NIF-CA was first deployed more than six years ago on U.S. Navy destroyers and has probably been upgraded since then. Laser weapons and advanced electronic warfare capabilities are emerging that can track and jam the electronic guidance systems built into the Chinese carrier-killer missiles. Range enhancements have also been developed, quite possibly as a specific counter to China’s missiles and its anti-access/area-denial weapons. One example is the rapid emergence of the Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray carrier-launched refueler drone [https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/14285399/unmanned-tanker-aircraft-carrier]. This first-in-kind sea-launched drone can basically double a fighter jet’s attack reach by fueling the aircraft hundreds of miles away from the carrier deck. Unlike a large, vulnerable tanker, the MQ-25 is small, sleek, and of course much less risky to deploy, since it is unmanned. Carrier Survivability In a tactical sense, this means that carriers with the MQ-25 could project power over land from twice the distance offshore, enabling sustained attack reach in an A2/AD environment. What the Navy Says The argument that Chinese “carrier-killer” anti-ship missiles [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/01/df-21-and-df-26-the-chinese-missiles-the-u-s-military-worry-about/] make U.S. Navy aircraft carriers obsolete is so familiar it is almost cliche, given some of the often less recognized context or collection of variables [https://www.businessinsider.com/could-chinese-missiles-really-sink-a-us-navy-aircraft-carrier-2022-1] that contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the overall threat equation. China’s DF-26 [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/03/df-26-how-china-could-sink-a-navy-aircraft-carrier-from-2000-miles-away/], an anti-ship missile tested and “demonstrated [https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2020/8/27/china-fires-aircraft-carrier-killer-missile-in-warning-to-us]” by the People’s Liberation Army reportedly able to travel 2,000 miles to destroy carriers, does present a credible threat to be taken seriously. Yet much of the hype [https://www.livemint.com/news/world/us-navy-trolls-china-for-aircraft-carrier-killer-missile-threat-comment-by-chinese-media-11594021157970.html] seems to leave out certain critical comments made by senior U.S. Navy leaders [https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/navy-admirals-reject-beijing-s-claim-that-dual-carrier-drills-in-south-china-sea-were-symbolic-1.661671] and various adaptations the modern Navy has made to respond to or “counter” China’s often-discussed A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) strategy [https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/tag/A2%2FAD]. SHIP DEFENSES, ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) & AEGIS For many years now, U.S. Navy leaders [https://warriormaven.com/sea/navy-ship-breakthrough-defenses-destroys-attacking-sea-skimming-cruise-missile] have been clear that its carriers will sail “wherever” they need to project power [https://www.csis.org/analysis/freedom-navigation-south-china-sea-practical-guide]. What might this mean? In the face of China’s “carrier-killer” anti-ship missile threat, the U.S. Navy continues a firm resolve to sustain the operational effectiveness of its Carrier Air Wings and Carrier Strike Groups. Why? There are many relevant elements of layered ship defenses [https://warriormaven.com/sea/navy-nimitz-class-carriers], of which details are likely not available for security reasons, yet senior Navy leaders, innovators, and weapons developers have been very clear about a wide range of enhancements to carrier security. Generally speaking, many of these details fall within the realm of electronic warfare technologies able to find and locate a “line-of-bearing” or signature of an approaching enemy ballistic, air, and cruise missiles and “jam” or “disable” the RF signal or guidance system. Many Navy surface ships, likely including carriers, are being armed with laser weapons able to both perform optical functions and incinerate or intercept incoming threats at the speed of light. Naturally, a carrier is regularly protected or flanked by destroyers and cruisers armed with Aegis Combat Systems for missile defense as well as Vertical Launch Systems to fire fast-paced interceptors at incoming enemy weapons such as the SM-6, SM-3, or SM-2. Carrier strike groups also operate with upgraded deck-fired interceptor missiles such as the Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile Block II [https://missilethreat.csis.org/defsys/evolved-seasparrow-missile-essm/], which can operate with a sea-skimming mode to destroy an incoming cruise missile flying parallel to the surface. Perhaps the rapid arrival of hundreds of Medium and Low-Earth Orbit satellites forming a “mesh” surveillance network can identify mobile launchers [https://warriormaven.com/sea/navy-tomahawk-targets-moving-ships-at-sea] for the carrier-killer missiles and cue weapons able to destroy them at or during launch. There are simply far too many variables of great relevance to maritime ship defenses to instantly assume that carriers are obsolete or simply “cannot” operate in high-threat areas. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS AND MULTI-DOMAIN NETWORKING Multi-domain networking and unmanned systems [https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2023/4/12/navy-task-force-charts--course-for-future-of--unmanned-systems] are also fundamental to carrier defense, as they can operate as both a surface and aerial “node” within a larger meshed system to identify approaching threats early, often from beyond the radar horizon of surface ships. Drones, and even some manned aircraft such as an F-35 [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/01/joint-strike-fighter-why-charlie-is-special/] or Hawkeye [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/e-2-hawkeye-why-navy-aircraft-carriers-need-this-plane/], can relay threat data to ship-based fire control to launch interceptors. Armed drones and fighter jets [https://warriormaven.com/sea/navy-f-a-xx-6th-gen-carrier-launched-stealth-fighter-prototypes] might even be able to fire interceptor weapons and incoming Chinese missiles themselves. Sensor range, weapons range, and secure multi-domain networking are consistently changing the paradigm when it comes to ship defenses, a reality that at least raises questions about the true extent of the threat posed by China’s “carrier killers.” While the Chinese newspapers have often cited various tests and demonstrations of their carrier-killer missiles, there are likely many unanswered questions. These would include unknowns such as just how precise is the targeting and guidance systems on these missiles. Are they networked to the point where they can track and hit moving targets? Do they operate with electronic countermeasures such as frequency hopping which can overcome “jamming” attempts? Putting all of these unknowns aside, there is yet another compelling reason why even less defended carriers might succeed in projecting power from the sea in this kind of high-threat environment. The answer is the MQ-25 Stingray [https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/14285399/unmanned-tanker-aircraft-carrier], a first-of-its-kind carrier-launched drone refueler that can, in effect, double the combat radius of carrier-launched aircraft. An F-35C or F/A-18 Super Hornet [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/01/the-f-a-18-super-hornet-block-iii-is-a-legend-for-a-reason/], for instance, may have a combat radius of several hundred miles. A large manned tanker might be too vulnerable to operate even a few hundred miles from an enemy coast, but an unmanned MQ-25 drone, by contrast, can refuel the jets without risk, essentially “doubling” the ranges at which they can project power and attack. This means carriers could hold enemy territories under threat while being twice as far away and therefore less vulnerable to shore-launched anti-ship missiles such as China’s carrier killers. Kris Osborn [https://warriormaven.com/author/krisosborn] is the Military Affairs Editor of 19FortyFive and President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University. BIOGRAPHY OF AUTHOR Kris Osborn [https://warriormaven.com/author/krisosborn] is President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
