By Logan Williams, Warrior Editorial Fellow At his press briefing [https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3631953/pentagon-press-secretary-maj-gen-pat-ryder-holds-a-press-briefing/], just days ago, on the 4th of January, the Pentagon Press Secretary, Air Force Major General Pat Ryder went to great lengths to painstakingly reiterate that the US views Iraq as “an important and valued partner.” Major General Pat Ryder went on to state that “we [the United States’ troops] work very closely with the Iraqi Security Forces… and [we] have had a relationship with the Iraqi Security Forces for many years;” and Major General Ryder also repeatedly emphasized that the United States’ forces are stationed in Iraq “at the invitation of the government of Iraq, to help train and advise, in support of the Defeat ISIS mission.” The feeling of “valued partnership” between the United States and Iraq, expressed by the Pentagon, does not seem to be mutual at the moment — and the Iraqi government is attempting to rescind its “invitation” [https://thehill.com/policy/defense/4391371-iraq-moving-to-remove-us-led-military-coalition-prime-minister-says/] for U.S. troops to be stationed on Iraqi soil. It is important to note that the current friction between the United States’ forces and the Iraqi government, given voice by the Prime Minister of Iraq, Mohammed Shia’ Al Sudani, was catalyzed by the United States’ rare, targeted airstrike against an Iraqi citizen, conducted on the 4th of January, 2023. The airstrike, which Maj. Gen. Ryder described as a defensive action and as a “necessary, proportional act,” targeted Mushtaq Taleb al-Saidi, the leader of a militia group that has been listed by the U.S. Department of State as a foreign terrorist organization, called Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HAN or HHN). Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces HAN is a part of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF; i.e., Hashd al-Shaabi in Arabic), although there seems to be some disagreement as to whether the HAN has parted from the PMF, as some news organizations’ reportage lists the two as previously affiliated organizations. For historical context, the PMF is a conglomeration of different tribal militia groups, that operates as a quasi-official Iraqi state security service, despite in reality existing separate from the official Iraqi Security Forces and operating outside of the chain of command. The PMF is known for its particular brutality, having been accused of numerous war crimes [https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/iraq_report_turning_a_blind_eye.pdf?VersionId=3H0IKBfbCIgrLySgghGqAvyaxC8R9zSC], intentionally inflaming sectarian violence, and targeting innocent Sunni Muslim civilians unconnected to the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL; i.e., Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS), for illegal detention, torture, and murder. The PMF has even occasionally been called the new Iraqi Republican Guard, due to its proclivity for grotesque violence, and presumably, as a reference to its lack of obedience to the government’s command structure. The PMF militia units originated as Iranian-backed “Special Groups,” which were Shia Muslim terrorist organizations intent upon carrying out attacks upon United States military forces during the United States’ initial 2003-2011 intervention and occupation within the State of Iraq. Iran’s Quds force, a division of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, was responsible for the proffering of training, weapons, and financing for Shia terrorist organizations in Iraq. Iran, being one of two Shia-majority Muslim nations (Iraq being the other, although the divide is not nearly as cavernous as it is in Iran) and the only Muslim nation in which Shia Muslims have a strong majority, hopes to establish Shia-led states in Sunni-majority nations, believing that Shia-majority or Shia-led states will show loyalty and deference to Iran, as the epicenter of Shia Islam. The Center for Military Modernization sits down for an exclusive interview at the Pentagon with Hon. Gabe Camarillo, Under Secretary of the US Army Warrior Goes to Pentagon to Talk to Army Under Secretary These Shia terrorist “Special Groups,” [https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/] the component militias of the now Iraqi-state recognized PMF, were responsible for thousands of attacks upon U.S. troops in the region. Asaib Ahl al Haq [https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-islamist-proxies], for example, carried out over 6,000 individual terrorist attacks upon U.S.-led coalition forces before the Coalition’s withdrawal in 2011. Perhaps one of the most well-known terrorist acts carried out by Iran’s “Special Groups,” was the abduction [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/03/iraqi_terror_group_f.php] of Issa T. Salomi, a United States’ civilian contractor, by Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq. Of course, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq is now one of the leading militias within the PMF, if not the sole leading militia. Many of these militias seem to take pride in their allegiance to Iran, certainly they do not attempt to conceal their connections to Tehran and the IRGC — Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq [https://www.thedailybeast.com/iraqs-most-fearsome-shia-militia-leader-speaks-out], Kata'ib Hezbollah [https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/e12202f1-7b0b-4f8b-a259-263f4c7331c7] (whose founder [https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/iraq-iran-airstrike-al-muhandis.html] had spent years in exile in Iran, was an Iranian citizen by marriage, a known close-advisor to the commander of the IRGC’s Quds Force Qasem Soleimani, and who had become the deputy commander of the PMF), and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba [https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/03/iraq-shiite-hezbollah-nujaba-victory-islamic-state.html] (the terrorists upon whom the airstrike of January 4th was launched), have all proudly announced their affiliation with Iran. The PMF, like all other Iranian proxies, have served as a tool to advance Iran’s expansionist, destabilizing interests. For example, various PMF militias recruited fighters to intervene during the Syrian Civil War [https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/], to launch attacks in support of the Assad regime, and against the United States as well as the U.S.-backed segments of the Free Syrian Army and other rebel groups. Briefly, it appeared [https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/ATAC-GTD-Terrorist%20Attacks%20on%20US-Coalition%20Supply%20Convoys%20and%20Bases%20in%20Iraq-2023.pdf] as though the United States’ interests in the Middle East might align with those of Iran and its proxies, because both the United States and Iran were committed to defeating ISIL. It is important to note that the United States was opposing ISIL for very different reasons than Iran and its proxies. The United States was opposing ISIL on the grounds that it was an international terrorist organization intent upon sowing chaos, committing horrendous war crimes, and killing American soldiers; Iran and its proxies, ostensibly, were opposing ISIL as an extension of the sectarian conflict between Shia Islam and Sunni (the official faith of ISIL) Islam. It might be interesting to note that, when they weren’t too busy slaughtering each other, both ISIL and the Iranian-proxy “Special Groups” perpetrated terrorist attacks on United States’ and Coalition forces, prior to 2011. Iran’s proxies in the PMF played a significant role in the defeat of ISIL, so much so that the commander of the Combined Joint Task Force - Operation Inherent Resolve (CSTF-OIR), Lt. Gen. Stephen Townsend, even heaped praise upon the PMF, in comments made to The Daily Beast [https://www.thedailybeast.com/top-us-general-two-more-years-to-beat-isis] in 2016, describing the militias as professional and disciplined, as well as remarking that their had been no overt conflict between the PMF and the United States’ troops. Lt. Gen. Townsend seemed to convey the belief that the PMF had the potential to be tentative allies to the United States in the fight against ISIL. With the collapse of ISIL as a common enemy, latent tensions between the Iran-backed PMF began to escalate, exploding forth in 2019 when on May 14th, Kata'ib Hezbollah launched drone attacks [https://ctc.westpoint.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/] upon Saudi Arabian oil infrastructure. In August of 2019, the PMF saddled the United States with the blame [https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/37f6b699-af89-4128-9353-13a6f13ccf5e] for Israeli airstrikes on militia arms depots, and the Iranian-proxy issued a decree, ordering the revenge killing [https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2019/08/iraq-us-israel-pmu.html] of United States’ forces. Iraq & Iran Partnership? This escalation occurred amidst the context of the widespread protests of 2019-2021, against the perceived corruption of the government of Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi, the Prime Minister’s subservience to Iranian interests, high unemployment, poor living conditions, and sectarian politics. These protests were catalyzed by a number of events, most notably, Prime Minister Mahdi’s dismissal of Lt. Gen. Abdul Wahab al-Saadi from his position as the deputy commander of the elite Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS), despite al-Saadi’s status as a national hero for his instrumental role in the defeat of ISIL — a decision which was believed by many to be [about:blank] “a purge of officials seen as unfavorable to Iraq's [Iran-backed] Hashed al-Shaabi paramilitary force [the PMF].” The PMF responded to these protests with violence. The PMF deployed snipers [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-protests-iran-snipers-exclusive-idUSKBN1WW0B1/] against these protesters, and with other forms of excessive force [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/dec/05/pro-iran-militia-supporters-converge-on-baghdad-protests], killed at least 460 protesters and injured over 20,000 within months of the movements inception, earning the vehement criticism [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/10/10/iraq-hrw-denounces-lethal-force-against-protesters-urges-probe] of Human Rights Watch. During the chaos of these protests, on December 27, 2019, Kata'ib Hezbollah launched a rocket attack [https://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/publications/local_attachments/ATAC-GTD-Terrorist%20Attacks%20on%20US-Coalition%20Supply%20Convoys%20and%20Bases%20in%20Iraq-2023.pdf] upon K-1 Airbase, killing a U.S. civilian contractor and injuring four U.S. service members. The United States responded by striking Kata'ib Hezbollah installations, killing 25 PMF militiamen, on December 29, 2019. The Iranian proxies operating within Iraq did eventually find a use for these protesters, who had began a popular political movement that would become the largest in Iraq’s recent history. On December 31, 2019, several PMF militia groups used the protests as cover [https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/12/31/these-pro-iran-militia-leaders-are-rabble-rousing-protesters-us-embassy-baghdad/] to have their militants and supporters storm the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. The former President of the United States responded [https://en.radiofarda.com/a/trump-blames-iran-after-protesters-attack-u-s-embassy-compound-in-iraq-/30354039.html] with threats. Finally, on January 3rd, 2020, the United States conducted an airstrike [https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-quds-force-head-qassem-soleimani-killed-in-baghdad-strike-iraqi-tv/] killing the commander of the IRGC-QF, Qasem Soleimani, as well as the afore-mentioned founder of Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq and deputy commander of the PMF, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis [https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/world/middleeast/iraq-iran-airstrike-al-muhandis.html]. The parliamentary elections of 2021 thrust Iraq into one of the greatest political crises of its history. The Combating Terrorism Center, based at Westpoint, published one of the most extraordinary, perspicacious, and in-depth explorations [https://ctc.westpoint.edu/iraqs-new-regime-change-how-tehran-backed-terrorist-organizations-and-militias-captured-the-iraqi-state/] of this political crisis, providing more information – including lists of PMF militias’ terrorist attacks against the U.S. and allies – than could ever be provided here. During the parliamentary elections of October 2021, allies of Iraq’s most powerful Shia politician, Moqtada al-Sadr outperformed the Iran-proxies’ coalition, winning enough seats to garner decisive influence over the formation of the new Iraqi government. Remember Moqtada al-Sadr? Moqtada al-Sadr, was a former militant and commander of the Mahdi Army, who had waged war against United States’ forces during the initial 2003-2011 occupation of Iraq, and who had run death squads that tortured and killed Sunni civilians Following the United States’ initial withdrawal in 2011, he founded an organization called the Peace Companies, which aided in the fight against ISIL – in particular, they were known for their efforts to protect Shia monuments from ISIL destruction – while also purportedly espousing support for the peaceful coexistence of Sunni, Shia, and Kurds. After the collapse of ISIL, rather than integrating the Peace Companies into the PMF, which was an enemy of the Sadrist movement and often conducted attacks against the Peace Companies, al-Sadr chose to dissolve [https://thearabweekly.com/sadr-suspends-all-armed-factions-including-peace-brigades] the militia, and it has been connected to no known terrorist attacks against U.S. and Coalition forces. Indeed, al-Sadr seems to have partially renounced violence, having encouraged peaceful protests in Iraq, and having even urged [https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/01/08/iran-launches-missile-attack-us-bases-iraq-latest-news/] militants not to attack U.S. forces. Al-Sadr even became the first Shia Muslim leader to call upon [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-syria-sadr-idUSKBN17B070/] Assad to step-down as President of Syria following Assad’s chemical attack upon his own citizens. Certainly, al-Sadr was no friend to the United States, as a populist and a nationalist, and he has called for the expulsion of U.S. troops from Iraq and the closure of the U.S. embassy [https://www.rudaw.net/english/middleeast/iraq/271020231], but in each case he repudiated the militias’ terrorist violence as a tactic. Most importantly, al-Sadr is the only Shia public figure willing to extensively criticize Iranian influence within Iraq. Indeed, al-Sadr repeatedly publicly pledged to dismantle Iran’s power-base, in the proxy militias of the PMF. The 2021 parliamentary election crisis could be seen as the culmination of a worsening trajectory of failures for Iran and its proxies. Sadrists were the second largest political party in the Parliament after the elections in 2014, and they became the largest in both 2018, and 2021. The Sadrists' victories in 2021 were certainly a manifestation of the increasing distrust for Iranian influence within Iraq, which catalyzed the massive political uprisings of 2019-2021. When al-Sadr announced his intent to form a cross-sectarian coalition government of Sadrist Shia, Kurds, and allied Sunnis, thereby cutting out all Iran-proxy parties linked to the Shia PMF militias, the Iran-proxies recognized that this was nothing less than an existential threat. Not only would it exclude Iran’s proxies from the government of Iraq, but it would also create the first real chance of cross-sectarian concordance, seriously undermining the ability of Iran to promote instability by stoking religious violence. The Iran and PMF responded with a coordinated assault upon Iraq’s institutions. The militias began to issue threats against then-PM al-Kadhimi, who was seen by some as leaning Western, and being too friendly with the United States. Just weeks after the election, these Iran-proxies launched a rocket attack on the headquarters of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. On November 7th, these militias launched an assassination attempt upon al-Kadhimi, by attacking his home with explosive drones. What’s more, Iran and its proxies had spent two decades, placing friendly bureaucrats in Iran’s highest institutions, including the Federal Supreme Court of Iraq — now, the time had come to make use of them. One such Iranian plant was the senior judge of the Supreme Court, Faiq Zaydan, who issued a ruling changing the requirements for forming a government from a coalition of a majority of Iraq’s parliament to a coalition of two-thirds of parliament, making it impossible to form a coalition without the Iranian proxies. Iran paired this with a wave of terrorist attacks perpetrated by its proxies, against Kurdish targets, insisting that the attacks would continue unless Kurds abandoned the cross-sectarian coalition. As an act of protest, the entire Sadrist faction of the parliament resigned in June 2022 [https://mepc.org/commentary/timeline-iraqi-political-crisis], apparently in hopes [https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/08/30/iraq-politics-moqtada-al-sadr-protest-election/] that it would force the Iranian-proxy faction to return to the negotiating table. This was a major miscalculation. In control of the legal system of Iraq, and with the support of Iraq’s Constitution, the Iran-proxies moved quickly to fill the vacated seats in the parliament with their loyalists. Al-Sudani was chosen to become Prime Minister with the new majority held by Iran’s proxies; reportedly, al-Sudani was in close contact with the IRGC throughout the entire political crisis, and PMF leaders had boasted – as quoted from the report published by Westpoint’s Combating Terrorism Center – that he was “the guardian of the Shia project.” In January 2023, according to the same report, a militia leader referred to the al-Sudani government as “the muqawama government,” clarifying that “the muqawama has come to represent the official view of Iraq, and it is the one running affairs today.” Immediately after taking power, al-Sudani began the process of purging members of the Iraqi Security Forces and intelligence apparatus that were seen as too friendly to the West, or who were trained by the United States. Horrifyingly, al-Sudani began opened the doors to the country’s elite Counter-Terrorism Command, allowing members of Iran-proxy, IRI-allegiant militias to join that service, effectively replacing qualified anti-terrorism operatives with the terrorists that the organization was designed to bring to justice. It is a cruel and unjust irony. Additionally, any foreign state that wishes to conduct business in Iraq is increasingly forced to funnel trade through IRI officials in the government. Iraqi businessmen are increasingly pressured by the IRI to boycott Western trade and to accept deals with Iran, Russia, and China. These are just a few of the reasons that the authors of the afore-mentioned report, published by Westpoint’s Combating Terrorism Center, concluded: “The result is the emergence of a terrorist-run state [al-Sudani’s Iraq] with greater resources than any of Iran’s other proxy networks, hiding behind the facade of a sovereign country.” Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (the target of this week’s airstrike) declared its allegiance to the Islamic Resistance of Iraq [https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2021/04/iranian-backed-groups-tout-operations-in-iraq.php] (IRI; Al-Muqawama al-Islamiyah fi al-Iraq in Arabic, or the afore-mentioned “muqawama” in short ) in 2020, at the IRI’s inception. The IRI is a burgeoning network of Iran-proxy terrorist groups, affiliated with the PMF, which has only existed for approximately three-and-a-half years. The IRI is supposed to function as an outlet – i.e., as a banner to be used as cover – for terrorist organizations whose beliefs are considered too radical for the PMF, and who wish to take their acts of violence to even greater heights than the PMF banner allows, particularly against U.S. troops in the region. Theoretically, a militia’s allegiance to the IRI, in direct contravention of Iraqi government policy, should preclude that militia from membership in the PMF. However, no evidence has emerged to date, indicating that such is the case. The militias that have declared their loyalty to the IRI have faced no consequences from the Iraqi government; for all intents and purposes, these militias seem to remain as fully legitimate members of the PMF, which is in turn still an officially recognized component of the Iraqi government. On November 7th, 2022, an American citizen, named Stephen Troell, was brutally murdered in the streets of Iraq, purportedly [https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/perpetrators-stephen-troells-killing-baghdad-remain-unknown] as vengeance for the deaths of Qasem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. Troell was volunteering as an English teacher in Baghdad, with the Global English Institute, an NGO which works to teach English in developing and third-world countries. An Iranian and four Iraqi citizens linked to Iranian-proxy militias were arrested [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/9/1/iranian-four-iraqis-jailed-for-life-for-killing-of-us-citizen-in-baghdad] for the crime, nearly a year later, and sentenced to life in prison. Ever since the October 7th, 2023, brutal Hamas terrorist attack against the innocent Israeli people, the IRI has made good on its promise to perpetrate attacks and cruel violence upon the United States troops in the region — as well as upon the United States’ closest partners. On October 24th, The Washington Post reported [https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/10/24/us-troops-attacked-syria-iraq-israel-hamas-gaza/] that, due to the IRI’s numerous attacks upon U.S. troops located at al-Tanf Garrison and Ain al-Assad Airbase, as well as in other locations, 24 U.S. service members had been killed. The Atlantic Council reported [https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/islamic-resistance-in-iraq-israel-hamas/] that, ahead of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s November 5th visit to Iraq, the IRI leveled threats against the Secretary and the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, stating that “Antony Blinken, the son of a Jew, is not welcome in Iraq” and vowing to shut down the U.S. Embassy through violence. Islamic Resistance of Iraq According to The Atlantic Council’s count, by the middle of November, the IRI had conducted 61 separate attacks against U.S. forces in the region. The Atlantic Council also stated that the IRI had conducted an IED attack upon a U.S. and Coalition troop convoy, on November 9th. On November 14, 2023, it was reported [https://en.irna.ir/news/85290799/Iraq-s-al-Nujaba-says-successfully-targeted-Israeli-regime-s] that the IRI, in particular, HAN, has launched a missile attack upon the Israeli port in Eliat. Sheikh Akram al-Kaabi, the Secretary-General of Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, gleefully stated that more “surprises” were on their way, and vowed to ensure that the United States “will never find happiness.” The IRI made no effort to conceal [https://www.newarab.com/news/who-islamic-resistance-iraq] their responsibility for these attacks on U.S. troops, even going so far as to post footage of them, and brag on social media. Tension is growing between China, Taiwan and the U.S. Warrior Maven's Kris Osborn and RoundTable's Rob Nelson discuss the latest news. Full interview at warriormaven.com Warrior Video: When Might China Invade Taiwan? A week later, the United States’ responded to the IRI’s attacks on U.S. troops by striking [https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-november-21-2023] a vehicle operated by the IRI militias. On December 3rd, 2023, the United States conducted an airstrike [https://english.alarabiya.net/News/middle-east/2023/12/03/US-airstrike-kills-five-militia-members-in-Iraq-Sources] on an “imminent threat” [https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-iran-us-strike-kills-five-militants] at a drone staging site for IRI militants, the attack killed five militants who were in the process of launching a one-way drone – as in, kamikaze drones rigged with explosives, designed to attack U.S. forces – which are often Iranian made. Various news organizations affiliated with the IRI identified [https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/overlap-between-islamic-resistance-iraq-and-popular-mobilization-forces] the five slain terrorists as members of the PMF militias. On December 7th, 2023, terrorists initiated a rocket attack on the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. Many presume that PMF militias loyal to the IRI were responsible, especially since they conducted different attacks against U.S. forces on the same day, which they publicly claimed. Interestingly, the government of Iraq publicly admitted [https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/12/14/us-embassy-attackers-linked-to-iraqs-security-services-iraq-pm] that the attackers had connections to the country’s security services, by which they presumably meant the PMF. Finally, after the continued harassment and murder of the United States service members, the Biden Administration launched the airstrike of January 4th, 2024, killing the leader of Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba. Indeed, it is worth noting that, according to an analysis [https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/who-are-nujaba-and-why-did-us-just-strike-them] performed by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, HAN was responsible for approximately 70% of all the recent attacks upon U.S. and Coalition personnel in Iraq and Syria. Now, the Prime Minister of Iraq is attempting to boot U.S forces out of the country. Of course, this is after he has taken [https://www.dvidshub.net/news/318017/isf-soldiers-complete-train-trainer-courses-led-tf-besmaya] more than $3.5 Billion of the weapons and military aid from the United States and other Coalition countries, and this is after the United States-led coalition has trained more than 200,000 of the Iraqi Security Forces’ troops. Reuters correctly notes [https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/three-iran-backed-militia-fighters-killed-baghdad-drone-strike-sources-2024-01-04/] that the Iraqi Prime Minister is facing increasing domestic political pressure form powerful Iran-backed factions, over which PM al-Sudani has very little control. However, Reuters falls short by creating a narrative in which PM al-Sudani appears to be battling, but losing, the fight to control the Iran-proxy PMF. This narrative conveniently forgets that Iran, the PMF, and its political allies are the sole reason that al-Sudani rose to the office of Prime Minister to begin with. It is also important to note [https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2023/06/08/the-iraqi-militias-are-copying-their-overmighty-cousins-in-iran] that, as soon as al-Sudani came to power, at the behest of Iran and with the assistance of the PMF, he purged the government of any remaining pro-American elements, he has cracked down on free speech, targeted his political opponents, further manipulated election law to exclude Independents and anti-PMF figures from elected office, and he has forced Western journalists and academics to leave the country. As always, Iran is able to use the PMF to keep control of Iraq, at the barrel of a gun. When the United States-led Coalition’s combat mission ended [https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iraq-security-adviser-says-international-coalition-ends-combat-mission-no-us-2021-12-09/] in 2021, very little actually changed on the ground in Iraq, as the then-PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi requested that U.S. forces remain to “advise, assist, and enable” the Iraq Security Forces to defend their own country from future strife. Iran and the PMF were the two organizations that brought the greatest pressure to bear, to attempt to force Iraq to expel U.S. troops, and they have since spent the last two years attempting [https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/iran-update-december-27-2023] to bring about that goal. It is essential to understand that, Iran has long held the goal [https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/03/obituaries/qassem-soleimani-dead.html] of vassalizing Iraq following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein; as such, Iran’s foreign policy towards Iraq has been centered upon deliberately fomenting chaos through subversion, and the undermining of the authority of the Iraqi government, in an effort to create a shell-state entirely subject to Iranian authority and manipulation. With al-Sudani as the Iraqi Prime Minister, Iran appears to be succeeding. The U.S. forces in Iraq are the only remaining counterbalance to the solidification of Iranian influence over Iraq, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops would be an irreversible victory for Iran and its chaos-monger proxies. This would be an unmitigated disaster for the future security of the United States’, the broader West’s, and Iraqi national interests. It might also be worth noting that, if the PMF – and in particular, its member militia, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, targeted by the January 4th, 2024, airstrike – are indeed official Iraqi government entities, acting at the behest of Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani, as the PM has vehemently and repeatedly attested is the case, then the murder of U.S. service members by an official Iraqi government militia is undoubtedly casus belli — an act of war. At the very least, if the PMF is an official Iraqi government militia, there is very little reason not to immediately list Iraq, once again, as a State Sponsor of Terror [https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism/] — Iraq will find itself amongst “good company,” should it be re-listed, as it will join its puppet-master, Iran. Finally, with all the respect that he is due, Lt. Gen. Pat Ryder might need to be reminded, before he once again enters the Pentagon Press Briefing Room and calls Iraq “an important and valued partner,” that if aiding the “Defeat ISIS” mission is sufficient to earn a state the title of U.S. partner, a whole lot of our nation’s enemies are about to become our friends. Russia [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/16/russia-islamic-state-syria-assad-forces-recapture-town-okeirbat] fought ISIL and at one time the United States considered partnering [https://gallagher.house.gov/media/columns/resist-temptation-trying-defeat-isis-partnering-russia] with Russia towards that end. Syrian totalitarian dictator Assad, who has launched chemical weapon attacks upon his own people, fought [https://www.brookings.edu/articles/after-7-years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next-for-washington/] ISIL. Iran fought [https://www.brookings.edu/articles/after-7-years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next-for-washington/] ISIL. Hezbollah fought [https://www.brookings.edu/articles/after-7-years-of-war-assad-has-won-in-syria-whats-next-for-washington/] ISIL. Are Russia, Assad’s Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah about to be named “important and valued partner[s]” of the United States? Iraqi Prime Minister al-Sudani has gone to great lengths to make it clear that he is no friend of the United States. Should he continue to harbor terrorists, encourage attacks upon United States’ forces, and stand in the way of the development of a stable, peaceful, free Iraq, the United States’ should stand firm in its commitment to defend the Iraqi people, and meet al-Sudani with the same hostility with which he has treated the United States and its allies. Williams is a writer and researcher currently studying at the University of Connecticut
