By Olawale Abaire, Warrior Editorial Fellow The United States Navy is grappling with significant strategic challenges as it attempts to augment its surface fleet's missile capacity amidst ongoing delays and technical redesigns of the future Constellation class frigates. The Congress has mandated a study into alternative approaches to bolstering missile launch capabilities, either through the procurement of a new class of small, missile-laden warships or by retrofitting existing vessels with additional launch systems. This directive, articulated in a report accompanying the draft of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2025 [https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/press-releases/reed-and-wicker-file-fiscal-year-2025-national-defense-authorization-act], underscores the legislative concern over a potential decline in the Navy's battle force ship count and the overall VLS capacity forecasted through 2027. The critical backdrop to this decision is the delayed delivery of the Constellation class frigates, such as the future USS Constellation and USS Congress, which are now expected to enter service years behind their original schedule. According to a recent report by The War Zone News [https://www.twz.com/sea/navy-to-explore-arming-other-ships-with-missiles-amid-constellation-frigate-woes], the U.S. Navy has plans to integrate 32 vertical launch system (VLS) cells in these frigates, yet this specification has been the subject of intense scrutiny regarding its adequacy for projected mission requirements. This ongoing issue, compounded by the broader geostrategic challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China’s naval expansion, has driven the Senate Armed Services Committee to advocate for a "highly producible small surface combatant study." B1-b Bomber Final 6_26 The underlying critique from the Senate Armed Services Committee emphasizes not only the delays in the frigate program but also the potential underestimation of medium-term capacity requirements by the Navy. This has led to suggestions of leveraging more immediate solutions such as converting existing platforms or accelerating other programs like the LUSV [https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45757.pdf]. Additionally, the concept of integrating missile systems on non-traditional combat vessels is not without precedent but poses considerable challenges. For instance, retrofitting auxiliary or commercial ships with complex missile systems such as the Mk 41 VLS or containerized launchers like the Mk 70 involves significant alterations in ship design to accommodate the weight, balance, and operational requirements of these systems. Such modifications can impact the vessel’s survivability, operational capabilities, and maintenance demands. Comparatively, platforms like the Flight III Arleigh Burke class destroyers [https://warriormaven.com/sea/ddg-51-flight-iii-destroyersaegis-baseline-10-an-spy-6-v1] and the forthcoming DDG(X) are designed from the keel up to integrate advanced weapon systems, including substantial VLS arrays. These ships are expected to mitigate the loss of VLS capacity from retiring Ticonderoga class cruisers and Ohio class guided missile submarines, which are approaching the end of their service lives. The push to diversify the Navy’s missile launch options aligns with modern military policies emphasizing distributed lethality and network-centric warfare. However, the integration of such systems must be meticulously planned to ensure that these platforms can effectively communicate and coordinate within the broader tactical network. Ultimately, the Navy's approach to expanding its missile launch capabilities will have to balance urgency with practicality. While the integration of advanced systems onto existing platforms offers a quicker path to enhanced firepower, the long-term solution likely involves a combination of sustaining current capabilities with Arleigh Burkes and DDG(X)s, and innovating with new designs like the LUSV and potentially other classes of small surface combatants. This strategy must also consider the evolving threat landscape, particularly in key regions such as the Indo-Pacific, where the balance of naval power is critical to maintaining U.S. strategic interests.
