By Logan Williams, Warrior Editorial Fellow In a future full-scale, near-peer war against the People’s Republic of China, the United States’ battle for air dominance is likely to be hard fought, and if it is won, it could be at an exceptionally high cost, depending upon the range and technological maturity of advanced Chinese air defenses. Without long periods of uncontested air dominance for the United States, its' aerial refueling capabilities will be at significant risk, something which adds challenges to any US ability to penetrate into enemy airspace. As the F-35 platforms operate with a combat radius nearing – but, remaining just under – 1,000 miles, and as the United States' fourth-generation fighter aircraft operate with an even more limited combat radius, aerial refueling would be critical in any engagement in the Pacific. This would increase dwell time and place critical PRC targets more easily within reach of 5th-generation aircraft launching from US and Japanese warships or taking off from land-bases in Japan, South Korea, Guam and the Philippines. However, are existing US refuelers survivable enough to perform their necessary mission in an conflict with China? There have been intimations about the creation of a true “stealth” aerial refueling tanker, for over a decade. In January 2023, the Pentagon reached out [https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/aviation/a42941315/next-generation-air-refueling-system/] to industry experts, seeking information about the potential for “Next Generation Air Refueling Systems (NGAS).” Of course, no finalized designs or significant details have emerged, as of yet. What would happen in a US-China airwar without the US operating stealthy refuelers? In one particular worst-case scenario, detailed in a thesis published by the Marine Corps University, it is postulated that the Chinese anti-access/areal denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This scenario postulates that China would be able to effectively completely exclude U.S. aircraft from penetrating the first island chain (includes the entirety of the South China Sea, Taiwan, Okinawa, and likely South Korea, but excludes the Philippines), and China would successfully establish an FEZ (fighter engagement zone) that extends to the second island chain (including the Philippines, the Mariana Islands, Guam, and Japan extending from Tokyo, south). This worst-case scenario also hinges upon the assumption that China's A2/D2 capabilities will inhibit, or completely restrict, the entrance of the United States' naval aircraft carriers into the South China Sea. Furthermore, this worst-case also presumes that the risk of continued bombardment of United States' airfields close to Taiwan will discourage, or prevent, these airfields' continued utilization — as in, this paper makes the reasonable assumption that China's bombardment would not be "one-and-done" so-to-speak, but rather, that it would be a recurring and vexing threat. Tension is growing between China, Taiwan and the U.S. Warrior Maven's Kris Osborn and RoundTable's Rob Nelson discuss the latest news. Full interview at warriormaven.com Warrior Video Analyzes China Threat to Taiwan Presuming that – as stated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in their recent wargame [https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?VersionId=WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ] of a war between the United States and China – China chooses to decimate United States’ and allies’ airfields with aerial bombardment (CSIS states that 90% of aircraft attrition was due to destruction on the ground, from such bombardment), the surviving U.S. airfield nearest to Taiwan, in this worst-case scenario, would be Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture — at the northernmost edge of Japan. Aomori is approximately 1650 miles from Taiwan. Tankers too Vulnerable? Given these variables, the United States’ aerial refueling tankers might be too vulnerable to fly near enough to the combat zone to support the fighter jets that are so crucial to the war effort. The United States is making efforts to solve this problem. For example, the USAF has attempted to purchase the KC-46 Pegasus [https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104537/kc-46a-pegasus/] as the first step in shoring up the air-to-air refueling dominance that has begun to degrade with the branch’s aging fleet. However, only about 70 of these aircraft have been received. The KC-46 is eventually supposed to be upgraded [https://www.voanews.com/a/us-military-laser-defense/4576159.html] to include some self-defense capabilities, although as of yet, this does not seem to have occurred. Additionally, while the KC-46 has some features intended to reduce its radar signature, it could not be considered a stealth aircraft [https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2023/04/27/air-force-plan-for-an-indo-pac-tanker-will-transform-the-aerial-refueling-fleet/?sh=1404f41c4808]. In all likelihood, the KC-46 likely just presents a slightly newer, far more expensive, easy target. The U.S. Navy has also adopted a brand new unmanned aerial refueling vehicle, called the MQ-25 Stingray, which is just over half the size of a traditional refueling tanker, with a length of over 70 feet and a wingspan of approximately fifty feet. However, the MQ-25 Stingray seems to be just another aerial refueler designed to operate in a low-threat environment, or uncontested airspace. Naturally, due to the MQ-25’s reduced size, it will have a reduced radar signature. However, the Pentagon seems to have decided that “stealth” was not a requirement for this unmanned refueler. In fact, reportedly [https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/grading-the-mq-25/], Lockheed Martin received specific instructions during the development stage, stating that “no credit will be given for the ability to evolve to a stealthy survivable design.” The result is an aerial refueler that becomes unsurvivable the moment that it ventures away from the immediate airspace that falls within the reach of the host aircraft carrier’s defenses, as the drone is unable to defend itself. Effectively, this refueling UAV is fixed to a 100-mile radius around an aircraft carrier, and thus, is not the most useful piece of technology. Additionally, the UAV’s 14,000 lbs of fuel capacity is sufficient to refuel two F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, but less than the requisite amount of fuel for the refilling of two F-35s. Quite the opposite of revolutionizing the United States’ air-to-air refueling capability, the MQ-25 is the Pentagon’s defense-industrial equivalent of dipping their toe in the unmanned vehicle water. Next Generation Air Refueler The most that has been made public about this Next-Gen Aerial Refueler is that Northrop Grumman – the defense contractor behind the infamous and iconic B-2 “Spirit” stealth bomber and the new, cutting-edge B-21 “Raider” stealth bomber – has presented a blended-wing body (BWB) design, which has also been suggested as a potential cargo/airlifter design. This BWB aircraft reduces the airframe’s radar cross-section by minimizing [https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-does-americas-b-2-spirit-bomber-evade-radar-182078] the amount of flat and vertical surface area that could reflect radar signals back towards a receiver. This blended-wing design is also supposed [https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-blended-wing-body-tanker-jetzero/] to lead to an aircraft that is half the empty weight of the KC-135, and which requires half the power to get airborne. This potentially opens up an array of possibilities for the United States Air Force, such as taking off and landing from shorter airstrips, which is an essential capability in the Indo-Pacific, a region where the United States is starved for land-basing opportunities. Most importantly, the next-gen tanker is supposed to be up to 30% more fuel efficient, due to its aerodynamic design. There has been some discussion [https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-launches-new-stealthy-tanker-program-with-delivery-projected-for-2040/] of adding some additional stealth features to the KC-46 Pegasus to create a so-called “bridge tanker,” as a stop-gap measure, as the Pentagon waits for industry to develop a legitimate stealth aerial refueling tanker, which is predicted to occur in the 2040s. Now, Western intelligence still predicts [https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/apr/21/taiwan-foreign-minister-warns-of-conflict-with-china-in-2027] that China will move against Taiwan by 2027, so the notional NGAS is not going to be much help. As is often the case with the Pentagon, this is tomorrow’s solution to today’s problem, the defense experts have yet to come up with a solution that can be implemented in time to be relevant. Not only is the United States’ aerial tanker fleet aging, however, but it is decreasing as well. During the Vietnam War, the United States operated over 600 aerial refueling tankers, 30% (196) of which were deployed [https://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/Visit/Museum-Exhibits/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/196003/tankers-at-war-air-refueling-in-southeast-asia/] for missions within the Vietnam area of operations (AO). The USAF’s tanker fleet has shrunk [https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/06/got-fuel-fixing-us-militarys-aerial-refueling-architecture/368345/] from a high of over 700 to approximately 470. Today, the 193 tankers deemed necessary for the Vietnam War, a much smaller conflict than would likely develop against the PRC, would equal nearly half of the United States’ tanker fleet, and the USAF is still retiring legacy tankers at a rate much faster than they can be replaced. Additionally, the USAF has petitioned [https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/06/01/us-air-force-wants-to-lower-the-number-of-tankers-required-in-its-fleet/] Congress to permit the branch to degrade the United States’ aerial refueling capability even further, by reducing the number of tankers in the fleet to 455. Thus, without the possibility of a drastically improved air-to-air refueling capability, the United States Air Force is at significant risk of losing its ability to perform effectively in hostile environments, particularly on missions which require long-haul flights, deep into contested airspace. -Warrior President Kris Osborn Contributed to this story Logan Williams currently studies at the University of Connecticut. He is an International Affairs Researcher; Work Published in Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals, Such As: Geopolitics Magazine, Modern Diplomacy, Tufts University's The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Democracy Paradox, Diario Las Américas, International Affairs Forum, Fair Observer, History Is Now Magazine, UNC at Chapel Hill's American Diplomacy, The Center for Military Modernization's Warrior Maven Magazine,
