by Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization (Washington DC) Russia’s Navy was poorly positioned to assert itself as a major global force years before its war with Ukraine [https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2023/02/europe/russia-ukraine-war-timeline/index.html]. Developments since the Kremlin began its invasion, would suggest this is even more true now. For Putin, it seems the Russian Navy does indeed look like a ‘sinking ship’ in every sense of the word. UKRAINE HOLDS STRONG AGAINST NAVAL ATTACK Ukraine has demonstrated an ability to target and destroy Russian surface ships [https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/29/russias-black-sea-fleet-stuck-struck-and-sinking-00054114] from the coastline, and beyond an initial amphibious incursion into Odesa [https://news.usni.org/2022/03/04/u-s-officials-russian-forces-keeping-forces-ashore-for-now-odesa-amphibious-assault-still-possible], the Russian Navy has not presented Ukraine with any kind of serious naval threat. While some might wonder just how much Russia can rebuild its Navy following the war with Ukraine, the Russian Navy was not much of a threat to begin with. This challenge is not only complicated by the many problems associated with Russia’s damaged and now docked single aircraft carrier [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/02/admiral-kuznetsov-is-russias-only-aircraft-ever-going-to-sail-again/], but also evidenced in its inability to project power into Ukraine from the ocean in any impactful way [https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64975766]. Despite this reality, there are nevertheless still several significant threats presented by the Russian Navy, including its growing fleet of technologically advanced submarines [https://www.newsweek.com/us-nuclear-submarine-fleet-russia-comparison-1786023] and the emerging ability of its surface warships to fire hypersonic weapons [https://www.cnn.com/2023/01/05/europe/russia-warship-hypersonic-missile-deployed-intl-hnk-ml/index.html]. For example, the Russian Navy is up gunning, modernizing, and revamping some of its massive, yet somewhat antiquated Cold War-era battle cruisers [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/05/putin-has-a-problem-the-russian-navys-battlecruisers-are-dying/] by adding advanced interceptor missiles, close-in ship defenses, upgraded ship-integrated longer-range air defenses, and even hypersonic weapons [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/01/russia-is-getting-a-new-warship-armed-with-hypersonic-missiles/]. Should Russia truly be arming its upgraded 1980s battle cruiser, the Admiral Nakhimov [https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/scrapping-could-be-next-russias-nuclear-powered-battle-cruiser], with up to 60 hypersonic missiles, then many NATO countries and the U.S. could face a massive and potentially unparalleled threat. Russian Naval Threat Beyond Ukraine Arming a battle cruiser with hypersonic missiles would be a substantial step forward when it comes to changing and upgrading the offensive firepower [https://warriormaven.com/russia-ukraine/russias-lone-aircraft-carrier-corroded-destined-for-boneyard] of the 1980s-era Russian battlecruiser Admiral Nakhimov [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/04/russian-navy-nightmare-will-putin-scrap-a-rare-nuclear-battlecruiser/]. An interesting article in Forbes magazine says the Russian ship is “almost as large as the Iowa-class” battlecruisers and would well become the “most powerful surface combatant in the world.” Carrier Survivability What might make it so powerful? Depending upon the scope of the upgrades, and particularly the extent to which they increasingly incorporate high-speed computer processing, long-range sensor networking, and new “fire control.” Should these systems be brought into the modern era, then an upgraded heavily armed ship would indeed present a massive threat to U.S. and NATO forces. The Admiral Nakhimov is being upgraded with a number of weapons such as Russia’s S-300 [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/03/russia-is-the-only-navy-with-deadly-battlecruisers-they-might-be-junk/] type anti-aircraft defenses, land-attack missiles, AK 192 guns, close-in defenses, and new anti-submarine weapons. UPGRADE OR SCRAP? The large Russian battlecruiser is also armed with a host of additional weapons, according to the Forbes report, which says the Admiral Nakhimov’s “carrier killer” missiles include 20 large Granite supersonic missiles [https://en.missilery.info/missile/granit]. The ship is also armed with 40 9K33 Osa short-range missiles [https://www.army-technology.com/projects/9k33-osa-air-defence-missile-system-russia/] and as many as 96 S-300 long-range missiles. Also of significant importance, the ship is armed with a Kashtan [https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17233/russia-to-begin-testing-its-fearsome-new-pantsir-me-naval-close-in-defensive-system] close-in weapons system, armed with Gatling guns and eight 9M322 short-range missiles. Could the Russian battlecruisers be upgraded long-range missile rival the U.S. Tomahawks [https://warriormaven.com/search?query=Tomahawks]? Is the Russian close-in weapons system (CIWS) comparable to the U.S. Navy’s upgraded weapons, which fire a Phalanx close-in weapon [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/05/5-ways-china-could-sink-a-u-s-navy-aircraft-carrier/] to take out incoming small boats, drones, explosives, or other kinds of close-in threats? As part of an integrated system of defenses, many Navy ships are also armed with deck-launched interceptor missiles for medium to short-range attacks, such as SeaRAM [https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2167555/searam-close-in-weapon-system-ciws-anti-ship-missile-defense-system/] and Rolling Airframe Missiles [https://www.seaforces.org/wpnsys/SURFACE/Mk-49-missile-launcher.htm]. Finally, both a U.S. Navy destroyer [https://warriormaven.com/sea/u-s-navy-keeps-80-destroyers-ready-for-war] and an upgraded Russian battlecruiser would operate with drones and helicopters able to conduct reconnaissance, hunt submarines, and even lead forward attacks on the ocean. While a navy destroyer would be smaller than a large, modernized Russian battlecruiser, its high-tech weaponry may give it a distinct advantage in any kind of open or “blue-water” maritime warfare engagement. This would likely depend upon the performance and relative technological capacity of the upgraded weapons. The U.S. has been massively upgrading Tomahawks, SM-6 missiles, CIWS, and SeaRAMs with extended range, an ability to hit moving targets at sea, and the new generation of guidance systems. Clearly, it would be critical to have an understanding of the state of relative sophistication of these Russian weapons and, perhaps to an even more significant degree, how well are they networked with other ships, drones, or even submarines coming to the surface for networked connectivity. Russia’s submarines, by contrast, are known to be both extremely advanced and threatening to U.S. and NATO land and naval forces. However, the country’s inability to mount and project any real kind of surface Naval warfighting power will place massive limitations on the kinds of missions it can accomplish. REVIVING A CURSED AND OUTDATED CARRIER The story of Russia’s lone aircraft carrier [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/02/admiral-kuznetsov-is-russias-only-aircraft-ever-going-to-sail-again/] is almost as confusing as it is complex, given the condition of the ship [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/02/admiral-kuznetsov-russias-last-aircraft-carrier-is-on-the-brink/], future prognosis [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/04/admiral-kuznetsov-why-russia-should-scrap-its-last-aircraft-carrier/] and strategic implications for Russia’s military posture. The Admiral Kuznetsov [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/01/admiral-kuznetsov-russias-only-aircraft-carrier-looks-dead/] carrier has been in drydock since 2018 for extensive repairs and re-fitting for continued service and is reportedly slated to return to service next year. The ship, which first launched in 1985, began as part of the Soviet Navy as a first step in a plan to deploy a two-carrier fleet. However, the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 90s derailed plans to complete a second carrier. As a result, the would-be Varyag carrier [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/05/russia-wants-to-buy-back-its-old-aircraft-carrier-from-china/] was sold to China and became China’s first carrier, called the Lioaning [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2023/04/chinas-aircraft-carrier-fleet-what-do-we-know-about-it/]. Russia never completed and deployed its second carrier but instead helped the People’s Liberation Navy jump-start a massive Naval expansion. Not only did Russian plans for the fleet implode, the Admiral Kuznetsov itself appears to have encountered extremely significant maintenance and functionality challenges. The ship has already been in drydock for as long as five years, and recent news reports say the damage and corrosion to the carrier involves extreme erosion of its metal structures. 5-15-23 Navy Read Pravda.com reports that Russia’s only carrier will not be in a condition where it can return to deployment. “Ship repairmen warned the military that the condition of Admiral Kuznetsov does not allow it to be deployed due to the high probability that it would sink or capsize. During the examination, it was revealed that the metal structures below the third deck of the ship were significantly corroded. The holds are filled with muddy water, which makes it impossible to examine the ship in detail from the inside,” the Pravda paper states [https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/01/9/7384073/].https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/01/9/7384073/ The paper says Russian weapons developers have been beset with infighting and blaming various decision-makers instead of focusing more sharply on fully preparing the aircraft carrier to return. The Admiral Kznetsov has been experiencing additional problems beyond its serious corrosion and damage. The repair process has been hampered by several extremely problematic accidents [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/12/russias-only-aircraft-carrier-could-make-a-comeback/]. In 2019 there was an engine-room fire [https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/12/russia-has-only-one-aircraft-carrier-and-its-on-fire-again/] on the carrier, which resulted in one death and several injuries. The return timeline, therefore, has been adjusted or modified a few times to extend the ship’s anticipated return to 2024. Russia plans to deploy and sail the ship for another 15 years after its return to service, however that seems to very much be in question. Problems with Russia’s carrier seem to align with other significant tactical and strategic nuances. To what extent does Russia truly wish to deploy a Navy that is substantial and lethal enough to project power beyond its borders? It seems extremely unlikely that the Russian Navy can position itself to be a large, influential global Naval power. That requires more of a U.S.-like fleet of multiple carriers. China is fast-tracking [https://warriormaven.com/china/chinas-navy-is-larger-than-the-us-navy-but-is-it-better] its ability to compete with the U.S. in this fashion. Is it realistic and even being pursued by Russia? Perhaps not, however there are clear reasons why Russia would want a carrier if even for regional or limited purposes. Should the carrier return to service with any carrier air wing, it might position Russia to hold NATO allies along the Black Sea [https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2018/05/25/the-black-sea-region-a-critical-intersection/index.html] at risk of attack and also defend its airspace from the ocean. Russia clearly appears to have regional ambitions in the Black Sea [https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/07/black-sea-war-geopolitics-russia-ukraine-nato/], which includes coastal borders from Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey, among others. Of course Russia and Ukraine border the Black Sea as well, and the U.S. is known to at times operate warships in international waters in the area. An ability to launch cruise missiles or fighter jets from offshore does present a credible threat to Ukraine and other NATO allies, something which likely explains why Ukraine has had some success destroying Russian warships with land-fired missiles. RUSSIA’S ARCTIC PUSH The other significant concern likely relates to Russia’s Northern Sea Route [https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/russias-northern-sea-route-sees-more-traffic-despite-war-and-sanctions] and Arctic ambitions [https://www.diplomaticourier.com/posts/a-reality-check-on-russias-arctic-ambitions]. In recent years, Russia has been adding assets, bases, and force concentrations in the Arctic in what appears to be a clear, focused effort to massively expand influence. Not only does the Northern Sea Route along Russia’s borders enable direct and achievable access to the Arctic region, but Russia is known to operate a high-number of ice-breakers able to support carrier travel. Russia likely knows that if it wishes to truly establish and defend its Arctic presence, something of enormous strategic, geopolitical and tactical advantage, it may need a carrier presence in the region as well. Overall, Russia’s Navy is not only smaller but also believed by many observers to be limited in its ability to attack ocean and land targets from surface ships. Should Russia have budget flexibility and industrial capacity, it seems there are a number of key areas where its posture might benefit greatly from the presence of more aircraft carriers. Kris Osborn [https://warriormaven.com/author/krisosborn] is the Military Affairs Editor of 19FortyFive and President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
