By Ken Allen — Former Air Force Officer & Assistant Air Attache, US Embassy Beijing & Warrior Maven Senior Long-Term China Military Analyst
This report was first published in 2021 by Air University’s China Aerospace Studies Institute
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2018-05-01%20PLAAF%20Key%20Training%20Brands.pdf
By Jana Allen and Kenneth Allen
Introduction —– The PLA Air Force’s Four Key Training Brands
Guided by its service-specific strategy to “integrate air and space and be simultaneously prepared for offensive and defensive operations,” which was approved in 20041 , the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force (PLAAF) is pursuing an ambitious path of modernization to transform itself from an inward focused homeland air defense force to a world-class “strategic air force” 2 capable of playing a decisive role in China’s national security and military strategy.
To this end, over the past decade the PLAAF has fielded increasingly modern and more capable equipment and weapon systems. Its likelihood to achieve victory, however, in informatized, high-intensity combat in a complex electromagnetic environment (CEME) is contingent on more than equipment modernization.
Success in modern warfare also necessitates highly trained personnel who can adapt to tactical scenarios in a combat environment and perform sustained combat operations at their home bases and in deployed locations. After taking power in late 2012, Chinese President and Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Xi Jinping put forth a vision for building a strong China, known as the “Chinese Dream” (中国梦). The modernization of China’s military is essential to the success of this strategy, as a strong PLA is viewed as a prerequisite for “building a well-off society” and “rejuvenating the Chinese nation.”4
In April 2014, Xi urged the PLAAF to speed up its transformation into a strong air power with an integrated air and space capability, emphasizing that the PLAAF must focus on training that boosts combat capability.5 Xi’s remarks allude to the difficulty of developing a truly combat-capable force, a longstanding challenge for the PLAAF. Indeed, historically PLAAF training was characterized by highly scripted scenarios that did not reflect the realities of modern combat.
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“.Jana Allen is a Former Lt Col in the USAF Reserve and a CASI Associate. She is now the Director of Staff, Air Force District of Washington (AFDW), Joint Base Andrews, Md.
Kenneth Allen is the Former Research Director for CASI and a retired USAF Officer. He has focused on China and PLA issues for years and has published extensively on the subject.”
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Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute
The PLAAF’s desire to advance its strategic transformation through qualitative changes is evidenced by its development of what it calls the “four key training brands”6 (四大品牌).7
These include: the Golden Helmet (金头盔) military competition; the Golden Dart (金飞镖) military competition; the Blue Shield (蓝 盾) exercise, which includes the Golden Shield (金盾) competition; and the Red Sword (红剑) exercise.8
This report provides an overview of these annual training events, which are described by the PLAAF as its “four main actual-combat oriented training series.”9
The four key training brands increasingly serve as an important platform to test and further develop the PLAAF’s operational capabilities, and also present an opportunity to assess the PLAAF’s progress toward becoming a modern “strategic air force.” Although they cannot be considered impartial sources, the frequent reports in Chinese media and commentary by key personnel and military experts about these annual training events provide some insight on PLAAF developments.
In 2016 and 2017, Chinese official media published several reports detailing the success of the four key training brands, which form the basis for this report. The official PLAAF newspaper, Air Force News (空军报), is an especially useful source of reporting on PLAAF training. Its more official descriptions and commentaries provide a starting point for analysis of the four key training brands, despite the lack of transparency regarding some details.
These training events have evolved in complexity as the PLAAF took concrete steps to reduce the gap between training scenarios and what is expected under actual-combat conditions. Key observations on the four key training events include: • The primary focus of the four key training brands is on preparing for actual combat under unknown (unscripted) conditions in a CEME. The PLAAF has gradually increased the complexity of each of the four key training brands since their inception and will likely continue to include more complex components in the future, as it moves incrementally toward completely unscripted training. •
******** Video Published by Center for Military Modernization***********
The competitions and exercises conducted under the four key training brands provide a platform for the PLAAF to assess existing tactics and combat methods and to make recommendations for adjustments or creating new ones. They are also used to help the PLAAF identify shortcomings in equipment and pilot capabilities.
The PLAAF is taking concrete steps, albeit incremental, to raise training to the next level. This has likely led to a corresponding increase in capabilities, such as improved pilot autonomy. The PLA Air Force’s Four Key Training Brands • Evaluation criteria for the four key training brands were developed to emphasize the actual effects of each engagement rather than simply focusing on scores and who wins. Furthermore, evaluation criteria are intended to guide the forces toward studying “real enemies” and identifying areas of weakness. This indicates the PLAAF is making some progress toward providing personnel with accurate and impartial feedback, which it has been hesitant to do in the past.
As a deputy chief of staff of an Eastern Theater Command Air Force (TCAF) air regiment noted in 2016, “The real point of Golden Helmet is not to rack up glories for the unit, but to uncover and fix mistakes.”10 •
Overall, the PLAAF is increasingly including key components of the surface-to-air missile (SAM) and radar branches, and communications specialty units, as well as each component of the aviation branch, including fighter, attack, bomber, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), refueling, and airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, in these competition and exercise events. Of note, however, no references have been found to the antiaircraft artillery (AAA) branch or the airborne branch. •
Although the overall number of individual components in each event is growing, there were no reports found in Chinese media of multiple aircraft, SAMs, and radar units training together in a joint engagement zone ( JEZ). For example, although fighter and SAM units train separately on a regular basis against “enemy” aircraft, no information was found concern
ing any training that involves a PLAAF aircraft taking off, being vectored to an air engagement by a controller in the control tower or an airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft, engaging an “enemy” aircraft, and then having a SAM fire at the “enemy” aircraft at the same time that the PLAAF aircraft is in the air.
Furthermore, although the PLAAF has official definitions for a missile engagement zone (MEZ) and a fighter engagement zone (FEZ), it does not appear to define a JEZ, where aircraft and SAMs engage the enemy in the same airspace (see Appendix A). • The four key training brands are developed by and for the PLAAF.
As such, they focus on honing PLAAF core competencies, rather than joint interoperability. The one exception was in 2017, when three Naval Aviation pilots from the South Sea Fleet (SSF) air brigade participated in the Golden Helmet competition for the first time.11 They did not win any awards; however, their inclusion provided an opportunity for valuable individual and joint training, and may be an indication of more to come.
Chinese Aerospace Studies Institute — Air University
Although the Dingxin Test and Training Base in the Gobi Desert in Gansu Province has been the primary location for the four key training brands, some events have taken place in Eastern China, the Bohai Gulf, and over water off the east coast of China. •
The PLAAF has given personnel who excelled during the four key training brands opportunities to participate in international military competitions, such as Aviadarts.12 This competition was held in Russia from 2014 to 2016 and in China in 2017.
Full Text of the Study HERE
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAAF/2018-05-01%20PLAAF%20Key%20Training%20Brands.pdf
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“.Jana Allen is a Former Lt Col in the USAF Reserve and a CASI Associate. She is now the Director of Staff, Air Force District of Washington (AFDW), Joint Base Andrews, Md.
Kenneth Allen is the Former Research Director for CASI and a retired USAF Officer. He has focused on China and PLA issues for years and has published extensively on the subject.”
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