By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
(Washington D.C.) The Chinese military and the PRC’s state-backed newspapers regularly hype and test fire their now quite famous “carrier killer” anti-ship missiles, weapons ostensibly capable of destroying aircraft carriers with precision-guided firepower from distances as far as 2,000 miles off shore.
The existence of these weapons, called DF-21D and DF-26, played a major role in the US development of its Anti-Access/Area-Denial combat strategy, an effort which sought to ensure carriers projected power and could still attack and destroy enemy targets from farther distances in a very high-threat environment. This was thought to be the entire point of China’s A2/AD thinking, meaning far-reaching precise anti-ship missiles could prevent carriers from operating close enough to sufficiently project power from the sea.
The question as to whether long-range precision Chinese and Iranian anti-ship missiles make aircraft carriers obsolete and simply too vulnerable to operate is cited so often that it has almost become somewhat of a cliche. However the claim is as commonly mentioned as it is inaccurate, as the suggestion that carriers are too vulnerable to operate in that kind of threat environment lacks critical context and arguably ignores impactful variables.
Yes, the existence of anti-access/area-denial weapons with range and precision sufficient to threaten carriers 1,000 or 2,000 miles off shore presents a dilemma the Pentagon has likely been taking quite seriously. Upon initial examination, it might appear that such threats would potentially force carriers to operate beyond the ranges from which its aircraft can project power and attack land targets, yet there are other essential elements to this equation.
The Marine Corps has of course been arming its growing fleet of WASP-and-America-class amphibious assault ships with the 5th-generation, vertical-take-off F-35B. This brings mobile 5th-generation air power to smaller, mobile platforms such as amphibs to complement carrier attack or move places less accessible to carriers. America-class amphibs, for example, can deploy with as many as 13-to-15 F-35Bs, so there is little question that they can bring additional power-projection versatility to maritime warfare. However, there is arguably still very much of a need for big-deck carriers to, among other things, “mass” power for larger-air campaigns by utilizing a large Carrier Air Wing increasingly powered by big-deck carriers such as the Ford-class. In a large-scaled great power engagement, the Navy will need to “mass” air power across a wide envelope to secure air superiority, which is likely why the service conducted “dual-carrier” operations last year in the Pacific. Improved networking and command and control technology enabled two big-deck carriers to launch, coordinate and deconflict massive numbers of sea-launched attack and reconnaissance platforms.
The pressing question is, despite the threat, the hype and chorus of concern …. do these Chinese weapons make carriers obsolete? It seems, at the moment, that the answer is no for technological, tactical and strategic reasons. By adjusting concepts of operation, leveraging advanced networking and manned-unmanned teaming and integrated new innovations critical to layered ship defenses, it seems the need for the US Navy to sustain its massive carrier advantage is not going anywhere soon. This is particularly true given the pace at which China is adding new carriers, as it is now progressing quickly with its third aircraft carrier and voicing plans to build many more.
Part of this equation also pertains to the Navy’s fast-growing ability to “network” surface ships with air-assets, satellites and large fleet of unmanned systems in position to conduct forward reconnaissance, search for and attack mines and submarines and identify lower-threat areas for carriers to operate. Using AI-enabled computing and multi-domain networking through programs such as Project Overmatch, the Navy can now gather, organize and distribute time sensitive critical combat information across an integrated, mesh network of “platforms” and “nodes” in position to fast-track target and threat information across domains.
Aircraft Carrier Survivability
There are several lesser or underrecognized elements of aircraft carrier survivability which have been evolving quickly with US Navy weapons developers, scientists and innovators, such as new “layered” carrier defenses and the emergence of the unmanned MQ-25 Stingray carrier-launched refueler drone. The carrier-launched Stingray drone can enable deck-launched aircraft to essentially double their combat radius and be refueled in flight to extend air attack ranges.
Without having to risk a large, non-stealthy manned tanker aircraft, jets can be refueled in flight such that they can have much longer dwell time over targets or are simply able to reach targets from much greater distances. In a tactical sense, what this means is carriers can operate and still project power from safer standoff ranges beyond where Chinese and Iranian missiles can reach. The existence of the MQ-25 Stingray offers a way the US Navy can respond to and potentially overcome China or Iran’s often discussed anti-access/area-denial strategy.
The other reason for continued carrier relevance relates to the fact that, beneath the clamor of discussion about China’s anti-ship “carrier killer” missiles, the US Navy has … if somewhat quietly … been breaking through with advanced carrier and ship defenses. Much of the details of this is likely not available for security reasons, yet senior service leaders regularly talk about the fast-growing advantages of ship-integrated EW, laser weapons and enhanced radar detection systems. Ships in a Carrier Strike Group, such as destroyers and cruisers, now offer new dimensions of protection to carriers through technologies such as the Aegis 10 Combat System which combines ballistic and cruise missile radar into a single system able to cue fire control and launch defensive interceptors. An SM-6, for example, can now due to software upgrades track and destroy moving targets by adjusting course in flight. US Navy destroyers are increasingly being armed with scalable lasers able to operate as both optical sensors and weapons to incinerate or simply disable an enemy aircraft, drone or incoming missile. There have also been breakthroughs with electronic warfare weapons able to find and “jam” or disable enemy communications or weapons guidance systems. EW technologies are increasingly capable of deconflicting a cluttered spectrum to “frequency hop” to counter enemy “jamming,” identify hostile versus friendly electronic signals or launch a series of difficult to detect narrow “pencil beam” kinds of electronic beams to disable or jam an enemy system. There are also upgraded close-in ship defenses inc
reasingly able to track and intercept threats much more quickly, often using AI-enabled advanced algorithms to identify and destroy threats at exponentially greater speeds.
All of this is made possible by breakthrough levels of multi-domain networking wherein surface ships connect with aircraft, drones, satellites and aerial gateway platforms to identify and relay threat information from unprecedented distances beyond the horizon.
Given all this, the Pentagon, and certainly the US Navy, have for years now been exploring a range of ways to stop, destroy or disable these carrier-threatening weapons. Chinese anti-ship missile threat, despite the fact that much is likely still unknown when it comes to the reach, guidance technology and accuracy of these “Carrier Killer” missiles and their ability to hit moving targets. In response to this transparent Chinese A2/AD strategy, the US Navy has been clear for several years now that it can and will operate anywhere it needs to when conducting comb at operations and projecting maritime power.
There are likely some interesting and important reasons why Navy leaders make these comments, recognizing that of course many elements of ship-defense technology are not available for security reasons. For instance, in recent years, the Navy has been making rapid, breakthrough progress in the realm of layered ship defenses, meaning ships can increasingly see and “destroy” potentially catastrophic threats from beyond the horizon. Carrier Strike Groups, for instance, now operate with new generations of long-range sensors and “aerial gateways” able to relay threat data from beyond the horizon to ship commanders in position to take defensive action and decide which countermeasure or defensive weapon to use.
A now deployed technology called Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air uses Hawkeye surveillance planes and even F-35s to function as an “aerial” relay node able to detect threats from beyond the radar aperture from where ship radar can detect. NIFCA is an integrated system which uses an airborne gateway as a sensor to send threat data down to the ship while the attacking missile is at much safer ranges. The aerial sensor then cues ship-based fire control to launch an SM-6 interceptor to fly up and intercept or destroy the incoming enemy missile. NIFC-CA was first deployed more than six years ago on US Navy destroyers and has likely been upgraded since then as well. Layered ship defenses are also increasingly engineered with laser weapons and advanced EW able to track and “jam” the electronic guidance systems built into the Chinese carrier-killer missiles.
There are also range-enhancements as well, quite possibly developed as a specific counter to China’s missiles and anti-access/area-denial weapons, such as the rapid emergence of the Navy’s MQ-25 Stingray carrier-launched refueler drone. As a first of its kind platform, the sea-launched drone can basically double a fighter jet’s attack reach by virtue of fueling the aircraft hundreds of miles away from the carrier deck. Unlike a large and very vulnerable tanker, the MQ-25 is smaller, sleeker and of course much less risky to sailors by virtue of its being unmanned. In a tactical sense, this means that carriers with the MQ-25 could project power over land from twice the distance offshore, enabling sustained attack reach in an A2/AD environment. The carrier-launched Stingray drone can enable deck-launched aircraft to essentially double their combat radius and be refueled in flight to extend air attack ranges.
Without having to risk a large, non-stealthy manned tanker aircraft, jets can be refueled in flight such that they can have much longer dwell time over targets or are simply able to reach targets from much greater distances. In a tactical sense, what this means is carriers can operate and still project power from safer standoff ranges beyond where Chinese and Iranian missiles can reach. The existence of the MQ-25 Stingray offers a way the US Navy can respond to and potentially overcome China or Iran’s often discussed anti-access/area-denial strategy.
DF-26
The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force has for many years now been testing and reporting on its famous DF-26 “carrier killer” missile reportedly able to track and destroy aircraft carriers from distances as far as 2,000-miles away. Can the weapon truly do this? If so, there are many variables and concerning implications to consider such as its ability to hold the US territory of Guam at risk from mainland China. Clearly this threat is quite significant, as China is already known to operate a large arsenal of short, medium and long-range ballistic missiles. As a cruise-missile-like anti-ship weapon flying parallel to the surface, the DF-26D could prove more difficult to track than a standard ballistic missile which flies a parabola-like curve up in the sky before descending. This presents significant threats to vital US assets, buildings and technologies now in Guam and also of course holds carriers at risk of destruction from unprecedented distances.
Is the US Navy concerned? Certainly the force is likely to take this threat very seriously, as China has repeatedly advertised the ability of the missile to track and destroy targets at this range, yet US Navy leaders have also been clear that US Navy carriers will operate wherever they need to in order to sufficiently project power. What are the reasons for this apparent confidence? There are likely many variables to consider, such as the rapid maturation of advanced US layered ship-defense systems enabling carriers to find, track and destroy or disable incoming anti-ship missiles from paradigm-changing stand-off ranges. Guam is likely armed with many ground-based sensors, radar systems and interceptors, yet US Navy ships at sea have in recent years been receiving new generations of ship defense technologies such as lasers, long-range precision interceptors and networked, over-the-horizon radar detection using satellites, drones and manned aerial gateway systems. Yet another critical area of innovation when it comes to ship defenses is in the realm of electronic warfare, as newer kinds of long-range EW weapons could potentially find a “line of bearing” and jam or disable an incoming DF-26. Carrier Strike Groups are also increasingly becoming armed with laser weapons potentially able to incinerate, intercept or destroy fast-approaching DF-26 missiles, and advanced interceptors fired from Vertical Launch Systems on destroyers are being upgraded with new guidance systems improving their ability to track and destroy or “knock out” an incoming anti-ship missile.
The SM-6, for example, has been engineered with key software upgrades and a “dual-mode” seeker enabling it to adapt to moving targets while in flight. Instead of needing to rely upon a ship-based illuminator to find or “light up” a target for the interceptor missile, the SM-6 now has its own ability to send a
forward “ping” from the missile itself and adapt to changing targets while in flight. This is why the SM-6 is so critical to a now-operational Navy over-the-horizon ship defenses system called Naval Integrated Fire Control – Counter Air. NIFCA, as its called, consists of an integrated system connecting ship-based command and control with an “aerial gateway” node such as a Hawkeye, F-35 or drone in position to expand the radar aperture beyond the horizon of what ship-based systems would be able to detect. Once a track is established by an aerial gateway platform functioning as an over-the-horizon sensor, ship-based fire control launched a guided SM-6 interceptor which can adjust in flight to find and destroy the approaching missile miles before it approaches the radar “field of regard” for a Navy ship.
DF-21D
Chinese carrier killer DF-21D anti-ship missiles have been on the Pentagon’s radar for quite some time, as they are 1,000-mile long ground-fired weapons ostensibly able to destroy aircraft carriers with advanced range and guidance systems.
The existence of the DF-21D is likely a key part of why the US Military services have been accelerating a strategic approach referred to as A2/AD, anti-access/area denial. The idea with A2/AD is to develop weapons, multi-domain tactics and technologies sufficient to overcome an enemy’s effort to keep forces too far away to attack. With China for instance, the existence of long-range ballistic missiles and weapons such as the DF-21D represents an effort to make ocean and land territory too risky or too costly to approach. A Carrier Air Wing can launch F/A-18s and F-35Cs from the maximum distance its combat radius allows, a distance of roughly 300 to 500 miles. This means that, in order to avoid being held at risk of full destruction by a DF-21D, a US Navy carrier would have to operate farther than 1,000 miles offshore. This is a distance potentially out of range for carrier-launched fighter jets, therefore attack “access” to waters close enough to attack China is denied.
Despite the existence of the DF-21D, which the PLA has repeatedly test-fired and reported on in its state-backed newspapers, US Navy leaders have been clear that they will operate carriers anywhere they need to in order to project power. There are likely many reasons for this, including the emergence of advanced US Navy layered carrier-defenses and potential limitations of the DF-21D. Of course many of the specific technologies woven into the DF-21D and its guidance systems may not be fully known or remain mysterious to an extent, yet some interesting observations have pointed out some of the difficulties the weapons might have when it comes to fully “killing” carriers. Several reports years ago from Air Force Magazine raised interesting questions about the DF-21D, suggesting that perhaps its guidance system may not be sufficient to hit moving targets such as carriers. Perhaps its sensors or guidance systems are not sufficiently integrated to establish the needed “track” on a weapon. One AF Magazine report from as far back as 2013 suggested that the PLA Rocket Force may not have the “networking” sufficient to complete the kill chain and succeed in destroying a target. The DF-21D reportedly uses radar and satellite navigation, however the AF Magazine report suggested that the Chinese may not have the networking or “over-the-horizon” radar needed to establish a “track” and destroy a target. The report also raised questions about whether its warhead would have the energetics and lethality to truly disable a carrier and stop it from operating and launching attacks.
In total, the weapon would need accurate guidance systems, integrated and secure data networking and an ability to hit moving targets in order to succeed in actually “striking” a carrier. Therefore, the DF-21D simply may not be able to do all of this, despite Chinese media claims to the contrary.
Kris Osborn is the Military Affairs Editor of 19 FortyFive and President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
