Rust to Obsolescence or Modernize to Credibility?
By Peter Huessy, Warrior Senior Nuclear Weapons Analyst
Dr. Tara Drozdenko, with the Union of Concerned Scientists, writes June 7, 2024 in the Hill that all ICBMs should be eliminated from the US nuclear deterrent, referencing an upcoming meeting hosted by Senator Edward Markey (D-MA) and Representative John Garamendi (D-CA) who apparently seek to cut out Sentinel ICBM spending in the pending defense bill.
The essay cites many of the assumed defects of land-based missiles, and also invents a new problem that only disarmament advocates could embrace. Apparently, ICBMs are at fault for being possible Russian targets. Drozdenko is concerned that an attack on the US 400 Minuteman silos would cause a lot of fallout and nuclear radiation and kill millions of people.
However, she chooses not to apportion any accountability to the Russians that might launch nearly 1,000 warheads against the Minuteman silos, rather, it is the mere existence of the Minuteman silos that is accountable for drawing Russian missile fire. Consequently, if you remove the targets there would be no need for Russia to attack our ICBMs.
It is true that some of the 400 Minuteman missiles and their associated launch control centers are within hundreds of miles of major urban areas with 1.3 million people, including Denver and Omaha. But four other nuclear targets—the two submarine bases in Kings Bay, Georgia and Bangor, Washington and our bomber bases at Whiteman, Missouri, Minot, North Dakota and Barksdale, Louisiana, are near major population centers with 3.5 million people, all of whom also would be at risk if these five bases were destroyed with Russian nuclear warheads.
More perplexing is why not blame the people of New York and Los Angeles for also drawing nuclear strikes as their populations in the greater urban areas of these two cities are 38 million, a very attractive target. While the US deterrent policy is not to strike cities, major disarmament groups including the UCS have often advocated minimal deterrence that targets population centers (not military assets) to deter nuclear war, and the Russians and Chinese have no qualms about destroying cities as a means of deterrence.
An assessment done for the Sasakawa Foundation on the effect of just one 30 kiloton nuclear warhead denotating over Manhattan determined that 750,000 people would be killed instantly and 3 million over time. The point of the assessment with John Diamond was to call for stronger deterrence, not blame the people of the city of New York for getting attacked! But the US could move the folks of New York out of the city and not tempt Moscow.
However true that many Americans would be seriously harmed and killed if the Russians attacked the United States, it is not an argument for unilaterally cutting nearly 60% of the US allowed SNDVs (strategic nuclear delivery vehicles) from the US arsenal, leaving the US with 12 nuclear targets which if eliminated would take the US out of the nuclear business. Cutting out ICBMs would make it easier to disarm the US and make nuclear war more likely, not exactly the most innovative way to improve deterrence.
Dr. Drozdenko’s argument against ICBMs also suffers from at least 12 other major flaws, arguments that reflect an ongoing lack of understanding of reality and actually have no factual basis.
ICBMs are accused of being part of a US led arms race of planned nuclear modernization. Fact: is the total number of warheads under the nuclear modernization program of record fit within the 2010 New START ceilings. Unless the New START arms control treaty was actually a nuclear arms race treaty, such a charge that the US is starting an arms race is ridiculous.
The essay then argues the US actually has a policy of launch on warning of a missile attack. Again, untrue. The US deterrent strategy is assured retaliation with second-strike capabilities. A launch if detected requires a launch conference to be held to determine the source of the launch. Additionally, a second conference would be convened to determine the correct response, and then only executed after the confirmation of a strike with nuclear weapons on American soil. However, the ambiguous nature of the US response capability is what sows doubt in the mind of the aggressor and thus strengthens deterrence even though it is not US policy to launch under attack.
The Russians may be reckless but they are not suicidal. There is no reason Moscow would strike 400 Minuteman missiles in the central USA. And if they were intent on attacking the US they would also take out the submarines at Kings Bay and Bangor, the three bomber bases in North Dakota, Louisiana and Missouri, and relevant NC3 nodes. Russia would still know that nearly 1,000 warheads could be coming back at Russia from submarines at sea, bombers on alert and airborne, and surviving ICBMs.
So, the question is, why would Russia attack 400 ICBMs with nearly 1,000 warheads but leave intact some roughly 350-400 submarine warheads in port that could be destroyed with the use of a handful of warheads, especially in that the subs in port could put to sea to strike back at Russia?”
Similarly, the US could have strategic bombers available as the UCS essay admits—especially if generated to alert status with required refueling support. The three bomber bases with upwards of 60 airplanes would have at least 600 gravity bombs and cruise missiles to launch back at Russia. This retaliatory force is available 24/7. What evidence is there that Russia doesn’t understand this?
The essay next claims the USAF has determined the US can keep Minuteman around through 2036 and that somehow, they are pretending otherwise. Actually, the Minuteman III force is required by law to be sustained and maintained “through 2030” as an NDAA amendment by former Senator Kent Conrad required. The planned deployment of Sentinel has always been from roughly 2031-36, although there now may be a delay in that deployment of an estimated 2 years.
Credibly maintaining a working MM III is not planned beyond those years and that has been the basis for the schedule of the Sentinel acquisition program. The cost of the Sentinel missile itself has remained at the original estimated cost. The increase projected costs have been in the ground equipment, launch control centers, silos and cabling that operates the system as it is now some 55 years old. New projections simply now estimate it will be more expensive to redo the infrastructure, although when completed the operating costs are estimated to be significantly lower and save the country some tens of billions. No one is using any fuzzy calendar math.
However, if defense opponents, including the disarmament cheerleaders, had not kicked the modernization can down the road for nearly 40 years, the US could have modernized in sequence rather than simultaneously recapitalizing all three legs of the Triad, and consequently significantly reduced the annual cost of the nuclear enterprise.
In the current planned budget for FY2024, Sentinel costs $4.8 billion in RDT&E and Acquisition including all re-entry/warhead work. The missile will be deployed through 2080 and even with the $132 billion price tag, will require an investment — very reasonable — of $2.9 billion annually.
The critics of ICBMs continue to find clever ways to apply creative accounting to cook the books, now in this new essay raising the estimated price to $313 billion over 50 years which implies nearly $200 billion for the annual maintenance and the current planned warhead enhancements but for 50 years.
Given the current cost of MMIII 0&
M of $1 billion annually, projecting the new costs to $4 billion annually is absurd. Why not stretch out the costs for 100 years and get an even bigger number?
CBO specializes in this trick, adding $98 billion to one of their recent cost estimates for “potential projected” growth. Their July 2023 assessment headline was that all nuclear activity for the next ten years would cost $756 billion, but the actual modernized element would cost $247 billion, or one-third of the total cost, with operations and maintenance of the existing force and nuclear command and control through 2032 at over $400 billion, a cost that would be incurred if the United States simply kept the legacy force and indeed risked “rusting to obsolescence.”
Usually, Congress looks at 5- year budgets but let’s try this expanded horizon. By comparison, the food stamp program for the next 50 years assuming no annual cost increase would be $5.6 trillion. Have the previous decades of poverty programs worked well, which food stamps were designed to alleviate? Mercatus Center data indicates the war on poverty, since 1965 or for the past 58 years has cost the United States some $24 trillion in today’s dollars. The current annual cost is $2 trillion in means tested poverty programs estimates Mercatus, while the number of people living below the poverty line has grown from 30 to 38 million since 1965 although the rate has declined from around 15% to 11.5%.
The entirety of the nuclear modernization effort over the next 20 years will be roughly $500 billion, as the bulk of the remaining costs will be sustaining the legacy systems, refurbishing our DOE infrastructure and command and control systems.
Looked at realistically, the ICBM program will be fully deployed through 2080. For 45 years (2035-800) the annual costs work out to a $2.9 billion annual investment. Or about 0.00045% of the current annual Federal budget of $6.3 trillion (FY2022) and $6.5 trillion in FY2024, and 0.001% of the current defense budget.
Ironically, Mr. Garamendi previously supported keeping MMIII, in lieu of Sentinel, even though the identified expanded costs, up to $132 billion, are largely related to the new infrastructure that must be recapitalized irrespective of whether the missile is a legacy MMIII or a new Sentinel.
As for warhead costs, if warheads don’t work, which is a risk if we do not follow through on the NNSA plans, and we forgo all National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) warhead SLEP work, well the United States rapidly goes out of the nuclear business. But if we are going to maintain the New START level of 400 ICBM and 1090 SLBM warheads, the cost for NNSA remains roughly the same whether the warheads allowed by New START are aboard ICBMs and SLBMS or just SLBMs.
Since ICBM warheads don’t necessarily fit on submarine missiles, the Navy, to keep just at the New START numbers would see their warhead costs expand dramatically. And if we decide not to keep the allowable 400 Minuteman warheads on any substitute force, our deterrent force will remain at nearly one-third below the New START allowed force at a time when both Russia and China are markedly expanding their nuclear forces.
This appears highly inconsistent with the new administration pledge—a good development– to seriously look at adopting a bold, new, aggressive nuclear doctrine which might very well include deploying more nuclear warheads above the New START levels. Which would be highly problematic should ICBMs be terminated.
You can’t cut if you are thinking of expanding.
Even attempting to keep MMIII and eliminating Sentinel would not work. Soon after the termination of the Sentinel, Minuteman would atrophy out of the nuclear force, as one cannot keep MMIII around much beyond this coming decade. So, after having to spend tens of billions on redoing the infrastructure and the associated warheads associated with Minuteman III, that provides only the current MMIII capability which gives us a shortfall to required capabilities to keep pace with Russia and China. Cancelling Sentinel means relying on a legacy ICBM force that while heroically providing deterrence for 54 years would in all likelihood have to be retired before the end of the next decade.
Since the essay’s author doesn’t want ICBMs to be part of the US nuclear deterrent, we are eventually left with “fast flyers” on only 12 Columbia submarines with 16 missiles each or 192 total missiles. Add in the 60 bombers and the US would have a grand total of 252 nuclear platforms (missiles and bombers) although both the Russians and the United States under New START can have 700. No doubt to disarmers that is a sure basis for strategic stability! And while building more Columbia class submarines is being seriously considered by Congress, those new submarines would only come into the force post 2042 after the current 12 Columbia submarines would be acquired.
Even worse if the US wanted to keep the 1,490 SLBM and ICBM warheads allowed under New START, (to say nothing of increasing the US deterrent force), the D-5 would have to be loaded with 8 warheads each, its maximum capability, reaching a total of 1536 warheads, just marginally above the New START allowable limits, but with ZERO further growth possible.
The more warheads the D-5 missiles carry the heavier the missile, with less range and to some degree with wasted or superfluous warheads. Heavier missiles have less range and may be required to patrol closer to Russia and China and thus occupy a smaller deployment or patrol area for the submarines, weakening survivability.
This also means the US would be without a “hedge” buildup capability, above New START levels, which the US has always had as an insurance policy in the event of a Russian breakout, and now a Chinese build as well. What kind of leverage would that give the US in any further arms talks? The US would have all of 46 warheads above the New START limits, compared to what Dr. Chris Yeaw projects as a total of 10,000 Russian and Chinese strategic and tactical warheads by 2035.
And what a gift to Russia and China to be able to engage in a nuclear arms race which would be decidedly one-sided as the US could not participate. The bad guys build, the good guys stay at New START levels even when the treaty expires in 2026 as the US would have zero other options. [Except admittedly 200 theater gravity bombs in Europe.]
Finally, to destroy all 400 MMIII silos and associated 45 launch control centers, the Russians would according to some estimates have to use some 900 warheads, but they would be launched from an inventory of silo and rail mobile ICBMs in different locations and thus not simultaneously. The US early warning systems would see the initial launches within minutes, giving the command authorities opportunity to act rationally.
And these incoming missiles would not necessarily arrive on US soil together, as US missile silos are spread over 45,000 square miles, thus allowing an assured retaliation and second-strike response from major elements of the US Triad, thus not placing strategic stability at risk.
Eliminating ICBMs also would put all our missile nuclear eggs in one submarine technology basket, a risk the US must ponder as China announced it is working to develop technology that can seek out America’s submarines by air.
This wrong-headed essay’s recommendations would make the Chinese aim to disarm the US easier and incentivize the PRC to go all out in anti-submarine detection and warfare technology.
In conclusion, as one analyst said recently, an individual ICBM silo may be vulnerable, but as a system and as a Triad of forces, the US deterrent both legacy and modernized systems is sound, solid, credible and guarantees a second-strike assured response capability. It defends our allies, and deters if correctly done the use of conventional, nuclear, cyber, space, bio-chem weapons against the United States and its allies.
As retired Admirals Richard Mies and Charles Richard both previous
ly explained, there are only two choices: replace and modernize our nuclear forces or go out of the nuclear business. Clark Murdock outlined the clear danger, we can “rust to obsolescence” or as recommended here, modernize to credibility.
