By Logan Williams, Warrior Contributor
Undeniably, the last several years have been some of the most tumultuous in contemporary history. 2020 – 2021 brought a global pandemic, and 2022 – 2023 has brought several wars, each with the potential to escalate to a regional or global conflict. Global pandemic notwithstanding, these conflicts are a direct result of the United States’ relative retreat from global leadership following the end of the Cold War.
On February 24, 2022, Russia’s limited, subversive, hybrid war in eastern Ukraine transformed into a brutal, massacrous, full-scale invasion, that has tested the West’s unity, conviction, and military preparedness.
On October 7th, when Iran-backed Hamas subversives initiated a terrorist assault against the people of Israel, the conflict in Ukraine had become a contracted war of attrition. The United States’ righteous support of the Ukrainian people’s courageous resistance had severely diminished the United States’ stockpile of crucial munitions and weapons systems. When war once again broke out in the Middle East due to concerted acts of international terror, many policy-makers in the United States began to experience understandable consternation. It became painstakingly clear that – regardless of whether the United States had the political conviction, which is a different conversation, entirely – the United States did not have the material and logistical capabilities to support its allies through two prolonged wars of attrition, even though both conflicts have immense geopolitical significance.
Yet, these are far from the only two conflicts that will potentially call upon significant United States’ defense resources.
Through a sham referendum, Venezuela announced its intent to annex an oil-rich portion of Guyanese territory; despite recent news coverage stating that Venezuela’s totalitarian leader, Nicolas Máduro, has vowed not to resort to the use of force in the land dispute, if history is any guide, that promise is laughable and violence should be the only expected outcome. If violence was not the intent and the expectation, there would have been little reason to reject the ICJ’s authority over the conflict. Venezuela is a shell-state that has been occupied by Cuba and which provides Cuba with a source of income through its fossil fuel revenues, and Maduro’s government is the perpetrator of many crimes against the global community, such as Venezuela’s participation in drug smuggling and its state sponsorship of terrorism. Recognizing this, the President of the United States has already indicated that the U.S. will begin overflights in Guyanese airspace, which is a strong indicator of the United States’ support for Guyana, and the United States’ intent to protect Guyana from any expansionist wars of aggression. Additionally, Great Britain has declared that it will reposition a naval patrol vessel to Guyana in support of its “regional ally and Commonwealth partner.” Brazil has deployed troops to its border with Venezuela, in an effort to prepare for any hostile Venezuelan action on that shared border, however unlikely a prospect.
The long-standing Houthi insurgency in Yemen has become inflamed by the explosion of the Israel-Palestine crisis. The Houthi movement began as a rejection of foreign intervention in Yemen, but in reality, it is an extension and a consequence of decades of Soviet as well as Cuban subversion, beginning with the Aden Emergency toward the end of the Sixties. The Houthis have conducted numerous attacks on international shipping with Iranian backing, and have pledged to continue doing so, in an effort to damage Israel, as well as the United States and the West. The U.S. Navy has undertaken an enormous responsibility to defend vessels in the vital Red Sea trade corridor.
Finally, China has drastically increased its violations of Taiwanese airspace, and it has presently stationed naval vessels proximate to Taiwanese territorial waters ahead of the island nation’s upcoming elections. All this, in addition to Xi Jinping’s attempts to prepare the PRC to invade Taiwan by 2027.
VWhat if China Invades Taiwan
The aforementioned flash-points are just those with the potential to develop into major conflicts, and thus, those which have made the headlines in Western media. No less than five ongoing conflicts, that are presently limited in scope, have the potential to expand into regional warfare and draw upon significant United States’ defense resources — a reality for which the United States is hopelessly unprepared.
Indeed, during the Cold War, the United States was able to maintain this level of involvement on the world stage, as the “world’s policeman,” due only to the sheer size of the defense apparatus and due to the United States’ dramatic war-fighting posture.
During the Cold War, the U.S. Military’s readiness was evaluated based upon the Pentagon’s informal, notional precursors to the “two-war doctrine,” a doctrine which wouldn’t be officially codified until after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a doctrine which necessitated that the U.S. defense apparatus be able to successfully fight and decisively win two, near-simultaneous, major theater wars.
One of the notional precursors to the discrete “two-war doctrine” was President Reagan’s idea of a military scaled for a proverbial “2+2 doctrine,” which asserted that the U.S. military should be capable of waging two major wars and engaging in two low-intensity conflicts (LICs), or a “brushfire” conflict as it has been called. For clarification, an LIC is likely how defense strategists would have described the subversive hybrid war waged by Russia and its insurgent proxies within the Donbas, prior to the invasion of February 2022. President Reagan’s understanding of the necessary strength of the U.S. Military’s war-fighting posture, required by the United States’ vast international interests, led to such ambitious goals as the “600-Ship Navy.”
Following the end of the Cold War, however, based upon erroneous notions of a peace dividend, the United States began to explore the idea of a defense draw-down. President Obama delivered the death-blow to the United States’ war-fighting posture when he cast aside the lessons of nearly a century of national security strategy, and abandoned the two-war doctrine as a schema through which to view broad defense readiness. President Obama intended to transform the United States’ military apparatus, and refocus it towards fighting unconventional battles, against terrorists and insurgencies, rather than against a near-peer force — which President Obama’s Pentagon officials seemed to believe no longer existed. This departure from established strategy ran in the face of one of the world’s oldest maxims: “prepare for the worst, but hope for the best.” The United States’ defense strategists would have been better served by preparing to fight two, large-scale, prolonged, wars of attrition – and rejoicing if they were met with smaller-scale conflicts – rather than by attempting to hope a new paradigm of warfare into existence. This error, which should have been obvious in 2012, has become painstakingly so, today.
While it is likely too late to perform an expensive and miraculous military overhaul, in time for the U.S. intelligence community’s suspected 2027 timeline for the PRC’s invasion of Taiwan, this should not be considered an acceptable argument in opposition to re-adopting the two-war doctrine. Accepting that U.S. military doctrine should conform to our present limited capabilities is an admission that the United States is no longer able to have – and work towards realizing – its aspirations and ambitions, such an admission would forever cede the United States’ position as a world leader. Rather, defense strategists should look at the adoption of a two-war doctrine as a chance for clear and decisive goal setting. Without a firm understanding of the extent of the United States’ global interests, and the war-fighting capacity that these interests demand, it is not possible to arrive at an accurate estimation of the shortcomings of the U.S.’ defense apparatus.
In 2019, the Heritage Foundation produced an estimate of the minimum requirements for the United States to restore its two-war capacity. Among other things, the Heritage Foundation believes that a U.S. Military prepared to wage two major wars requires an Army of 50 brigade combat teams — a Herculean task during the present recruiting crisis; a U.S. Navy of 400 ships – far less than Reagan’s proposed 600-ship Navy – and 624 aircraft; an Air Force of 1,200 fighter/attack aircraft, and a Marine Corps of 36 battalions.
By recognizing the obvious fact that the United States’ national interests require a force posture prepared to wage two major wars nearly simultaneously, and by utilizing the Heritage Foundation’s standards, or by initiating a Department of Defense review to produce another viable estimation of the necessary procurement for successful adoption of a two-war doctrine, the United States could begin to prepare for the global realities of China’s rise.
Furthermore, by shrewdly prioritizing some necessities over others, the United States can maximize its time and investment. For example, the United States could feasibly prioritize investing in U.S. Navy procurement, because the United States’ Navy is likely to become the most important branch of service in a conflict with China — in particular, the U.S. should invest in submarine procurement, because sub-surface naval warfare is likely to be the domain in which the United States can thoroughly dominate China. Feasibly, an argument could also be made for prioritizing investment in the U.S. Air Force, because the USAF will play a leading role in the next conflict, regardless of whether or not it is in Europe or South East Asia.
A decline in U.S. military supremacy, like in so many other areas, is by no means inevitable — it is a choice. By investing in critical procurements, the United States can reclaim its capacity to wage two wars — which is absolutely necessary for a state that claims to lead the free world and to serve as the arsenal of democracy. However, the path to doing so must begin with conviction. Put simply, the United States’ policymakers – and the nation at large – must decide that it still desires its traditional leadership role — without such a commitment, policymakers will be hard-pressed to initiate the needed drastic measures, in time.
Logan Williams is a writer and researcher currently studying at the University of Connecticut. He is pursuing research regarding Ukrainian history and national identity, hegemonic theory, the Cold War, and international development/liberalization processes. Mr. Williams’ work has been published in newspapers, magazines, and journals, such as:, Geopolitics Magazine, Modern Diplomacy, The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Democracy Paradox, Diario Las Américas, International Affairs Forum, Fair Observer, History Is Now Magazine, American Diplomacy, etc.
