Pentagon Hardens Command & Control For Nuclear Weapons Attack

By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization

(Washington D.C.) An attacking ICBM fired across the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean would likely travel beyond the earth’s atmosphere for about 20-minutes through space during its mid-course phase, ultimately hitting its target roughly 30 minutes after launch if one includes the boost and terminal phases of flight. This kind of time scenario, which would of course vary depending upon which hemisphere or continent an ICBM was traveling to and from, leaves little to no time for decision makers to determine a potential response, defensive move or counterattack. 

This reality, long known by Pentagon strategists, is why there is a critical need for Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3), as lives and the very survival of nation-states may hang in the balance and depend upon its effectiveness.

This introduces several key longstanding Pentagon priorities, such as the need to “secure” or “harden” any nuclear-specific command and control systems and also expedite or “optimize” speed and method of information transmission. A modern, much more high-tech threat environment means that NC3 is far more at risk than at any point in history, given that a potential adversary is now much more likely to be capable of “jamming,” “hacking” or disrupting time-sensitive communications. 

Cyber intruders, electronic weapons attacks or other kinds of “jamming” and interference can place secure nuclear communications in great danger of being compromised, something which is inspiring an ongoing Pentagon “NC3 Next” initiative to replace and upgrade the existing E-6B Mercury, an older B707 variant configured to perform highly-sensitive nuclear command and control missions.

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The Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday’s 2022 CNO Navigation Plan for the Navy specifies “information warfare” as a huge priority, referring to what he described as a need to “connect fleet platforms and persistently cover the battlespace to ensure decision advantage.”