By Logan Williams, Warrior Editorial Fellow
In an ideal world, the United States’ Air Force would be able to complete a full overhaul of the USAF fighter jet arsenal, retiring F-16 jets at the same steady, rapid rate as it acquired new F-35s to replace them. However, in the real world, F-35s have a much higher unit cost than F-16s, and likely take a great deal longer to manufacture.
It is for these reasons that the United States’ Air Force has announced its intent to continue fielding F-16s, for at least the next two decades. However, little details have been given as to what role the F-16 will play, particularly with the possibility of a war with the People’s Republic of China — nor has their been much discussion of what role the F-16 is even capable of filling.
The United States’ fleet of F-16s have undergone a significant retrofit, to ensure that the platform remains combat relevant in a fifth-generation fighter jet world.
The F-16 Service Life Extension Program has provided the F-16 with the Northrup Grunman APG-83 AESA radar system, which was derived from the radar systems designed by Northrup Grunman for the F-22 and the F-35, giving the F-16 robust fifth-generation capabilities, while maintaining the fourth generation air-frame.
Additionally, the F-16 was provided with a new electronic warfare (EW) component, called Viper Shield, which is designed to identify and defend against the ever-changing threats in the EW realm, such as radar jammers, and it is intended to perpetrate offensive EW countermeasures of its own.
Amongst these major upgrades is the addition of several artificial intelligence-based features, taken from the F-22 and the F-35 platforms, including a cutting-edge Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto GCAS), which allows the plane to automatically seize controls if it detects that a crash is imminent, such as if the pilot loses consciousness in the cockpit.
Additionally, the F-16 upgrades incorporate AI in the form of predictive maintenance. Predictive maintenance AI utilizes the available data from previous F-16 machine failures, which is made available through centralized data storage, to predict the conditions under which certain mechanisms might fail. Predictive maintenance AI allows aircraft maintainers to perform essential services prior to a component failing, ensuring that surprise malfunctions do not take aircraft out of the fight for long. In addition, if a pilot is about to attempt a maneuver in the cockpit, and other F-16s have experienced malfunctions during that maneuver in the past, the AI can warn the pilot to be on the lookout for warning signs, to be prepared to perform damage control, or to avoid the maneuver altogether. This helps to keep the USAF’s most essential and irreplaceable weapon, a human pilot, safe.
Warrior Video Special — Will China Take Over Taiwan?
The F-16’s incredible upgrades have led some defense experts to claim that the fighter is able to field fifth-generation capability with the affordability and dependability of a fourth-generation airframe.
While the upgraded F-16 is certainly a formidable aircraft, the Service Life Extension Program did little to address the aircraft’s greatest weaknesses, and thus, the F-16 might not have a place in modern aerial combat — such as the inevitable battle for air superiority during any conflagration within the “South China Sea.”
The F-16 was originally designed to be a lightweight, low-cost, and highly-maneuverable multi-role fighter aircraft, optimized for dog-fighting, which could augment the capabilities provided by the USAF’s more expensive, dedicated air superiority fighter, the F-15. The Pentagon considered several options under the banner of the Lightweight Fighter Program, and the USAF selected the prototypical F-16 — shortly thereafter, the U.S Navy selected the prototypical F/A-18 Hornet, which was the precursor of the Navy’s current F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet.
The F-16’s lightweight design is what enabled it to become such a versatile fighter jet platform, with superb maneuverability, for the time. However, the lightweight platform is also the source of the F-16’s greatest weakness. The F-16 was optimized for short-range dog-fighting, not the long flights required to penetrate deep into enemy-held airspace. The F-16 has a maximum take-off weight of approximately 40,000 lbs, which is very little compared to the afore-mentioned F-15 (which was designed for the long-haul flights required for air superiority missions, and has a max take-off weight of approximately 68,000 lbs). The F-16’s limited take-off weight is well surpassed by modern aircraft such as the F-22 (over 80,000 lbs) and the F-35 (65,000 lbs).
The F-16’s reduced take-off weight inherently limits the aircraft’s fuel capacity, which sits at just 7,000 lbs of internal fuel. Conversely, the legacy F-15 has approximately 14,000 lbs of internal fuel, the USAF’s newer F-22 air superiority fighter and the F-35 multi-role fighter have 18,000 lbs of internal fuel.
The drastically reduced fuel capacity of the F-16 reveals the airframe’s greatest weakness, which is the aircraft’s limited combat radius — the combat radius is the farthest distance that an aircraft can fly, and return, without requiring air-to-air refueling. The F-16 has a combat radius of approximately 300-400 miles. The F-15, the F-22, and the F-35 each have a combat radius that nears 1,000 miles. While this fuel capacity can be increased externally, with conformal fuel tanks or drop tanks, the added weight comes at a high cost to the aircraft’s weaponry. The result of this severe deficiency is that the F-16 is entirely dependent upon air-to-air refueling to operate.
Future of US Air Force F/A-18s and Tankers
It is worth noting that when the U.S. Navy opted for the prototypical F/A-18 Hornet, they insisted upon several alterations to the design to ensure the platform’s relevance, one of which was to increase the aircraft’s fuel capacity and combat radius. The F/A-18 Hornet has a combat radius of nearly 500 miles. The later F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet increased that combat radius to approximately 700 miles. While the F/A-18 platforms’ combat radius does not approach that of the F-15, or that of the United States’ fifth-generation aircraft, the Hornet and the Super Hornet are designed to operate based upon aircraft carriers, which are practically floating airfields and logistics hubs. These aircraft carriers carry F/A-18s far afield, away from the United States’ land-based airfields, and if necessary enables the operation of the aircraft without air-to-air refueling.
The United States’ primary air-to-air refueler, the KC-135, is a massive aircraft, with a length and wingspan each
over 130 feet. It has a top speed of approximately 530 miles per hour, and a service ceiling of 50,000 ft. These metrics have caused many defense scholars to sardonically remark that these fat, slow-moving planes are “easy target practice” for the United States’ enemies. The problem is that, without the United States’ air-to-air refueling capacity, the entire USAF loses viability in combat. Thus, due to their strategic importance and obvious vulnerability, air-to-air refuelers can only operate in uncontested airspace, often far from the actual “front lines” of the battle.
This was not an issue during the last United States’ war in the Asia-Pacific, in Vietnam, because North Vietnam possessed only the anti-aircraft equipment that the Soviet Union and China were able to provide, and the Viet-Cong had no ability or desire to project power. As an article published by the National Museum of the United States’ Air Force, states, the United States’ aerial refueling tankers established “several meeting areas called “anchors” over Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam and the Gulf of Tonkin… so fighters could select the nearest airborne gas station on the way to and from their targets.” The aerial refueling tankers would fly in a holding pattern within a designated area, and wait to provide fuel for the USAF’s combat aircraft, often servicing a dozen or more at a time. This same strategy was acceptable during the asymmetric wars in the Middle East during the first decade of the twenty-first century. Afghanistan lacked anything resembling an air force and any anti-aircraft capabilities were destroyed within a week of the inception of hostilities; similarly, the United States turned the Iraqi Air Force to dust. The United States’ military transitioned into a broadly expeditionary force, and lacking any serious challenges to its complete aerial dominance, the Pentagon seems to have given little thought to the vulnerabilities of its aerial refueling tanker fleet. In fact, an article in The Hill noted an incredibly important fact, “Our [the United States’] air power has so dominated the skies that no U.S. ground troops have been killed by enemy aircraft in over 65 years.” The United States military has gotten so used to operating with air superiority, they have forgotten how difficult that it can be to obtain or maintain, they have begun to see the United States’ air dominance, mistakenly, as fait accompli.
Wargame US vs China
Obviously, however, the People’s Republic of China, being the first near-peer threat that the United States’ has faced – or rather, inevitably will face – in direct combat since World War Two, is a drastically different opponent than anything that U.S. troops fought in Iraq or Afghanistan.
In a war with China, aerial supremacy is not likely to be easily or quickly established, that is if it is established at all. A suggested worst-case scenario postulates the idea that China would be able to effectively completely exclude U.S. aircraft from penetrating the first island chain (includes the entirety of the South China Sea, Taiwan, Okinawa, and likely South Korea, but excludes the Philippines), and China would successfully establish an FEZ (fighter engagement zone) that extends to the second island chain (including the Philippines, the Mariana Islands, Guam, and Japan extending from Tokyo, south).
Will China Truly Attack Taiwan?
Presuming that – as stated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in their recent wargame of a war between the United States and China – China chooses to decimate United States’ and allies’ airfields with aerial bombardment (CSIS states that 90% of aircraft attrition was due to destruction on the ground, from such bombardment), the surviving U.S. airfield nearest to Taiwan, in this worst-case scenario, would be Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture — at the northernmost edge of Japan.
Aomori is approximately 1650 miles from Taiwan, which is obviously well outside the F-16’s combat radius, and it is just over the limit of the United States’ fifth-generation aircrafts’ combat radius. To put it simply, the United States’ aerial refueling tankers would not be able to fly near enough to the combat zone to allow F-16’s to contribute to the war effort.
The United States is making efforts to solve this problem. However, those efforts are likely too little, too late.
MQ-25 & Survivable Refueler
For example, the USAF has attempted to purchase the KC-46 Pegasus as the first step in shoring up the air-to-air refueling dominance that has begun to degrade with the branch’s aging fleet. However, only about 70 of these aircraft have been received. The KC-46 is eventually supposed to be upgraded to include some self-defense capabilities, although as of yet, this does not seem to have occurred. Additionally, while the KC-46 has some features intended to reduce its radar signature, it could not be considered a stealth aircraft. In all likelihood, the KC-46 likely just presents a slightly newer, far more expensive, easy target.
The U.S. Navy has also adopted a brand new unmanned aerial refueling vehicle, called the MQ-25 Stingray, which is just over half the size of a traditional refueling tanker, with a length of over 70 feet and a wingspan of approximately fifty feet. However, the MQ-25 Stingray seems to be just another aerial refueler designed to operate in a low-threat environment, or uncontested airspace. Naturally, due to the MQ-25’s reduced size, it will have a reduced radar signature. However, the Pentagon seems to have decided that “stealth” was not a requirement for this unmanned refueler. In fact, reportedly, Lockheed Martin received specific instructions during the development stage, stating that “no credit will be given for the ability to evolve to a stealthy survivable design.” The result is an aerial refueler that becomes unsurvivable the moment that it ventures away from the immediate airspace that falls within the reach of the host aircraft carrier’s defenses, as the drone is unable to defend itself. Effectively, this refueling UAV is fixed to a 100-mile radius around an aircraft carrier, and thus, is not the most useful piece of technology. Additionally, the UAV’s 14,000 lbs of fuel capacity is sufficient to refuel two F/A-18 E/F Super Hornets, but less than the requisite amount of fuel for the refilling of two F-35s. Quite the opposite of revolutionizing the United States’ air-to-air refueling capability, the MQ-25 is the Pentagon’s defense-industrial equivalent of dipping their toe in the unmanned vehicle water.
Finally, there have been intimations about the creation of a true “stealth” aerial refueling tanker, for over a de
cade. In January 2023, the Pentagon reached out to industry experts, seeking information about the potential for “Next Generation Air Refueling Systems (NGAS).” Of course, no designs or significant details have emerged, as of yet. There has been some discussion of adding some additional stealth features to the KC-46 Pegasus to create a so-called “bridge tanker,” as a stop-gap measure, as the Pentagon waits for industry to develop a legitimate stealth aerial refueling tanker, which is predicted to occur in the 2040s. Now, Western intelligence still predicts that China will move against Taiwan by 2027, so the notional NGAS is not going to be much help. As is often the case with the Pentagon, this is tomorrow’s solution to today’s problem, the defense experts have yet to come up with a solution that can be implemented in time to be relevant.
Finally, in a rather unique circumstance, the USAF has recently utilized a private corporation which specializes in air-to-air refueling, for the refueling of F-15 and F-22 fighter jets. Omega Air Refueling is a private company which has existed since the 1980s, which solely provides air-refueling services to the United States’ military as well as its partners and allies. It is worth noting that the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps has occasionally made use of commercial aerial refueling tankers in the past, but this is the first instance of the USAF being willing to do so. Commercial refuelers serve no purpose during wartime operations, as it would require civilian pilots and aircraft to fly in airspace that is dangerously close to combat zones, however, it could assist in reducing the burden upon the USAF’s tanker fleet by taking responsibility for non-combat or lower-priority operations, thereby freeing USAF tankers for Indo-Pacific combat missions.
Not only is the United States’ aerial tanker fleet aging, however, but it is decreasing as well. During the Vietnam War, the United States operated over 600 aerial refueling tankers, 30% (196) of which were deployed for missions within the Vietnam area of operations (AO). The USAF’s tanker fleet has shrunk from a high of over 700 to approximately 470. Today, the 193 tankers deemed necessary for the Vietnam War, a much smaller conflict than would likely develop against the PRC, would equal nearly half of the United States’ tanker fleet, and the USAF is still retiring legacy tankers at a rate much faster than they can be replaced. Additionally, the USAF has petitioned Congress to permit the branch to degrade the United States’ aerial refueling capability even further, by reducing the number of tankers in the fleet to 455.
Thus, without the possibility of a drastically improved air-to-air refueling capability, the F-16 is only fit for a few specific roles in the coming decades.
New US Fighter Jet?
In order to succeed in a military confrontation with China, the United States is in need of a new fighter jet. It is interesting that the United States has already identified this need for a new aircraft. However, the Pentagon has yet to identify the exact niche that this jet needs to fill.
The general impetus for this need, according to the USAF, is the failure of the F-35 to replace the F-16 as an affordable and mass-producible, multi-role fighter jet. During the development of this exceptional fifth-generation fighter, the Pentagon’s pursuit of new technological frontiers transformed this aircraft from a versatile and inexpensive concept, into a futuristic, high-tech, and thus, incredibly high-cost fighter jet.
It is interesting to note that, in the Biden Administration’s National Defense Industrial Strategy – the first of its kind, ever – two of the methods through which the Pentagon is hoping to achieve its goal of revolutionizing the acquisition process for defense materiel, are the limitation of the impulse to unnecessarily over-customize new weapon system designs, and the reduction of “scope-creep” or the problem of producing a weapons system that is no longer suited to the purpose for which it was commissioned due to the Pentagon’s happy-to-glad upgrading — i.e, the DOD wants defense contractors to stay on task. In all probability, this was a hat-tip to the F-35’s problem, in which Lockheed Martin produced a perfect plane, but not for the task for which it was required.
As was stated at the beginning of this article, the Pentagon and the USAF have thrown their hands up in exasperation, committing to flying the F-16 for several decades longer, although it truly isn’t combat relevant, any longer. However, despite the Pentagon’s decision, the need for an actual multi-role, F-16 replacement, remains.
In search of the solution, the Pentagon may want to first examine what Lockheed Martin accomplished for India, with the F-21, which took an upgunned F-16 and gave it a combat radius approximately equal to the United States F-35 fifth-generation fighter — again, at little cost to weapons capability.
The USAF ‘s new mass-producible, multi-role fighter (henceforth, MP-MRCA, for simplicity’s sake) would not require all of the technology of the F-35 aircraft. In reality, it would only require reasonable stealth that produces the radar signature of an F-35 (or, perhaps, a slightly larger radar signature), an AESA radar for increased “beyond visual range” capabilities, and sensor fusion. The new MP-MRCA would not need advanced electronic warfare (EW) capabilities, since that could be achieved by integrating the new fighter with the F-35, flying squadrons with a mix of F-35s and the MP-MRCA, in which the primary role of the F-35 would be to support the new fighter with its specialized, high-tech capabilities.
The singular characteristic required by this new fighter would be a drastically increased combat radius, preferably in the 1400-mile range, capable of striking Chinese forces within the first island chain, without aerial refueling. Crucially, this would need to be accomplished without sacrificing weaponry, stealth, and the mobility which allows for the F-16s superb dog-fighting capabilities.
Notably, an approximate notion to this long-range fighter concept was once proposed by the USAF as a “Penetrating Counter-Air” fighter. However, the Pentagon’s wishlist of high-tech customizations for the PCA is so long, that it seems the project was destined to become anot
her highly-specialized, high-tech boondoggle, with no mass-producibility — an ill-fitting replacement for the capabilities of the F-16. What’s more, the PCA fighter was conceived for the sole purpose of escorting the new B-21 “Raider” stealth bomber, A job that any long-range multi-role fighter can accomplish.
By rebuilding the backbone of the United States’ air power, based upon a long-range strike fighter, that is mass-producible and low cost, the Pentagon will ensure that the United States is better prepared to meet the Chinese threat — at least, better prepared than it would be with a fleet of legacy aircraft, conceived over 50 years ago. The MP-MRCA would give the USAF the ability to penetrate deep into Chinese-held airspace, with significant firepower, and no logistical concerns — the exact task that the F-35 was supposed to accomplish. It might be important for the Pentagon to reflect, by asking itself just how many wars in history have been lost due to logistical concerns that were overlooked by defense planners, many of whom were lulled into a false sense of confidence, or who were just too obsessed with building the sexiest, latest and greatest weaponry. Planes can’t fly without fuel, just as soldiers can’t fight without food, water, and bullets.
Logan Williams currently studies at the University of Connecticut. He is an International Affairs Researcher; Work Published in Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals, Such As: Geopolitics Magazine, Modern Diplomacy, Tufts University’s The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Democracy Paradox, Diario Las Américas, International Affairs Forum, Fair Observer, History Is Now Magazine, UNC at Chapel Hill’s American Diplomacy, The Center for Military Modernization’s Warrior Maven Magazine,
