By Kris Osborn, President, Warrior
Does the US Air Force need a new long-range, stealthy high-tech 6th-generation fighter to confront the growing mixture of threats presented by China in the Pacific theater? While the growing, multi-service and multi-national fleet of F-35s continues to present a formidable deterrent in the region, some might wonder if the current deterrence posture in the air is insufficient to meet a fast-evolving Chinese threat in future years.
The size of the US, Korean and Japanese fleet of F-35s is expanding exponentially, and the recently added US military bases in the Philippines and Japan could present new opportunities for the US to “forward-position” more F-35s in the Pacific. While the PLA operates a growing fleet of 5th-gen J-20 aircraft, it is land-launched and may not rival larger numbers of F-35s or an air-dominant F-22 in the Pacific. At the moment and in the near future, the US and its allies may be well-positioned to achieve air-superiority in any major engagement with China, particularly if greater numbers of F-35s continue to arrive throughout the region. This is particularly true should the US Navy continue forward positioning F-35-armed carriers and amphibs in the Pacific. At the moment, the growing fleet of US and allied F-35s seem well position to counter any PLA threat in the air.
However, surging into future years, will a force of F-22s and F-35s be sufficient to counter a fast-modernizing People’s Liberation Army Air Force? The PLA has already revealed a “rendering” of its 6th-gen aircraft, and US 5th-generation aircraft might face substantial range challenges in the Pacific theater. A just published Oct. 14 research essay by the Dept. of the Air Force’s China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) sheds light on this question as part of a broader analysis of the kind of Pacific strategy best pursued by the US Air Force. The paper, called “Charting the Course: How the PLA’s Regional and Global Strategies Should Influence the US Air Force’s Lines of Effort,” delivers a host of recommendations regarding what might constitute an optimal US Air Force Pacific strategy.
“Aircraft like the F-22 and F-35 were built to penetrate enemy IADS and dominate the Su-series aircraft, predominant in the European theater. Informing the design of these aircraft was a mostly contiguous geographic region that provided short distances and a plethora of viable airfields where the “tyranny of distance”xxi was not a factor. Furthermore, the requirements for the F-35 were developed during a time when the Air Force had many more fighter squadrons than today,” the CASI essay writes.
NGAD for the Pacific?
When Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Charles Brown was the Chief of Staff of the Air Force several years ago, he said the service was considering two different variants for an NGAD fighter, to include a longer-range aircraft for the Pacific and a smaller, shorter range 6th-gen fighter for Europe. It is not clear if this thinking still exists, as the current approach seems quite different. The very existence of an advanced, manned 6th-generation stealth fighter jet is now being re-evaluated, according to Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall. Speaking recently at the Air Force Association Symposium, Kendall confirmed that NGAD selection has been “paused” and that the effort was being “re-evaluated”
“We’re looking at a range of alternatives, and crewed versus uncrewed is one of the things we’re thinking about. … I believe that we’re probably going to do one more version of a crewed, more traditional aircraft. I don’t know exactly what that aircraft will look like yet,” Kendall said, as quoted in DefenseScoop. “It’s design to make it able to control CCAs effectively and fight with CCAs — I think is a question mark. Whether there’ll be variants that might be crewed or uncrewed is another question mark.”
The CASI research paper points out potential limitations central to the current US Air Force posture, yet does not specifically say a certain kind of manned NGAD must exist. The concept of having an advanced, highly-capable-manned 6th-gen platform, however, does seem to make great sense in light of some of the CASI report’s analysis. The expanse of the Pacific, as suggested by the essay, seems to call for the corresponding need to develop assets, weapons and platforms optimized for dispersed, multi-domain, long-range ground-sea-air warfare across a massive ocean, land & island expanse. Kendall’s 6th-gen thinking may indeed align with this, as there may be a way to reduce costs for the platform yet still meet key requirements for a platform to thrive in the Pacific. Kendall does seem clear that a 6th-gen aircraft needs to exist, and he talks often about the China threat, yet there are likely many questions regarding what can be achieved within certain budget constraints. Key performance parameters could be compromised in requirements “trade-offs” to save money, something which is generating both concern and controversy.
Regardless of whatever specific form a 6th-gen aircraft takes, there is likely consensus that a form of NGAD needs to exist. Arguably, the Air Force needs and would at very least greatly benefit from an advanced stealth fighter capable of operating with a range ability and performance capacity to outmatch China in the Pacific and meet the complex, varied requirements any conflict in the region would present.
More Weapons & Platform Range Needed for Pacific
The Pacific of course includes vast distances of ocean separating islands, large land masses and ocean stretching thousands of miles from Northern Japan and the Korean Peninsula South to Australia. There are tactical relevant distances within the Pacific which, depending upon a given contingency, will need to be considered, as Taiwan is a very “reachable” 100 miles from the Chinese mainland. This Chinese proximity advantage, however, can be greatly mitigated or offset by forward-operating US Navy carriers and F-35B-armed amphibs within a few hundred miles of Taiwan. Added to this defensive equation, it seems relevant to note that any map shows that the distance between the Northern-most parts of the Philippines and Southern Taiwan is only 155 miles, a circumstance which would seem to enable US allied 5th-generation aircraft to defend Taiwan from land-bases in the Philippines. An F-35A, for instance, operates with a range of 1,380 miles with a full weapons load could reach air-space over Taiwan and operate with some dwell time without needing to refuel with a risky and highly vulnerable tanker aircraft. This defensive posture would require the US to base F-35As in the Philippines, a deterrence concept which seems to make strategic sense.
Despite this possibility, the CASI essay points out that even an F-35A would be confronted with clear range challenges in the expansive Pacific, an area well known for its “tyranny of distance.”
“Platforms like the F-35 were designed for a European theater focused on a Russian threat. Although a versatile fighter platform, the F-35A lacks long-range and heavy payload capacity,” the report states.
Southern Japan, for example, is 500-to-600 miles from Taiwan, distance possibly difficult for F-35As should they need “dwell time” and operational flexibility without needing a refueler. This is likely why Japan has in recent years been acquiring massive numbers of maritime-capable short-take-off-and-landing F-35Bs. Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces, for example, have already demonstrated an ability to operate from large and small naval platforms, a scenario which could position Japanese 5th-gen air-attack capability to defend Taiwan.
The US Navy of course is also heavily focused upon forward-positioning 5th-generation aircraft capable of responding to a Taiwan contingency
These circumstances likely inform the rationale of the CASI essay which highlights the need for any attacking US Air Force fleet to engage and destroy critical enemy targets “outside” of the reach of enemy air defenses. This will require longer-range precision weaponry and, according to the CASI essay, a need to rethink Concepts of Operation regarding Air Superiority.
“Without a longrange posture, current forces are required to enter a contested, denied, and operationally-limited environment, skewing the risk/reward ratio by elevating the risk and reducing benefits. This, however, requires a change in thinking of how to achieve air superiority,” the CASI paper says. “This posture (long-range attack) forces adversary air to extend their reach beyond the protection of their IADS in order to stop attacks on their forces, allowing the U.S. Air Force to engage the adversary on more amenable terms.”
This strategy, the CASI paper maintains, would require 6th-generation air-protection in place to secure specific platforms capable of “long-range and long-loiter” requirements with “advanced long-range weapons such as a B-52 or B-21. The B-52 operates with a range of 8,000 miles and the B-21 is reported to operate at ranges of 6,000 miles, and both platforms are armed with long-range air-launched cruise missiles.
“Platforms like the B-52, B-21, and F-15EX fulfill long-range and long-loiter requirements while also providing capability to employ advanced long-range weapons. Paired with the F-22 and Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter to provide OCA-Escort, the long-range platforms can maintain a presence outside the JEZ (Joint Engagement Zone) while executing long-range strikes, removing the need for platforms to enter the JEZ until it is severely degraded.
Close-in-Fight-in Pacific
Alongside the primacy of range in the Pacific, the potential need for a “stand-in” fight is not lost on the Air Force or the analysis presented in the China Aerospace Studies Institute essay. A large portion of any warfare over Taiwan would likely take place within a radius of merely a few-hundred miles, given how close the island is to mainland China.
A Closer-In fight will require “mass” and “attritable” platforms capable of sustaining losses against advanced, concentrated air-defense systems, ground-fired interceptors and sophisticated air-to-air threats. One way to both achieve the requisite mass while reducing casualties is, quite simply, through using unmanned systems. The CASI essay makes the assessment that in a major-large-scale engagement with a capable adversary, a “close-in” fight may ultimately become necessary, a tactical consideration likely driving the current Air Force push to build large numbers of Combat Collaborative Aircraft (CCA). Not only are CCAs being built to lower costs, but the Air Force intends to build them in large numbers as unmanned platforms to increase mass and Aircrew survivability. Also, the now-under-development CCAs are being engineered with increasingly elaborate measures of autonomy, AI-generated functionality and complex multi-mission capabilities intended to conduct forward surveillance, test and penetrate enemy air defenses and also launch kinetic attacks when directed by a human decision-maker. A large volume of more “attritable” aircraft can not only achieve “mass but help “sustain” mass in the event of a protracted conflict. This is a strong argument for generating large numbers of CCAs, as a protracted engagement would require sustained “mass” and continued production of critical air assets.
“Since 1990, the Air Force has seen a substantial reduction in fighter squadrons and does not have the resources to maintain a fighter presence as it did in the 1990s. The ability to generate mass firepower with fighter platforms, therefore, is no longer the same which has driven the recent desire to build Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) to satisfy the principle of mass.
