Pentagon Seeks New “Refueler” For Air War in Pacific – Will it be Stealthy?

By Logan Williams, Warrior Editorial Fellow

In a future full-scale, near-peer war against the People’s Republic of China, the United States’ battle for air dominance is likely to be hard fought, and if it is won, it could be at an exceptionally high cost, depending upon the range and technological maturity of advanced Chinese air defenses. Without long periods of uncontested air dominance for the United States, its’ aerial refueling capabilities will be at significant risk, something which adds challenges to any US ability to penetrate into enemy airspace.

As the F-35 platforms operate with a combat radius nearing – but, remaining just under – 1,000 miles, and as the United States’ fourth-generation fighter aircraft operate with an even more limited combat radius, aerial refueling would be critical in any engagement in the Pacific. This would increase dwell time and place critical PRC targets more easily within reach of 5th-generation aircraft launching from US and Japanese warships or taking off from land-bases in Japan, South Korea, Guam and the Philippines.

However, are existing US refuelers survivable enough to perform their necessary mission in an conflict with China? There have been intimations about the creation of a true “stealth” aerial refueling tanker, for over a decade. In January 2023, the Pentagon reached out to industry experts, seeking information about the potential for “Next Generation Air Refueling Systems (NGAS).” Of course, no finalized designs or significant details have emerged, as of yet.

What would happen in a US-China airwar without the US operating stealthy refuelers? In one particular worst-case scenario, detailed in a thesis published by the Marine Corps University, it is postulated that the Chinese anti-access/areal denial (A2/AD) capabilities. This scenario postulates that China would be able to effectively completely exclude U.S. aircraft from penetrating the first island chain (includes the entirety of the South China Sea, Taiwan, Okinawa, and likely South Korea, but excludes the Philippines), and China would successfully establish an FEZ (fighter engagement zone) that extends to the second island chain (including the Philippines, the Mariana Islands, Guam, and Japan extending from Tokyo, south). This worst-case scenario also hinges upon the assumption that China’s A2/D2 capabilities will inhibit, or completely restrict, the entrance of the United States’ naval aircraft carriers into the South China Sea. Furthermore, this worst-case also presumes that the risk of continued bombardment of United States’ airfields close to Taiwan will discourage, or prevent, these airfields’ continued utilization — as in, this paper makes the reasonable assumption that China’s bombardment would not be “one-and-done” so-to-speak, but rather, that it would be a recurring and vexing threat.

Warrior Video Analyzes China Threat to Taiwan

Presuming that – as stated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in their recent wargame of a war between the United States and China – China chooses to decimate United States’ and allies’ airfields with aerial bombardment (CSIS states that 90% of aircraft attrition was due to destruction on the ground, from such bombardment), the surviving U.S. airfield nearest to Taiwan, in this worst-case scenario, would be Misawa Air Base in Aomori Prefecture — at the northernmost edge of Japan. Aomori is approximately 1650 miles from Taiwan.