Countering Hamas’ “Hybrid” Anti-Armor War…What Should an Israeli Ground Invasion Look Like?
Israeli Defense Forces appear to be waiting, planning and analyzing options regarding a ground invasion
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By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
Israeli Defense Forces appear to be waiting, planning and analyzing options regarding a ground invasion, an apparent deliberation and preparation which indicates that Israeli decision-makers are likely considering lessons learned from Ukraine.
While a ground incursion may still be likely, if not ultimately inevitable as part of an IDF military campaign, it takes little imagination to recognize that a linear, mechanized incursion into Gaza with standard formations and advancing armored forces might be extremely ill advised. IDF military tacticians have likely studied previous military confrontations with Hamas and also observed Ukraine’s success against an invading Russian force, and they are likely aware that an armored ground invasion with Merkava tanks and other armored formations is precisely what Hamas has been preparing for for quite some time.
Even a cursory examination of previous conflicts between the IDF and Hamas indicate that indeed Hamas is armed with an extremely lethal amount of Anti-Tank-Guided-Missiles and has a history of using obscured attack positions using terrain, buildings and an elaborate network of tunnels and trenches to ambush, attack and cripple IDF armor. Their previous style of war has for years been referred to as “hybrid,” meaning it involves a blend of lethal conventional weapons such as rockets, RPGs and ATGMs likely from Iran with standard terrorist and insurgent tactics. These kinds of Hamas tactics and warfare scenarios were well-articulated in an interesting 2009 essay called “Back to Basics” written by the US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The essay, which catalogs a detailed history of combat between both the IDF and Hezbollah as well as multiple engagements with Hamas in Gaza, explores in-depth analysis of the warfare tactics employed on both sides.
The IDF has likely studied this very carefully, as the 2009 study describes Hamas’ “hybrid” type of warfare tactics. The authors of “Back to Basics” explained that, by 2008, Hamas had indeed not only acquired large numbers of small arms and sniper rifles from Russia and Iran, but also had accumulated a formidable arsenal of anti-armor weapons such as SA-7s and RPG-29s, grenades and anti-tank-guided missiles. Given the state of commercial technology and weapons proliferation, Hamas is now likely to be armed with ATGMs with a higher-level of precision than may have been the case in 2008. These weapons, according to the study, were supplemented by an elaborate mixture of terrorist tactics to include the use of “extensive tunnels, IEDs, underground shelters and ambush points.”
Added to this equation is the fact that Gaza is highly condensed and heavily populated, a combat environment likely to require IDF armored forces to pass through narrow streets and passageways. Of course such circumstances only add to the vulnerability of IDF armor should it seek to enter and “take over” areas within Gaza defended by Hamas.
Hamas “Hybrid” War
This means Hamas fighters will be expected to deliberately hide and blend in with civilians, travel through an extensive amount of strategically placed tunnels, use IEDs and roadside bombs and seek positions of tactical advantage from which to attack IDF armor. Added to this equation, commercially available drone technology, coupled with ground robotics are have likely been acquired by Hamas from Iran or an open international market. This means Hamas fighters will likely be able to see and target incoming IDF forces much more effectively than may have been the case in 2009.