By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
When it comes to strategic deterrence postures against any massive incoming enemy nuclear or ballistic missile attack, even the most advanced countermeasures and missile defenses can be insufficient or ineffective. The term is often referred to as “bolt-out-of-the-blue,” a phrase identifying the dangers associated with a massive incoming “salvo” of missiles at one time.
A massive salvo would be designed to blanket an area with attacks, overwhelm defensive systems and ensure that large numbers of missiles proceed through to their targets. In the realm of nuclear attack, the prospect of bolt-out-of-the-blue is so alarming that the only real way to counter the possibility and achieve deterrence is through the assurance of catastrophic nuclear counterattack from air and sea. For instance, should an incoming ICBM attack be much too large and sudden for ground-based defenses to intercept, then the only thing potentially stopping and adversary from contemplating such an attack would be the presence of an undersea or air leg of the nuclear triad in position to ensure rapid, complete destruction of the attacking country in a counterstrike.
This concept regarding “Bolt-out-of-the-Blue” is often cited amid discussions of why the Pentagon needs a three-pronged nuclear triad consisting of air, land and sea nuclear weapons capability. In somewhat of a paradoxical way, the assurance of complete destruction of any attacker … keeps the peace.
Iran ballistic missiles
However, while the existence of the nuclear triad, which involves nuclear-armed submarines and aircraft may succeed in preventing a nuclear “bolt-out-of-the-blue,” what about a ballistic missile “bolt-out-of-the-blue?” Perhaps in similar fashion, the complete assurance of a devastating counterattack may be the only way to “deter” a ballistic missile offensive salvo of ballistic missiles attack. However, launching a devastating conventional ballistic missile attack as a response or countermeasure to a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack would not be without complications and challenges, as Hamas or Iranian rockets would most likely launch from populated areas with large and extremely vulnerable civilian populations.
Such a question becomes critical, if not extremely pressing for the Israeli Defense Forces and Israel as it confronts Hamas attacks. Not only would a large-scale “bolt-out-of-the-blue” rocket or missile attack from Hamas prove complicated to stop or counter, but a massive Iranian long-range ballistic missile “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack from Iran could similarly present serious or even more catastrophic problems for the IDF and Israel.
An examination of Iran’s large ballistic missile arsenal with a mind to guidance and range raises a serious threat possibility to Israel, as Iran appears to now operate at least five different long-range ballistic missiles capable of hitting Israel from Iran. Maps of the Middle East show Iranian missiles are easily able to hit Jerusalem and other parts of Israel from locations throughout Iran, as Jerusalem is less than 2,000km from Tehran. This means some ballistic missiles launched from Iran’s capital can hit Israel and an even higher number of long-range weapons can easily hit Israel from other locations within Western Iran.
An interesting and quite significant research paper from Iran Watch shows that indeed Iran does possess a massive arsenal of ballistic missiles, at least five of which can reportedly travel distances of 1,300km or more. The famous Shahab-3, for instance, is listed by Iran Watch as capable of traveling 1,300km with a 1,000kg warhead. The liquid fuel, single stage Shahab-3 rocket is now deployed and exists in large numbers. The longest range ballistic missile listed by Iran Watch is the Khorramshahr 1,2, and 4 .. weapons cited as able to travel as far as 2,000 to 3,000km. This means the missile could hit anywhere in Israel from Tehran or most places throughout Central and Western Iran. Other Iranian Medium Range Ballistic Missiles capable of traveling 1,600km or more are the now-deployed Ghadr, Emad and Paveh missiles, according to Iran Watch. The Iranian Sejjil MRBM can travel 2,000km as well.
By any estimation, this means Iranian ballistic missiles are capable of some kind of massive conventional “bolt-out-of-the-blue” attack. Such as possibility introduces significant tactical implications, because while precision interceptors such as Iron Dome and the Patriot missile recently provided by the US can certainly track and destroy individual attacks or even several attacking missiles at one time, even the most advanced or precise interceptors would be ill equipped to defend against a salvo of incoming Iranian missiles. An Iranian strategy, therefore, could easily consist of an effort to simply “overwhelm” and destroy Israeli air defenses, equipment storage facilities and command and control with a massive surprise “bolt-out-of-the-blue” ballistic missile attack. Such a possibility seems entirely realistic, particularly if Iran has surveillance technology in the form of drones to identify target areas and has precision-guidance systems on its ballistic missiles. Iran is known to operate drones, and while an Iranian ability to gather surveillance from satellites may be lesser known, it is extremely likely they would know IDF force locations, equipment storages and missile defense areas. Even if sensitive IDF and Israeli locations were well defended with interceptor missiles such as Iron Dome and Patriot systems, a bolt out of the blue would ensure that large numbers of Iranian ballistic missiles would likely “get through” and impact, damage or destroy high-value Israeli targets.
Therefore, it would seem to make sense that deterring an Iranian “bolt-out-of-the-blue” would need to be quite similar to strategic nuclear deterrence wherein the assurance of a second offensive strike is used as a deterrent. Defending against a salvo of Iranian missiles would similarly rely upon the assurance of a massive offensive retaliation which, in the case of Israel, could take many forms. Israel operates its own variant of the F-35, the F-35I Adir, and naturally has its own large arsenal of missiles and air attack platforms. It may be that one reason Iran has not, at least as of yet, attempted a “bolt-out-of-the-blue” ballistic missile attack is because they are aware they will face an immediate, massive and potentially catastrophic retaliation.
Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization and Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
