Israeli Defense Forces “Merkava Tank” vs Hamas Anti-Armor Weapons

By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization

As of more than 10-years ago, Hamas is well known to have large numbers of Anti-Tank-Guided Missiles, RPGs and rockets, an arsenal which has likely been massively upgraded and expanded since previous substantial Israeli-Hamas military confrontations roughly 10-to-15 years ago.

Hamas is likely now armed with a new generation of longer-range, precision-guided ATGMs, RPGs or other Iranian-provided anti-armor weapons, the kinds of munitions which had some success against Israeli tanks and armored vehicles years ago. Hamas is known historically for what, years ago, was referred to as a kind of “cutting-edge” Hybrid type warfare combining historic terrorist tactics with various kinds of conventional attacks and advanced weaponry.

Certainly the Israeli Defense Forces may pause or take time preparing for any possible ground invasion, given Ukraine’s success with anti-armor weapons and Hamas’ known combat history. However, should advanced IDF Merkava tanks enter Gaza, what are some of the threats and variables likely to define the experience? Could IDF Merkava tanks survive Hamas RPG and ATGM attacks? This is clearly a critical question likely being entertained by IDF commanders at the moment. For many years now, Hamas is known to have acquired large numbers of small arms and sniper rifles from Russia and Iran, but also had accumulated a formidable arsenal of anti-armor weapons such as SA-7s and RPG-29s, grenades and anti-tank-guided missiles, according to a 2009 essay called “Back to Basics” written by the US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Given the state of commercial technology and weapons proliferation, Hamas is now likely to be armed with ATGMs with a higher-level of precision than may have been the case at the time of the study.

The most essential variable, it would seem, relates to the extent to which fortified Hamas positions have already been found and destroyed. How many dismounted groups of ATGM-armed Hamas fighters have been found and killed? How many weapons caches have been attacked by IDF forces? To what extent will newer ISR in the form of drones, longer-range-high-fidelity EO/IR sensors succeed in finding and destroying dug-in, well-armed Hamas fighters who have likely been preparing for this kind of IDF attack for years. Will Hamas’ tunnels and underground hideouts be discovered and destroyed?

The answers to these questions, to the extent they can be known, are likely difficult to fully discern and will likely determine the pace, size and character of any larger-scale IDF invasion. Yet another variable is the extent to which Hamas fighter are or will be tactically adept? Will they rival Ukrainians with successful ambush-style, dismounted and dispersed anti-armor attacks? Certainly the IDF is likely to perform much better than the invading Russian Army, however the Hamas threat is likely being taken seriously by IDF commanders.