OP-ED Analysis: Countering insurgency and terrorism

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Countering insurgency and terrorism: op-ed

by Ikram Sehgal | Feb 11 – Warrior Global Security writer

Insurgency and terrorism having become endemic in Pakistan. The mixed success in developing an inherent capacity to counter both is surprising. We have to deal with two insurgencies, one feeding the Taliban in Afghanistan, the other directed towards terrorism within Pakistan and the world in general. Cocooned comfortably since 2002 in South Waziristan Agency by an inner core of Chechens, Arabs, Uzbeks, etc., settled here from the early 1990s, the Al-Qaeda hierarchy was holed up here since 2002, protected by an outer core of Mahsud tribal mercenaries, short on ideology but long on media hype, with cash fuelling their enthusiasm.

The militants of the Haqqani network, or the Gulbadin Hekmatyar-led group, do not target Pakistan but harbour terrorists who do. Given that the army must overcome an inherent reluctance to tackle them, diminished by two successive operations within six months the military capacity must be refurbished. Other than the insurgency in FATA, the immediate challenge in 2009 was the terrorism in Swat spawning a brutal insurgency by a different breed of barbarians, a “clear and present danger” to Pakistan’s continued existence as a civilised entity.

Locally recruited Frontier Corps troops are lightly armed, good only in their policing role, dealing with tribal rivalry and border smuggling, rather than engaging in military operations combating well-armed and experienced guerrillas. Based in Peshawar 11 Corps has only two infantry Divisions. Available troops are facing India, skilled in conventional warfare but with no expertise in counter-guerrilla warfare. Given the 2002 experience when militants targeted the Indian parliament in December 2001 and India massed four-fifths of its armed forces, as well as the 26/11 Mumbai incident in 2008, when a repeat of attacking Pakistan almost happened, thinning out troops along Pakistan’s eastern borders when already a 4:1 disadvantage existed was essentially a non-starter. India’s Cold Start Doctrine forced further contingency planning, shifting troops from proximity to their battle locations and retraining troops for counter-insurgency (COIN) operations became a fine balancing act.

An unmitigated disaster militarily, the 2004 operations in FATA and the subsequent 2007 one in Swat were psychologically devastating, debilitating for the morale and self-confidence of the army. Going into battle without adequate training or being properly equipped is bad enough, going without sufficient force, without proper motivation and/or battle-tested commanders down the line is asking for trouble. No surprise that military tactics on the ground were badly flawed. Some divisional commanders and most of the corps commanders promoted by Musharraf were meant for his personal survival, not deserving promotion past the lieutenant colonel’s rank. With consequent setbacks in operations a peace treaty had to be signed.