Survivability: The Origin of the Nuclear Deterrence Triad

Peter Huessy, Warrior Nuclear Weapons Analyst

In the late 1950’s, General Curtis LeMay, the USAF Chief of Staff, argued the US bomber strategic deterrent was vulnerable to a Soviet strike that could eliminate the US ability to retaliate. At issue argued General LeMay were the gravity bombs upon which the strategic nuclear airplanes relied. They were secured at only 14 storage areas on US military reservations. General LeMay feared a Soviet surprise attack on just those storage areas could disarm the United States. As a result, LeMay broached the idea of developing a complimentary survivable nuclear deterrent of either land or sea-based missiles not targetable by Soviet forces.

In October 1957 General LeMay’s concerns were further heightened with the Soviet launch of Sputnik. It was now feared that a series of Soviet satellites might continually orbit the earth and without notice strike the Air Force bomb storage depots, putting the US out of the nuclear deterrent business. Needless to say, sufficiently worried, the US sought to develop two new legs of what has become known as the “Nuclear Triad.” Developed not due to interservice rivalry but to secure our national survival although there was no guarantee that such new technology would be created.

In just five years, in a remarkable technological achievement, USAF General Bernard Shriever and Colonel Edward Hall directed the successful development of a new ICBM that was first deployed in October 1962. President Kennedy would later credit Minuteman for being his “ace in the hole” that peacefully resolved the Cuban missile crisis. And Rear Admiral Roderick Middleton directed the development of the Polaris missile to be deployed on submarines.

The US eventually deployed over 1000 such Minuteman missiles in five western and mid-western states in underground silos. These missiles could be launched to strike at key Soviet targets by Presidential order. One senior Air Force leader explained that such missiles enabled the US the flexibility to avoid what President Kennedy would describe as an “all or nothing posture which led to a choice between inglorious retreat or unlimited retaliation.”

USAF Chief General Nathan Twining shared the President’s concern and had argued as early as 1954 that instead of targeting the Soviets seeking to destroy their society under President Eisenhower’s policy of “massive retaliation”, or “mutual assured destruction,” the US would seek to strike the Soviets nuclear forces and disarm Mocow instead of destroying the entire country. This “counterforce strategy” of holding at risk Soviet military assets gradually replaced the “massive retaliation” strategy developed early in the Eisenhower administration and also became known as “flexible response.”

Critics See First Strikes, Supporters See Stability

The new Minuteman missiles were also solid fueled and thus unlike the liquid fueled Titan and Atlas ICBMS, these missiles did not take hours to fuel and get ready to launch. They were on alert 24/7/365. Thus, in a crisis the President did not have to alter the US strategic posture to sustain deterrence, a highly stabilizing element of the new ICBMs. However, critics of ICBMs saw in the force a threat to the Soviets where the US could in a crisis pre-emptively try and disarm Moscow in a first strike, taking out their nuclear assets.