by Peter Huessy, Senior Nuclear Weapons Analyst, Center for Military Modernization
The nature of nuclear deterrence is not fully understood in part because critics of nuclear modernization believe US restraint would engender reciprocal moves by adversaries such as China and Russia and establish deterrence at an equal level where no nation seeks to “play the nuclear card” and gain the military upper hand.
For example, in 2021 after the Commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, presented testimony to Congress about the dire state of the projected international nuclear balance, a number of critics claimed the Admiral had unnecessarily exaggerated the nuclear threat, especially from China and Russia.
Furthermore, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Issacs, for example, writing for the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, described the Admiral’s Hill testimony as both misleading, and mistaken in seeking “nuclear dominance” and the ability to “prevail” in a nuclear war.
Examining the Admiral’s testimony and much of his previous and subsequent remarks, however, reveals no call for US ability to “fight and win” a nuclear war, and then as Wilson and Issacs noted “rule over the ashes that remained.”
The Admiral did call for deterrence and the ability to compel an adversary not to cross the nuclear threshold, in addition to not undertaking conventional aggression.
But Wilson and Issacs do not seem to have understand the Admiral’s conception of deterrence, either as part of his Congressional testimony as well as some of the Admirals other observations, one in the February 2021 issue of Proceedings and later remarks the Admiral made to a NDIA conference in Alabama later that year.
In Proceedings, the Admiral warned that if the if the US failed to fix the gap in US nuclear deterrent strategy as perceived by Russia and China, the US would run the risk “of developing plans we cannot execute and procuring capabilities that will not deliver desired outcomes.”
Nuclear Threats
To Issacs and Wilson, seeking for the US to prevail in a conventional conflict is somehow not kosher as it would allow the US to as they put it, “play the nuclear card.” Actually, the whole point of the Admiral’s warning was that going nuclear by our adversaries would make securing conventional armed goals impossible.
Admiral Richard was explaining that the US could only prevail conventionally if the use of nuclear weapons were forgone by our adversaries, precisely what the arms control critics apparently favor as they repeatedly assert a nuclear war cannot be won nor should it ever be fought.
Admiral Richard concurred—he just understands that holding nuclear deterrence requires a credible nuclear force a President has to have deployed on time. Which was precisely the Admiral’s job to make sure was available, as he pointed out the seriousness of the nation’s situation in that of nine key procurements required to be available for deployment, only two had been delivered on time.
Isaacs and Wilson complain that while conceding Russia has modernized its nuclear forces to the 80%+ level, [now according to the DOD that percent has reached 90%] they assert the Admiral was inaccurate to portray the US as not yet fielding new nuclear forces because the US is planning on deploying such systems in the future as the United States embarks on a multi-billion dollar plus investment in new nuclear forces.
Adm. Richard: Need for Massive, Rapid Nuclear Modernization
It is unclear why the disagreement. The first nuclear deployed platforms come into the US inventory around 2030 and the deployments for the TRIAD are complete circa 2042. Here there is no argument. The fact that the US will in the future upgrade its deterrent is not the same as having a first-class deterrent now in the face of both heavy modernization in Russia and China where new systems are coming into the field now, not just sometime in the next decade. Admiral Richard was simply underscoring the critical need to sustain the modernization effort to meet these challenges, and that is what Wilson and Issacs apparently do not like. [Note: while a new strategic bomber will in all probability be available sooner than 2030, it will take some time to make the bomber nuclear capable.
Isaacs and Wilson also fail to understand the Admiral was laying out what is going to be the state of the nuclear environment at the conclusion of China’s buildup. The Admiral did warn that for “the first time, the United States needs to cope with two nuclear superpowers at the same time.” That indeed will be the case by 2030-35, as China’s deployed nuclear force level will begin to approach that of Russia and the United States. The Admiral carefully noted, the “US is facing two potential peer, nuclear capable adversaries at the same time.”
By their own assessment, Wilson and Issacs acknowledge part of the nuclear build is that the US is providing a life extension for US nuclear warheads for the first time since the 1980’s, some four decades ago. And not only are we late to the business of refurbishing our nuclear warheads, but as Admiral Richard explains, the US cannot now build a single “pit” or the bowling bowl size guts of a nuclear warhead, although current law requires the US to have the ability to produce 30 such pits by 2030. The US has modified existing warheads to lower yields for some submarine launched missiles, but that is not the same as creating new warheads.
Admiral Richard warned China was moving to a launch on warning capability or posture, which Issacs and Wilson complain is the fault of the US as China is simply emulating current US strategy. While it is true the US ICBMs and SLBMs at sea are on alert, they are not postured to be launched on warning, as all knowledgeable observers of the nuclear business know the US would launch our retaliatory missiles only once we have confirmed that the US has been attacked. And while the DOD 2020 China report noted that “China almost certainly keeps the majority of its nuclear force on a peacetime status – with separated launchers, missiles, and warheads” that is increasing not the status of the changing China nuclear force.
As General Robert Kehler, the now retired Commander of US Strategic Command, has explained, the US does indeed on a day to day basis deploy only a dyad, just as Admiral Richard pointed out– “day to day, what you have is basically a dyad.” While it is true the bombers could be placed back on alert, they have not been so deployed for years, a US policy of restraint that has not engendered reciprocal moves on the part of China or Russia.
Some critics of US nuclear modernization assert that Washington should forgo some nuclear modernization such as ICBMs, cruise missiles, and low-yield sea-launched warheads, and concentrate on rebuilding and upgrading our non-nuclear military capability, thus preventing a conflict from breaking out by improving deterrence at the conventional level. Such an assessment is muddle headed. The implicit assumption explained Admiral Richard of every conventional capability the US has is that “strategic [nuclear] deterrence will hold.” Further warned the Admiral, “None of our plans and no other capability will work as designed if strategic deterrence fails. This is not well understood and is often taken for granted.”
Integrated Nuclear Deterrence
And to achieve the integrated deterrence that will ensure nucle
ar deterrence holds requires an across-the-board effort in space, cyber, information operations, nuclear, and missile defense, as well as similar efforts by US allies and partners. Again, the Admiral emphasized “If I cannot set the conditions in which strategic deterrence holds, then no other commander’s plans will work as designed.”
If that means the US must have conventional and nuclear dominance, so be it. Reducing US forces to guarantee “fairness” or a military stalemate would be a powerful incentive for US adversaries to commit serial aggression.
When the China expansion is closely reviewed, the Admiral’s warnings are correct. He warned that China is building the capability “to execute any plausible nuclear employment strategy “and the “last brick in the wall of a military capable of coercion.” Or the very dominance critics deem unacceptable. Apparently, China is not listening.
In fact, in just the nuclear area, the Chinese are both developing and fielding: (1) precision strike DF-26 intermediate range missiles; (2) hundreds of new road and silo based ICBMs; (3) JIN-class submarines with JL-3 missiles; (4) a new NC3 capability; and an (5) anti-access and area denial network. All combined with launching more ballistic missiles annually than the rest of the world combined. Add China’s related non-nuclear technology including missile defenses; and hypersonic speed dual use technologies designed to evade detection and work around US terrestrial and space based sensor architecture, on top of a 350 ship Navy and the third largest air force in the world, bringing China to the cusp of “being the pacing threat in all domains—space, cyber, nuclear, [and] missile defense.”
Despite this breathtaking growth, critics underscore that the US has a nuclear stockpile of some 3600 warheads and thus still roughly a 9-1 advantage over China’s current nuclear forces. However, as Admiral Richard explained, treaty constraints make two-thirds of such warheads operationally unavailable for the US to deploy. On top of which the US must deter not just China but also Russia, North Korea, and others, simultaneously.
With the end of Cold War #1, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the overwhelming success of Desert Storm, “created the ultimate permissive environment” in favor of the United States. But while it was certain at that time that the chance of strategic deterrence failure was considered virtually non-existent, the expertise and the weapons systems the US had that gave us that security were allowed to atrophy, as the US “forgot how we got there.”
Now the US faces a dual threat, as China and Russia often do joint military exercises, and says he Admiral “have the ability to unilaterally escalate a conflict to any level of violence, in any domain, in any geographic location, and at any time.” The Admiral further referenced the historical example of the Cuban missile crisis. War did not breakout because “President Kennedy “had a range of capabilities that exceeded that of Khrushchev options” as Kennedy could pursue “incremental risks” while the Soviets choices were “all or nothing.” Walter Russell Mead put it this way in a recent Wall Street Journal essay explaining that US hegemony after the end of Cold War #1 was achieved by will and power, not diplomatic dexterity, and virtue.
The currently planned nuclear force is exactly that power needed to deter, not in the service of aggression but to prevent it. The additional good news is that now some four decades since we started working on defenses, Admiral Richard also underscored that technology now allow the US to deploy advanced missile defenses that can impose costs on our adversaries, deny any advantage to the use of offensive missiles, stress the defense budgets of our adversaries, and discourage the adoption of escalate to win strategies, all of which is now central to ensuring that nuclear deterrence holds. When added together, the US can make sure that every day our adversaries make the same decision and as the sign behind Admiral Richard’s desk wisely put it: “Not Today.”
By Peter Huessy is the Senior Nuclear Weapons analyst, Center for Military Modernization. Huessy is also President of Geo-Strategic Analysis, Potomac, Maryland. Huessy has a Masters Degree in International Relations from Columbia University and a BS in East Asian Studies from Yonsel University in Seoul, South Korea.
