Could the U.S. Quickly Win a Ground or Amphibious War Against Iran?

By Kris Osborn, Warrior

Shahed drone swarms, mines, anti-armor weapons and ballistic missile “salvo” attacks are certain to be on the Pentagon’s radar at the moment, as strategists wargame and analyze contingencies regarding the potential “reality” of some kind of ground combat with Iran. Surely the intent is to simply give the President and Pentagon decision-makers well-informed “options” for consideration as the Iran war balances upon a delicate threshold between negotiation and massive escalation. 

Hundreds of pages of strategic speculation, weapons analysis, force comparisons and geographical assessments could be written about the daunting yet potentially realistic prospect of a U.S. ground attack on Iranian soil, yet some of the prevailing discussion seems to lack critical tactical and technological context. 

Perhaps the most critical questions regarding a possible ground attack on Iranian forces, or successful amphibious assault along coastal areas or Kharg island, pertain to technology, tactics and air support.  However, as is often the case with any kind of large scale military operation, these factors all rely upon successful “logistical” execution.  Preparing, staging and deploying a large, mechanized ground force is a massive and difficult undertaking, particularly when points of entry are most likely Turkish territory or the ocean. It seems unlikely the U.S. could stage an invasion force in Iraq, but there may be previously unknown contingencies which become available. Regardless, the say the prospect is “high-risk” might be an understatement, in large measure because any concentrations of U.S. force would immediately offer a “target” for some of Iran’s remaining precision-guided ballistic missiles. 

No “Thunder Run” 

 Iran is not Iraq and there is not hundreds of miles of flat desert amenable to a “Thunder Run” type of capture of Tehran. A simple look at a map would suggest that a large mechanized force may need to enter from Turkey, requiring armored columns to transit heavily mountainous areas in Northern Iran en route to holding “territory” inside the country.  Defensive forces would be sure to lay mines and obstacles and use uneven terrain to ambush, surprise or counter advancing forces. Iranians know the terrain and defending forces could use underground tunnels for weapons and forces and places to stage attacks.   The effectiveness of shoulder-mounted anti-armor weapons and drone attacks has been well-established in Ukraine, so advancing U.S. Army tanks could prove vulnerable to suicide drone swarm attacks and the kinds of anti-armor hit-and-run ambushes proved effective in Ukriane. 

The general size of Iran’s 1 million-plus ground force, 4,071 tanks and more than 8,000 armored vehicles is well known; the mountainous, difficult, underground terrain throughout the large country is also known.  There is little question that a traditional linear mechanized armored assault would prove extremely difficult and costly, yet if fortified by unchallenged air superiority and new generations of AI-enabled multi-domain sensing and targeting …. decisive, rapid success does not seem entirely unrealistic.  Achieving this outcome, however, would require successful application of new forms of Combined Arms Maneuver, advanced, layered drone defenses and sensors, and an AI-enabled ability to instantly “close” the “sensor-to-shooter” gap. This would likely be the measure of difference, meaning if the U.S. military could operationalize its networking and targeting breakthroughs in an actual military campaign, Iranian forces might be destroyed quickly. With advanced, modern, multi-domain ISR, 5th-generation air superiority and a massively truncated sensor-to-shooter time, U.S. aircraft and ground-fired weapons might quickly destroy Iranian forces minutes after they first appear to U.S. sensors such as drones, satellites and surveillance planes operating in largely uncontested airspace. This has already been shown to be the case thus far in Iran, to a certain extent, as rapid U.S. “sensor-to-shooter” time has caused Iranian “launchers” to be destroyed quickly after emerging from hidden positions to attack.  

Most of the risks of a ground attack would be well known, as they would primarily come in the form of drone swarm attacks and ballistic missiles. Iran does operate an arsenal of precision-guided missiles, to a somewhat unknown extent, which could be fired at advancing forces. The question is, could mobile, ground-based air-defense systems “see” and “intercept” these missiles while U.S. forces were in any way “concentrated” or “on the move?” Could Iranian launchers and launch points be so degraded that Iran would only have a limited ability to fire missiles at advancing U.S. forces?  Also, it is important to bear in mind that the U.S.-IDF air campaign has decimated much of Iraq's military, and the remaining regime leaders are likely to be operating without much command and control infrastructure. Defending any territory or fighitng a land force in any capacity would require logisitical coordination and some kind of command hub, something which may no longer exist within Iran.

Mobile Patriots

U.S. advancing units would undoubtedly need to maneuver with organic air-defenses and multi-domain networking to “see” and “intercept” or destroy incoming Iranian ballistic missiles. Patriot missile batteries are combat proven, massively upgraded and “road mobile” to a degree. All major components—including the radar set, engagement control station, antenna mast group, power plant, and launching stations—are mounted on heavy-duty M860 semi-trailers, which are towed by Oshkosh M983 HEMTT trucks.  The newest Patriot interceptors will soon be upgraded with a 360-degree Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense radar able to track and intercept multiple maneuvering incoming targets at one time. U.S. ground forces would need large numbers of ready, deployable Patriot missile batteries to advance alongside mechanized units and protect forward positioned troop concentrations. As of early 2026, LTAMDS radar was not yet operational, yet the system is quickly transitioning from successful prototype to production. 

Drone Swarm Defense

The largest risks of any ground attack would likely relate to swarming Shahed drones, systems which Iran is known to “mass” produce, supply to Russia and regularly use against U.S. interests.  Surely the intent would be to see and destroy drone launch locations, yet any advancing ground force in Iran would simply “have” to have operational drone swarm defenses. This is much easier said than done, and it pertains to how mature and deployable the many counter-drone technologies are. There are many promising C-UAS technologies in development, ranging from “smart” interceptors such as the Coyote, to vehicle-mounted lasers and fast developing non-kinetic defenses such as EW and High Powered Microwave. The question is clear and simple: Many of these technologies are reasonably mature, mobile and potentially prepared for deployment, yet are they available? Can they be quickly produced at scale? How long would it take to integrate C-UAS lasers, interceptors and EW into operational units? This has happened to some degree already, yet the potential success of any ground operation relates in a very significant way to the answer to this question. If there are not effective drone swarm defenses, then it seems clear a land incursion of any kind might be ill advised or simply too costly to consider. 

The U.S. Army does, however, have operational counter-drone lasers and EW, so the question is how tailored are they to the Iranian threat and how “many” of them currently support Army units. Can they be produced quickly “at scale?” Do they exist in a substantial, deployable capacity? AV, for example, makes the now operational 50-kw LOCUST laser system, and Army ground units now also deploy with an integrated C-UAS system called Low, slow, small unmanned aircraft Integrated Defeat System (LIDS). This Raytheon system uses KuRFS radar with Coyote interceptors and an integrated Syracuse Research Systems EW system to destroy or “jam” attacking drones.  Could these operational technologies counter Iranian Shahed drones in a ground war? What about a salvo or swarm of attack drones?  Could these be deployed widely and sufficiently across a ground attack force to ensure maneuvering units could counter Iranian drone swarms? Would operational LIDS units succeed in jamming groups of Shahed drones? If the answer is yes, to a clear extent, then the prospect of a ground invasion might make more tactical sense. If the answer is  no, or not sufficiently, then a ground assault would simply be ill advised or too risky, as poorly defended drone swarm attacks could devastate armored convoys and troop concentrations. In Ukraine, for instance, U.S. made Switchblade kamikaze drones have simply decimated Russian T-90 tanks with an ability to loiter and “strike” as an explosive anti-armor weapon. Could Iranian Shaheds be seen and countered with sufficient success such that a mechanized advance could favor success?  This largely pertains to a possible “unknown” as well, meaning the extent of Iran’s existing drone arsenal may not be fully known, as much of it is likely buried underground.  Thus far, Iranian drone attacks have been limited to further stand-off ranges, yet a closer-in approaching U.S. Army force might be easier for Iran to target. 

Networking - Sensor-to-Shooter Time 

One possibility favoring success would include the integration of AI; for years, Raytheon and its Pentagon partners have been working to leverage an AI-enabled ability to gather incoming sensor data, perform analytics and pair a threat with a shooter or “effector” in seconds. Should this capability be mature and deployable now, then mobile armored units could potential maneuver with an organic, high-speed, fast-acting drone defense system. Using AI to verify threats and match an approaching threat with an optimal countermeasure in seconds could give ground Commanders an ability to “see” and “counter” attacking drones and drone swarms much farther away.  It is realistic that this capability is “here” in an operational sense now, given the massive breakthrough successes all the U.S. military services have been having in the realm of AI-enable threat detection and sensor-to-shooter pairing. 

Simply put, the time it takes for a sensor to acquire a target, verify it, process otherwise disparate incoming pools of sensor data, and identify a “shooter” or weapon capable of taking rapid lethal action ….has in recent years gone from 20 minutes …to a matter of seconds. Should the U.S. military now be able to “operationalize” these technological breakthroughs in a tactical combat, land-air-sea war environment, it is reasonable to posit that an opposing Iranian ground force could be destroyed quickly before moving into a position to “attack” or “counter” advancing U.S. forces.  Urban terrain would make overhead targeting more difficult and present challenges when it comes to exacting precision strikes on Iranian forces on the move, yet there are vast areas of open terrain clearly visible to U.S. satellites, drones and surveillance systems wherein Iranian ground forces would need to maneuver.  It seems entirely realistic that they could be destroyed quickly and decisively from the air  – should the current U.S. military breakthroughs translate into operational and tactical reality.  An ability to operate with complete air superiority, therefore, could massively favor an advancing U.S. ground force as enemy formations could be seen and destroyed from long-range stand-off distances before U.S. units were susceptible to Iranian ground-vehicle fire. 

However, with newer applications of Combined Arms Maneuver, adequate sensing and high-speed sensor-to-shooter time, pockets of dispersed Iranian fighters might be seen from the air and destroyed quickly by armed drones and fixed-wing fighter jets performing Close Air Support.  Certainly going house-to-house with some kind of Close Quarter Battle (CQB) would be ill advised and likely too costly for an advancing armored ground force, as Iranian fighters would hide in urban terrain and use buildings, bridges, checkpoints or narrowly configured areas to “ambush” U.S. armored formations. However, it seems feasible that a decisive victory could be achieved, and the existing Iranian regime could fully collapse, without there ever needing to be close-in-urban warfare in a large-scale capacity. Anti-regime Iranians could be armed, Iranian forces of any considerable threat could be seen and destroyed from the air, and a multi-domain U.S. military joint force could create a less contested  attack “corridor” to Tehran. 

Modern Combined Arms maneuver, using drones, multi-domain networking, unmanned vehicles and dispersed, yet integrated formations, would heavily favor the U.S. Army in armored warfare. Iran is known to have more than 4,000 tanks, most of which are Soviet-era T-72s, yet it is extremely unlikely that they are modernized with state-of-the-art thermal sights, targeting, computing and command and control capacity. Much smaller numbers of modern Abrams tanks with Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR) sensors, manned-unmanned teaming, air-ground networking and long-range targeting systems would likely be well positioned to prevail in tank warfare against a numerically larger Iranian armored force.  An interesting report in “21st Century Asian Arms Race,” states Iran has German-built Leopard tanks as well as Russian T-90s and even some Abrams. Iran’s first widely reported indigenous tank called the Farrar has emerged in recent years, a platform said to be based upon an upgraded Iranian T-72S chassis. The Iranian tank, reported to operate with an electro-optical fire control system, laser rangefinder and ballistic computer, would at least on the surface appear to most likely be vastly inferior to the U.S. Abrams. 

Massive Attack from the Sea

Perhaps with the U.S. Army’s increasing watercraft fleet and growing Marine Corps ability to transport armor ship-to-shore, a large-scale amphibious operation could launch from the Persian Gulf, something which could remove any need to enter Iran from Turkish territory on the ground. Once a beachhead was secured to some capacity, then potentially thousands of troops, weapons and armored vehicles could enter Iran from the ocean. While time consuming and logistically difficult, Iran has no ability to target arriving forces from the air and would be left to launch drone swarms and missile attacks on arriving forces. Surely a “salvo” of missiles or series of combined drone swarms would pose a serious risk, yet an amphibious attack would be supported by 5th-generation, amphib-launched F-35Bs, surface and air drones and integrated ISR.  Marine units can now quickly transport 70-ton armored vehicles with new Ship-to-Shore Connectors, use unmanned systems and operate with some warship-supported counter-drone weapons. Given the expectation of mines, it would make sense if unmanned systems were the first to breach the perimeter and clear a path or corridor for landing Marines. It is no longer impossible to envision a scenario in which large numbers of tanks and armored vehicles can be delivered over the ocean, given the vast extent to which the Army has developed new watercraft and worked on becoming more expeditionary.  Should the drone and ballistic missile threat be neutralized or massively diminished, the U.S. could potentially occupy fortified positions along the coastline to open the Strait of Hormuz.  However, forward units arriving on islands or coastline will need to be quickly fortified with mobile air defenses, protective cover from Navy warships and transportable, ground-fired drone swarm defenses. 

Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University