Decades of planning haven't erased the sub deficit. Can industry finally accelerate Virginia-class production to meet the Navy's urgent, growing needs?
By Kris Osborn, Warrior
(Washington DC) For many years, the US Navy, Congress and US defense industry leader have been “planning” and “talking” about creating a massive yearly uptick in attack submarine production in an effort to address and offset the worsening attack submarine deficit now experienced by the Navy.
More than a decade ago, US Navy combatant commander need for attack submarines outpaced and exceeded available supply, and the gap has progressively gotten worse over the course of the last decade. At several points in recent years, the US Navy commissioned and launched specific industrial base studies to assess industry’s ability to “flex” to accommodate the need to build two Virginia-class submarines every years when the Columbia-class begins to emerge. At several points Navy decision makers and Congressional appropriators even outlined an ambitious plan to try to build “three” Virginia-class submarines per year.
Despite large-scale efforts from General Dynamics Electric Boat and HII, and some funding increases put in place by lawmakers and Navy decision makers, the desired pace of submarine construction has yet to materialize. This problem of an attack submarine deficit has been outlined for years in the US Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan which, among other things, detailed the growing “drop” in available submarines. The question is one of production capacity, budget and simple math. Los Angeles-class submarines, which have served admirably for decades, are retiring at a faster pace than Virginia-class attack submarines can be added, therefore the submarine deficit has been growing. The challenge has been intensified due to the arrival of the Columbia-class, nuclear armed ballistic missile submarines which are now under construction as well. The service, and its industry partners have struggled to sustain a pace of “two” Virginias per years as construction demands for the Columbias emerge and intensify
Two Virginia-class Boats “Per Year”
The Navy has “procured” two Virginia-class boats at a rate of two per year since 2011, yet the service and its industrial partners have not been able to build the submarines at this pace since 2019, a circumstance which has in recent years greatly exacerbated the service’s submarine deficit problem. As of mid 2025, the US Navy operated 19 Virginia-class boats and 29 Los Angeles-class submarines, according to Embleholics, yet the Navy has for many years hoped it could operate a fleet of as many as 50 Virginia-class attack subs by the mid 2040s, according to its 2016 30-year shipbuilding plan.
The US Navy’s 2025 “30-Year Shipbuilding Plan” states the service plans to again build two Virginias per year by 2028
Virginia-class submarines are built by a cooperative arrangement between the Navy and Electric Boat, a subsidiary of General Dynamics and Newport News Shipbuilding, a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries. Each industry partner constructs portions, or “modules,” of the submarines which are then melded together to make a complete vessel
Need for Submarines
There is virtually “zero” ambiguity when it comes to “why” the US Navy needs additional submarines, as the reasons emerge purely from operational need, particularly in the Pacific theater. The need for advanced Block III and beyond Virginia-class submarines emerges from their ability to access high risk areas while remaining less detectable than large surface warships. Block III, Block IV and Block V Virginia-class submarines, in particular, are now operating with enhanced quieting technologies such as engine adjustments, sound-absorbing “coating” materials and new generations of antennas less likely to emit a detectable signal. In a world of contingency, Virginia-class attack submarines could prove essential to stopping any kind of PLA amphibious assault on Taiwan, given that they might be able to maneuver into position to destroy Chinese warships such as destroyers and amphibs without being detected. Surface warships can of course easily be seen by drones, satellites and other surveillance systems, yet ultra quiet, stealthy attack submarines lurking beneath the surface are far more difficult to locate. This is particularly true in expansive combat theaters such as the Pacific, as the US Navy would likely need to “mass” undersea firepower should be be forced to confront a PLA invasion of Taiwan.
Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University