U.S. Navy Has New Weapons to Counter Drone Swarms at Sea

By Kris Osborn, Warrior Maven

The U.S. Navy’s record defending drone and missile attacks in the Red Sea was essentially “perfect,” and many lessons were learned, weapons were acquired and new tactics were refined. Navy commanders explained the success in a multi-fold fashion, referring to sailor weapons training, effective doctrine, multi-domain sensing and breakthrough levels of “joint” command and control. For the USS Eisenhower Carrier Strike Group in the Red Sea, which include the USS Laboon destroyer, tracking and eliminating incoming Houthi attacks was a consistent, focused sailor focus on training, tactics and doctrine. 

Could this success inspire some to posit that perhaps U.S. Navy warships could simply “escort” and protect ships passing through the Strait? Would U.S. Navy experience countering drones and missiles, combined with weapons and trained sailors be sufficient to allay the fears of commercial oil tankers seeking peaceful transit? This is a key question as there are many variables central to this equation, and Iran is known to randomly and at times indiscriminately attack commercial vessels unrelated to the ongoing military conflict. The intent here would simply be to create global political and economic chaos and instability, by making the Strait of Hormuz essentially “too dangerous” to transit. 

U.S. Navy “Could” Protect Ships

Analyzing the tactical and technological circumstances surrounding Iranian missile and drone attacks in the Strait of Hormuz, one can discern two colliding trajectories. In one sense, yes the U.S. would be well positioned to “protect” ships passing through the Strait from Iranian attack, yet the mere “promise” of surface warship protection may not be sufficient to quell the hesitations and concerns of commercial oil traffickers who are all too well aware that they would be targeted without restraint. 

At the same time, while “perfection” in the realm of drone and missile defense at sea is not something which can be “guaranteed,” U.S. Navy warships do operate with an advanced suite of layered drone and missile defenses which have been proven extremely effective. Not only can incoming drones now be “seen” consistently from long stand-off distances with ground, air, space and surface ship sensing, radar and ISR, but U.S. Navy warships increasingly operate with advanced countermeasures. Ship-integrated drone defenses have been improved in recent months following the U.S. Navy’s Red Sea experience with new counter-drone weapons, longer-range high-fidelity sensors, multi-domain “joint” networking and command and control .. and improved threat detection systems. 

Ship-Fired Coyote

For instance, the U.S. Navy has integrated a maritime variant of the well-known Coyote land-based counter-drone interceptor. Coyote is a mini-drone and missile which can operate in both an offensive and defensive capacity; the weapon can conduct standard drone surveillance with EO/IR cameras or fire out from armored vehicles with a proximity fuse and “explode” in the air to disperse fragmentation across an “area” and potentially disable an entire attacking drone swarm.  Now, the U.S. Navy has integrated the Coyote into its layered ship defense systems so the weapon-drone-counterdrone weapon can fire out from the deck of a surface warship to detonate across an “area” to disable, stop, jam or fully “destroy” attacking drone swarms by “detonating” at a specific designated “spot” to destroy groups of drones at one time. 

Overall, the question invites a juxtaposition or contradiction, because while yes the U.S. Navy most-likely “could” protect non-military ships with its experience, surveillance, weaponry and countermeasures …..yet the promise of U.S. protection is likely not enough to assuage the fears and hesitations fundamental to ship crews seeking to transit the  Strait of Hormuz. 

Red Sea experience

While the Iranian threat in the Strait of Hormuz is certain to be more serious that that posed by the Houthis in the Red Sea in recent years, yet the Navy has specific countermeasure protocols, doctrinal practices, weapons systems, layered defenses and coordinated command and control to “see” the area and “defend” as necessary. A Carrier Strike Group is armed with many responsive options, including specific weapons and tactics designed to counter drone and small boat swarms.  Surveillance aircraft, drones and satellites will be in position to quickly “detect” Iranian small boats, and the Navy has the sensors and weapons to destroy them at stand-off ranges before they can get close enough to attack. This can be coordinated by aerial surveillance, fighter jets in position to fire precision air-to-surface weapons at boats on the move, and closer-in ship defenses such as Close-in-Weapons-System (CWIS). The CWIS weapon is a deck-mounted phalanx gun able to fire 4,500 rounds per minute at incoming projectiles by firing small tungsten-steel interceptors to “blanket” incoming threats with suppressive fire. Closer-in layered defenses also include missiles known as SeaRAM and Rolling Airframe Missile, precision-guided interceptors able to target and destroy maneuvering small boats at stand-off ranges.  Warships such as Arleigh-Burke-class destroyers are also armed with 5-in deck mounted guns able to target small boats approaching from different angles at one time. 

Drone vs Drone

Most recently, U.S. Navy warships have been armed with deck-launched counter drone “drones” armed with proximity fuzes. These are extremely significant, as they can be fired to a specific target “area” in close “proximity” to a drone swarm and explode or detonate across an “area” to disable, degrade or stop attacking drone swarms.  One such example is the Coyote drone which has already been integrated into armored vehicles to counter drone swarms; the Navy has now configured the weapon for ship-launched counter-drone operations. 

A few key lessons learned from the Red Sea include the use of carrier-launched fighter jets for targeting missions, aerial surveillance to see drones and cruise missiles from beyond the horizon, or weapons platforms able to “shoot” and destroy threats from the air. Yet another key lesson from the Red Sea, according to Navy commanders, is that a “deep magazine” is needed to counter drones.  Naval commanders from the Red Sea also say they learned new lessons about multi-domain command and control, meaning the value of connecting space assets with air surveillance and ground-based nodes to ensure an integrated threat picture. 

Marine Air Defense Integrated System

There is another critical tactic now in place on U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships, and it involves the U.S. Marines using tactical combat vehicles on the deck of warships to conduct counter-drone operations. Small tactical vehicles are now integrated with a system called Marine Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS), a suite of counter drone technologies positioned around the perimeter of the ship deck to track incoming drones and drone swarms; MADIS uses electronic warfare, advanced sensors and heat-seeking, shoulder launched Stinger missiles to counter enemy drones, helicopters and low-flying fixed wing aircraft.  These Marine units add an additional layer of drone swarm protection to surface ships as they increase both surveillance and countermeasures from the deck of a ship. 

Island Hopping? 

An unknown “x” factor in all of this is the prospect of some kind of amphibious operation; the USS Tripoli is also in the Gulf with 2,000 Marines, Osprey tiltrotors and F-35Bs all in position to support some kind of sea-air-land incursion in case they were ordered to seize and hold some island territory. With undersea unmanned systems, surface drones, a protective envelope provided by Aegis-radar on destroyers, air support and suppressive fire from large warships, it seems conceivable that an amphibious force could perform some kind of limited “island hopping” or amphibious operation. 

Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University