by Kris Osborn, Warrior It seems rather self-evident that strategists at the Pentagon are likely keeping a close eye on Taiwan, out of concern that perhaps the People’s Republic of China might seek to exploit U.S. involvement in Iran as a window of opportunity to seize or annex the island. Should the PRC leadership [https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/international-relations/how-one-man-s-prediction-fueled-fears-of-a-2027-taiwan-invasion/ar-AA1XMNtr?ocid=BingNewsVerp] think the Pentagon is distracted, tired and possibly operating with depleted stockpiles of ammunition, it does seem conceivable that the PLA might be incentivized to consider an “earlier than anticipated” rapid take over of Taiwan. “Fait Accompli” is the phrase consistently used by military analysts [https://www.yahoo.com/news/articles/xi-fires-army-commander-taiwan-160732497.html] writing the Pentagon’s annual China report, as it is a term referencing the possibility that China might seek to “seize” Taiwan so quickly that it becomes an immediate new “Fait Accompli” or new status quo. The concept would be to annex Taiwan before U.S. and allied forces could intervene, thereby placing Taiwan’s defenders in a serious predicament. Would the U.S., South Korea, Japan and others attempt to “extricate” an embedded Chinese force from Taiwan? Surely the PRC might think that the U.S. and its allies might consider invading [https://time.com/7304355/china-invasion-taiwan-2027/] to liberate Taiwan to be far too costly a proposition in terms of human lives and dollars. Forward Presence This is likely why the Pentagon and U.S. Navy so consistently emphasizes the forward “presence” of U.S. Navy assets in the region. The idea of forward presence is not merely designed for broad regional deterrence purposes, but it also seems to be part of a key “response time” and “proximity” calculus. An ability to stop China from taking Taiwan would likely rely quite heavily [https://time.com/7327558/taiwan-china-independence-military-war-invasion/]on the “speed” of allied intervention. Taiwan is merely 100 miles from mainland China, so the PLA might only be able to be stopped “if” a defensive intervening force were able to “get there” in time. This is why proximity is so critical and the reason why the U.S. Navy regularly operates [https://www.msn.com/en-us/politics/government/why-china-s-plans-for-taiwan-are-in-trouble/vi-AA1XDKPr?ocid=BingNewsVerp] two carriers in the region. An F-35C has a range of roughly 1,300 km, so it stands to reason that the U.S. Navy would be well advised to operate within striking range of the waters near Taiwan. Part of the Southern Japanese islands are roughly 500 miles from Taiwan, so the U.S. Navy is quite deliberate about basing one of its carriers in Japan. Two U.S. Navy Carriers Still In Pacific As for the question of whether Taiwan [https://www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/unmanned-vehicles/report-calls-for-taiwan-to-build-drone-based-hellscape-to-deter-chinese-invasion/] is vulnerable during U.S. combat operations in the Middle East, it seems that may not truly be the case. While there is unquestionably a carrier shortage across the Navy, and certainly the Pentagon is focused on Iran, yet there are still two U.S. Navy carriers in the Pacific. [https://www.npr.org/2026/03/04/nx-s1-5727608/as-trumps-plans-visit-to-china-arms-package-to-taiwan-is-delayed] The USS George Washington is based in Yokosuka, Japan and the USS Theodore Roosevelt is also in the Pacific theater, so while the U.S. might not be able to “flex” or “mass” power quickly in the event of a Chinese attack, it does appear that stealth aircraft, warships and certainly attack submarines remain in a position to intervene. ISR would be critical to this equation, however, given how close Taiwan is to mainland China. China routinely violates Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) by flying bombers and fighter jets within striking range of Taiwan, and the PLA Navy routinely conducts amphibious warfare drills and carrier operations within reach of Taiwan [https://www.pbs.org/video/taiwan-under-threat-1769552002/] as well. Could some of these “training” operations in the air or sea provide the PLA with a stage, excuse or cover from which to launch a fast, sudden surprise attack on Taiwan? That is certain to be a Pentagon concern. Timing of Taiwan attack There are competing schools of thought when it comes to the question of “timing” regarding the PRC’s intent to claim the island; in one sense, the PLA might seek to invade earlier than expected in an effort to leverage its short-term superiority in the realm of hypersonic weapons. The PLA has had operational DF-17 hypersonic missiles for quite some time, yet the U.S. is just now starting to establish its ground-launched Long Range Hypersonic Weapon in the Pacific and the U.S. Navy is a year or two away from deploying its Conventional Prompt Strike hypersonic missile on warships. Any potential window of PLA superiority in the realm of hypersonics, however, is closing quickly. Nevertheless, should the PLA have an impactful arsenal of operational hypersonic weapons, it could in effect create a bubble or hypersonic attack circle to keep U.S. and allied forces from successfully being able to survive an intervention on behalf of Taiwan. In another sense, however, the PLA might be better served to “wait” for several more years to enable its fast-growing stealth aircraft fleet to grow to the point where it could rival the U.S. and its allies. While the PLA AF is believed to operate hundreds of J-20s, its carrier-launched J-35 5th-gen stealth fighter exists in very small numbers, and its seems highly unlikely that the PLA’s 5th-gen force could rival a massive formation of Japanese, U.S. and Australian F-35s in position to strike from carriers and amphibs. Five years from now, however, the balance of power in the realm of stealth aircraft is likely to be quite different in terms of pure numbers, given the rapid arrival of the J-35 and existence of 6th-Gen J-36 and J-50. Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a highly qualified expert in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University
