By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
(Washington D.C.) Russian threats to use nuclear weapons are by no means new or surprising at this point, given their previous rhetoric and well-documented tendency to “escalate” to win, pressure or intimidate. However Putin’s most recent “threat” points to a broader question of great significance, such as “is this scare tactic working?”
Russia, Ukraine & Nuclear Weapons
It is a clear and significant question, meaning does this kind of threatening rhetoric, scare tactics or posturing truly afford Putin some kind of strategic advantage? It might. Certainly the prospect of nuclear catastrophe and the realities of a potentially unwinnable war are sufficient to cause any country pause when it comes to the questions of any escalation, yet Russia has a long history of using these kinds of tactics to essentially “hold the world hostage.” Is it pure manipulation to compensate for what appears to be military inferiority?
The Biden Administrations 2022 Nuclear Posture Review uses the interesting and significant term “shield” to “justify” aggression, suggesting that indeed Russia uses the prospect of a nuclear attack as a specific and pointed defense against being intervened upon or stopped militarily by NATO.
“Russia has conducted its aggression against Ukraine under a nuclear shadow characterized by irresponsible saber-rattling, out of cycle nuclear exercises, and false narratives concerning the potential use of weapons of mass destruction. In brandishing Russia’s nuclear arsenal in an attempt to intimidate Ukraine and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Russia’s leaders have made clear that they view these weapons as a shield behind which to wage unjustified aggression against their neighbors,” the text of the 2022 Pentagon NPR says.
However realistic the threat, and it is properly being taken quite seriously, the mere use of the possibility may be one reason why NATO is extremely careful to try to avoid escalation. Is this concern part of why there was never a decision to establish a no-fly zone? Is it part of why much longer-range missiles able to reach into Russia are not being sent? It would make sense if this were the case, as the consequences of nuclear war are so immense that, however small the risk, it is not one worth taking.