By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
(Washington D.C.) Multiple Russian news reports are printing sharp criticisms and what could be called “propaganda-type” spin related to the planned arrival of US Abrams and German Leopard 2s in Ukraine.
Abrams Tanks
“Of course, Leopard and Abrams tanks are very powerful vehicles. However, these tanks are garbage unless they are protected by fighter jets and enjoy strong defense and artillery support,” Vice President of the Russian Academy of Missile and Artillery Sciences Konstantin Sivkov told the Turkish Aydinlik newspaper, as cited in Russia’s state-backed TASS news service.
Interestingly, while the criticisms and comments invite substantial skepticism and lack context, several of the comments and quotes mentioned in Russia’s TASS news agency and the Russian-owned Sputnik news point to important questions related to the war in Ukraine and some of its tactical dynamics and concepts of operation.
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Both TASS and Sputnik essays argue that US Abrams tanks will encounter a “survivability” problem against Russia given the current state of anti-armor weapons and a lack of fighter jets, close air support and Combined Arms Maneuver integration.
“The decision to provide Ukraine with Western main battle tanks is, literally, a suicide pact, something those who claim they are looking out for the best interests of Ukraine should consider before it is too late,” Scott Ritter writes in the Russian Sputnik newspaper. Ritter goes on to suggest that, to a large extent, the value of heavy armor such as tanks may have been “outstripped” by the advent of anti-armor weapons and other technologies.
Certain newer drone and anti-tank weapon technologies likely continue to greatly impact evolving concepts of operation, threat assessments and maneuver formations as militaries look to the future of war, yet the suggestion that tanks have been “outstripped” seems completely off base or flatly wrong in a number of respects. While Ritter’s observation may have proven true for Russian forces attempting to close-in on Ukraine, his observation seems to lack critical context and detail of great consequence to modern war.
Clearly Ukraine’s success against invading Russian tanks has raised impactful new questions about the efficacy of well-employed anti-armor weapons such as Javelins Ukrainian forces used to incinerate Russian tanks in large numbers. This kind of disaggregated, de-centralized ambush-style hit and run attacks against Russian armor in narrow passageways, for example, exacted an unexpected and devastating toll upon Russian armor.
There are several things to bear in mind here, such as the extent to which Ukrainian forces employed enterprising tactics with the anti-tank weapons they had, often using terrain and buildings to obscure attack locations, using difficult to detect dispersed and dismounted groups of fighters to “surprise” and attack approaching Russian armored columns with specific tactical advantages such as at crossroads, checkpoints, bridges and other narrow passageways where Russian tanks might be more vulnerable.
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Also, many news reports and observers of the war made the point that Ukrainian fighters with anti-armor weapons correctly used elevation to their advantage, meaning they were able to attack from above, hit Russian tanks “top-down” and exploit their topside vulnerability. This being said, clearly the Ukraine-Russia conflict has raised new questions about anti-armor tactics and weapons, and certainly the US military has massively upgraded its Javelins with new generations of targeting and range.
It may not be clear which variants the Ukrainians have been receiving, yet it is quite clear they continue to be used in extremely effective and enterprising ways. The success of anti-armor weapons in Ukraine, for instance, was cited in the US Marine Corps’ Force Design 2030 strategy document which offers a plan or roadmap for future war.
Yet another glaring and widely observed element of this likely pertains to the fact that Russia appears to fight with poor and ineffective Combined Arms Maneuver techniques. The failure of Russia’s advance into Kyiv is evidence of this, as incoming Russian forces seemed to suffer from numerous tactical and strategic errors, inefficiencies and pure failure. Logistics and resupply efforts failed, incoming convoys “bunched” and aligned in formations making them extremely vulnerable and there may have been very poor intelligence, planning or preparation for the kind of resistance Ukrainian forces would present.
Of course Russia also suffers massive morale problems and, perhaps most of all, attacking Russian forces not only lackfed air supremacy but also seem ineffective when it comes to reconnaissance. Ambush locations, for example, might be “findable” to a certain extent with effective ISR such as drone, surveillance plane or satellite imagery.
Interestingly, Russia’s substandard Reconnaissance may have its origins as far back as WWII, according to a well-documented Feb. 2 essay in the National Institute for Public Policy called “The Unchanging Nature of Russian Combat Methods.” The essay documents and catalogs and articulates many observations made by German generals during their WWII invasion of Russia, including that, among other things, Russians were terrible at reconnaissance. Somewhat surprisingly, the Russian’s poor reconnaissance tactics may not have changed much, if at all, since the WWII era, the essay explains.
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“The generals (German) noted that Russian infantrymen were not “inquisitive” and as such, Russian reconnaissance was extremely poor. They also noted that if reconnaissance elements met no resistance, Russian forces would plunge …ahead into the unknown without further reconnaissance. This seems consistent with some early video of Russian reconnaissance units in Ukraine being surrounded, destroyed, or repulsed in the early days of the conflict even as major assault elements seemed blind to Ukrainian defenses,” James Lariviere writes in the essay.
What much of this amounts to is simply that several of these comments in the Russian papers are highly questionable, if not totally inaccurate or flat out wrong. When used with ISR, artillery, dismounted soldiers, infantry carriers, drones, rockets and other key elements of a Combined Arms Maneuver formation, arriving Abrams and Leopard tanks are likely to prove extremely impactful. Naturally, this is a reality which Russian newspapers might not be inclined to suggest.
Also, Russia’s
poor history with Combined Arms Maneuver might explain why their incomplete or inaccurate view of how Abrams and Leopards will be operated, as the critics don’t seem to recognize or perhaps understand Ukraine’s use of Combined Arms. First of all, in a manner perhaps unlike Russian forces, Ukrainians have ISR, both NATO-supported satellite and drone surveillance.
As part of this integrated ISR approach, Ukrainians are also operating smaller, hand-held, more organic drones such as US-provided Pumas. These smaller drones are operated by and in close coordination with advancing ground units, offering critical forward reconnaissance and targeting specifics for attacking forces. Secondly, the Ukrainians continue to effectively use counter artillery radar, mobile 155mm artillery and long-range, land-launched rockets such as HIMARS and GMLRS to great effect, meaning arriving tanks will quickly plug into a broader, more synchronized Combined Arms formation.
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Also, not to be overlooked is, simply put, the performance and technology of the Abrams itself. Ukraine is naturally getting export variants without certain sensitive technologies unique to the US, the Abrams brings what many suggest is the world’s top tank. The fidelity, range and resolution of its thermal sights, for instance, were proven in the Gulf War and Operation Iraqi Freedom as they were able to find, target and destroy enemy formations and vehicles such as Iraqi T-72s from undetectable, safe stand-off ranges.
The Abrams also now operates as an almost entirely new vehicle when compared to its inception in the 1980s by virtue of years of paradigm-changing upgrades to include improved armor components and configurations, computing and electronics, sensors and targeting, fire control and of course ammunition fired from its 120mm smoothbore cannon. Essentially, contrary to the Russian claim that Ukrainian Abrams and Leopards will be extremely vulnerable, the tanks will most likely be deployed by Ukraine within the context of a Combined Arms Maneuver framework, meaning they will operate with ISR, dismounted infantry support, rockets and artillery and a strong contingent of logistical and maintenance support.
The Ukrainian tanks will likely be operating in coordination with medium-altitude and hand-launched drones, artillery, overhead surveillance, rockets and other support armored vehicles such as Bradley infantry carriers and logistical platforms such as tactical trucks, MRAPs and Humvees.
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Specifically, the Pentagon has in recent months been sending tactical trucks and other critical logistical supplies able to provide the logistical support structure for arriving Abrams, meaning they can transport critical items such as ammunition, fuel and key maintenance equipment.
The Russian critics, who also cite well-known logistical challenges associated with Abrams tanks, may not have fully recognized recent history during which the Pentagon has sent impactful numbers of tactical trucks, wheeled vehicles and critical supplies. Tactical vehicles can, among other things, ensure that the requisite supplies, maintenance personnel and critical items such as food, fuel and ammunition are forward transported in support of mechanized units.
The Russian critics do make one point which seems quite significant, and that is simply a question of numbers. Reports are clear that the Pentagon is sending 31 Abrams tanks and Germany is sending 14 Leopards. This is a number which could clearly help enable counterattacking Ukrainian forces to break through a Russian perimeter, close to contact and reclaim territory to some degree, larger scale defense against thousands of Russian tanks and an ability to penetrate and hold the wider swaths of critical terrain necessary to sustain a victory may require more heavy armor and Wide Area Maneuvers with larger numbers of tanks.
Global Firepower’s 2022 military assessment reports that Russia operates as many as 12,000 tanks. The Pentagon does seem to recognize this, which is likely why US military officials say DoD will use its new, Ukraine focused contracting vehicle enabling US industry to specifically engineer and manufacture weapons and platforms for Ukraine. Abrams, the Pentagon says, will be part of this. The question is, can larger numbers of Abrams arrive fast enough? How many will Germany ultimately send?
There is also the question of intelligence and the risks of Abrams tanks falling into Russian hands. On this point, Russia’s TASS writes that Russian leaders are offering $12 million rubles to anyone who seizes an Abrams, Leopard or Challenger tank. However, given the extent to which export variants already exist and have been sold to US allies makes it unlikely that a scaled back export variant has not already been seen by the Russians.
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Export Abrams have been deployed or are in the process of being sent to Iraq, Egypt, Poland, Taiwan and other countries, and it seems quite likely that export variants have been stripped of potentially sensitive technologies to a very large extent. This is even more likely in recent years, given the massive extent to which Abrams tanks have been upgraded by US and General Dynamics Land Systems developers.
Lastly, there is the question of air support and the continued mystery of the war, which is Russia’s inability to gain air superiority despite having hundreds more fighter jets. Certainly the Russian critics’ point that lacking air superiority does make advancing ground forces and tanks more vulnerable seems accurate, yet this vulnerability is mitigated by the fact that “neither side” has air superiority and Ukrainian tanks will almost certainly operate with ISR, artillery, air defenses and perhaps even some kind of closer-in air support in the form of helicopters.
Kris Osborn is President of Warrior Maven – the Center for Military Modernization. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
