New Radar Counters Drone Swarm Attacks -Tracks 10,000 Targets at Once

By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization

The Pentagon and US military services are seeking to counter the fast-emerging and increasingly serious drone swarm attack threat presented by both sophisticated great power rivals and low-tech adversaries, with an urgency and fervor that cannot be underestimated.

The reasons for this are both clear and self-evident; the US Navy has not only been tracking and destroying groups of Houthi and Iranian-backed drones and cruise missiles in the Red Sea, but also preparing to counter larger and more sophisticated drone swarm attacks.

The intent with drone attacks is also clear, as low-tech, inexpensive “masses” of drone swarms can descend upon a ship, convoy, military installation or forward operating force to overwhelm countermeasures and simply present too many targets for even the most advanced interceptors or defenses to stop.

Weapons like CRAM (Counter Rocket, Artillery & Mortar) and ship-integrated CWIS (Close-In-Weapons-Systems on ship deck with radar and Phalanx), for example, have proven effective as “area” weapons able to blanket areas with defensive fire to “knock out” groups of drones. Also, ship-deck or ground fired weapons might be able to counter drone swarms to some degree with things like “proximity” fuses and other kinds of pointed “area” defenses. The other area of promise for drone swarm defense is likely EW, as advanced electronic “jammers” could potentially interfere with or destroy the electronic systems needed to guide groups of individual small drones. Electromagnetic signals could potentially cover an “area” or wide aperture to jam the guidance systems of large numbers of drones. 

AI & Counter Drone

Perhaps the greatest promise for drone swarm defense comes in the area of AI, as many US military and industry innovators are experimenting with AI-enabled systems able to “identify” targets in milliseconds, help deconflict the spectrum to assure accurate guidance and “pair” sensors with effectors to more quickly find and take out groups of drones. This is done by bouncing gathered sensor data against a vast database to make discernments and verify targets for the purpose of essentially “recommending” the optimal countermeasure for a specific attack. Perhaps some drone swarms can best be countered by lasers, yet others need to be stopped with non-kinetic effectors such as EW to decrease fragmentation and prevent unwanted casualties should drones be attacking from civilian areas. There may also be a pressing need for kinetic interceptors such as small missiles like Coyote, a small, high-speed, precision drone defense interceptor weapon now being massively acquired in large numbers by the US military services.

The margin of difference with all of this, however, relies upon an ability to “see” and “target” incoming threats in sufficient volume and at the safest possible stand-off ranges. Essentially, drone defenses will almost entirely rely upon radar and surveillance systems to “detect” and “verify” drone swarms before they get close enough to cause damage. The challenge with this kind of operational intent, however, presents a number of complicated threat variables. What if there are simply too many small drones for even the most advanced radar to track? Perhaps a track loop or “lock” can’t counter dozens or even hundreds of small drone explosives?