By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
(Washington D.C.) The Chinese military and the PRC’s state-backed newspapers regularly hype and test fire their now quite famous “carrier killer” anti-ship missiles, weapons ostensibly capable of destroying aircraft carriers with precision-guided firepower from distances as far as 2,000 miles off shore.
The existence of these weapons, called DF-21D and DF-26, played a major role in the US development of its Anti-Access/Area-Denial combat strategy, an effort which sought to ensure carriers projected power and could still attack and destroy enemy targets from farther distances in a very high-threat environment. This was thought to be the entire point of China’s A2/AD thinking, meaning far-reaching precise anti-ship missiles could prevent carriers from operating close enough to sufficiently project power from the sea.
The question as to whether long-range precision Chinese and Iranian anti-ship missiles make aircraft carriers obsolete and simply too vulnerable to operate is cited so often that it has almost become somewhat of a cliche. However the claim is as commonly mentioned as it is inaccurate, as the suggestion that carriers are too vulnerable to operate in that kind of threat environment lacks critical context and arguably ignores impactful variables.
Yes, the existence of anti-access/area-denial weapons with range and precision sufficient to threaten carriers 1,000 or 2,000 miles off shore presents a dilemma the Pentagon has likely been taking quite seriously. Upon initial examination, it might appear that such threats would potentially force carriers to operate beyond the ranges from which its aircraft can project power and attack land targets, yet there are other essential elements to this equation.
The Marine Corps has of course been arming its growing fleet of WASP-and-America-class amphibious assault ships with the 5th-generation, vertical-take-off F-35B. This brings mobile 5th-generation air power to smaller, mobile platforms such as amphibs to complement carrier attack or move places less accessible to carriers. America-class amphibs, for example, can deploy with as many as 13-to-15 F-35Bs, so there is little question that they can bring additional power-projection versatility to maritime warfare. However, there is arguably still very much of a need for big-deck carriers to, among other things, “mass” power for larger-air campaigns by utilizing a large Carrier Air Wing increasingly powered by big-deck carriers such as the Ford-class. In a large-scaled great power engagement, the Navy will need to “mass” air power across a wide envelope to secure air superiority, which is likely why the service conducted “dual-carrier” operations last year in the Pacific. Improved networking and command and control technology enabled two big-deck carriers to launch, coordinate and deconflict massive numbers of sea-launched attack and reconnaissance platforms.
The pressing question is, despite the threat, the hype and chorus of concern …. do these Chinese weapons make carriers obsolete? It seems, at the moment, that the answer is no for technological, tactical and strategic reasons. By adjusting concepts of operation, leveraging advanced networking and manned-unmanned teaming and integrated new innovations critical to layered ship defenses, it seems the need for the US Navy to sustain its massive carrier advantage is not going anywhere soon. This is particularly true given the pace at which China is adding new carriers, as it is now progressing quickly with its third aircraft carrier and voicing plans to build many more.