Why Future Amphibious Assaults May Need Tanks, Artillery & Heavy Armor

By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization

Island hopping warfare in the South China Sea, high-speed air-sea-land combat along the Chinese coastline or perhaps even a full scale amphibious assault to liberate Taiwan … are all likely the kinds of missions the US Marine Corps trains to be prepared for. Yet the prospect of amphibious warfare now introduces an entirely new generation of variables and threat circumstances given the advent of longer-range sensors, precision-guided anti-armor weapons, AI-enabled sensing and targeting systems and many new kinds of armed unmanned platforms.

Citing the success of anti-armor weapons in Ukraine, the text of Marine Corps Force Design 2030 roadmap for the future force makes groundbreaking observations such as …highlighting the need for a massive increase in unmanned systems, drones and manned-unmanned teaming along with agile, expeditionary, high-speed lightweight platforms, multi-domain weaponry, tactics and networking technologies designed to enable a more disaggregated, yet highly networked and lethal assault force.

Clearly the futurists, weapons developers and combat tacticians within the Corps seem to understand the increasing importance of the need for the Corps to be true to its maritime, multi-domain roots and move quickly across air, land and sea with unprecedented and unparalleled speed and lethality…yet in totally new threat environment. In a modern combat environment, it seems this would require upgraded anti-armor weapons, hand-launched drones, high-speed amphibious platforms and the ability to leverage now-operational Marine Corps 5th-generation stealth air power. What about heavy armor platforms and traditional weapons such as Howitzer artillery, tanks, armored reconnaissance vehicles and helicopters? How much will they still be needed .. and what is the future role of the Corps’ famous Marine Air-Ground-Task-Force (MAGTF)?

Part of the impetus behind Corps cutting edge thinking is likely related to new technologies such as the growing ability to attack from stand-off ranges with precision weaponry, paradigm-changing developments with AI, autonomy and unmanned systems, an ability to operate in more dispersed, disaggregated formations and leverage the best available multi-domain transport layer networking technology … At the same time, the text of the Corps’ future plan (Marine Corps Force Design 2030) carves out a special, enduring place for what it calls “stand-in” combat forces, a term quite close to the Marine Corps ethos and fundamental spirit.. Referring to an ability to “close” with and destroy an enemy in the “close-in” fight.

Therefore, Marine Corps Force Design 2030 embraces the importance of preparing the force with “stand-in” close range attack and combat capability. While there are elements of Close Quarter Battle likely to seem similar and timeless through generations of warfare, today’s requirements and tactical possibilities are indeed quite different. For example, winning a close-in fight in today’s threat environment likely requires the use of a lot of small, hand-launched drones, dismounted, yet highly networked infantry and next-generation precision anti-armor weapons.

These kinds of technologies are increasingly being blended into a more modern tactical equation inspiring newer thinking about traditional Combined Arms Maneuver strategy. This is extremely critical, and perhaps one reason why Force Design did call for a decrease in heavy armor and the eventual removal of tanks from the force. Subsequent thinking appears to have modified this somewhat, as the Corps also seems to understand the lasting tactical significance of heavy armor and mechanized formations .. particularly as they pertain to amphibious assault and ship-to-shore operations. Nevertheless, the Marine Corps is divesting its tanks and scaling back the amount of heavier platforms in favor of a lighter, faster, more agile, lethal and expeditionary force. What about both? Wouldn’t some measure heavy armor still be critical in a major amphibious assault? Heavier platforms are now much more deployable than they have been in previous years .. so what should the future role of the MAGTF be? Surely it needs to adapt … but it can’t fully dissolve either.