By: Logan M. Williams | Author’s Twitter
India, under the leadership of Prime Minister Modi, has pursued a transformative foreign policy, prioritizing relations with the United States and the West. Notably, these new and improved relations have manifested first as a result of shared anxieties over the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s wanton aggression within the region, and the PRC’s efforts to subjugate its neighbors. Thus, since the catalyst for this friendship is primarily geopolitical, the strongest bonds between the United States and India are within the defense sectors. This remains true despite the fact that President Biden has made steady progress towards building economic and cultural ties, through initiatives such as the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).
One important manifestation of the strengthening ties between India and the United States is the progress being made towards the production of the United States-designed Stryker fighting vehicles, in factories based on Indian soil, with Indian labor.
Strictly speaking, the Stryker is best suited for the roles which used to be filled by legacy armored personnel carriers (APC), although its official designation is that of an infantry carrier vehicle (ICV). This official nomenclature should be juxtaposed with that of the United States’ “tank-busting” powerhouse, the M2/M3 Bradley, which is properly identified as an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV). This difference in terminology is significant because it emphasizes the fact that the Stryker was never intended for front-line combat.
Rather, the Stryker is lightly-armored, offering sufficient protection against small arms fire, but without sufficient survivability for heavy combat engagement. The Stryker’s light armor and its use of an 8×8 drive-train allows the Stryker to move at a maximum speed of approximately 60 miles-per-hour. It can carry nine infantry-men, approximately 310 miles (500km), without refueling. This enables the Stryker to quickly deliver infantry troops to a combat zone; thus, while the Stryler is equipped with the requisite firepower to decimate enemy infantry and to engage some anti-tank defenses, its singular role is as a support for dismounted infantry troops. Importantly, due to its size and weight, the Stryker can easily be carried by the United States’ C-130 light to mid-size cargo plane, which cannot carry other, larger, armored vehicles.
The Bradley infantry fighting vehicle, which is the more well known of the two platforms, in juxtaposition, is much more heavily armored, larger, and heavier. It can carry six soldiers, it travels at a maximum speed of 40 miles-per-hour, with a 300 mile range. The Bradley’s large size reduces its maneuverability and restricts its ability to be transported to the battle-space with cargo planes. The Bradley also relies upon tracks rather than tires, to improve the vehicle’s performance on off-road terrain, which drastically increases its relevance in combat. The Bradley’s greatest claim to fame is its ability to provide “tank-busting” power, without the logistical limitations of owning and operating a tank. As such, the Bradley is not intended to serve as a support platform for infantrymen, rather, it is intended to engage in direct and heavy combat as an independent weapon system. In the case of the Bradley, the troop-transporting capacity of the vehicle is entirely secondary to its attack capability.
So, what is it about the Stryker that makes it such a valuable addition to India’s military.
First of all, India does not have any Bradley fighting vehicles, most of its vehicles of the same class are of the ancient Soviet-era BMP-1 and BMP-2 models.
More importantly, the significance of the Stryker isn’t just made evident through a cursory review of the specifications detailed above, rather the vehicle represents a much deeper Indian commitment to hawkish military doctrine, in the face of the ever-increasing Chinese threat.
Officially, India maintains a two-war military doctrine, which dictates that its military should be prepared to wage two simultaneous wars against its neighbors, China and Pakistan. More importantly, however, the Indian strategy for waging such a war depends upon a doctrine called “Cold Start.”
As the name implies, the intent of Cold Start is to enable India to rapidly mobilize troops in response to a threat. The Cold Start doctrine depends upon a well-armed “halting force” contingent with the necessary firepower to interdict an enemy element’s assault across the Indian border; while the “halting force” prevents intruding soldiers from successfully seizing and occupying Indian territory, pre-staged strike forces, much like a NATO quick reaction force (QRF), are moved quickly to the battlefield.
These strike forces are not intended to be utilized to bolster the defensive capabilities of the halting force, but rather, to muster the requisite strength to launch a limited counterattack upon the enemy’s territory, within 48-72 hours of the inception of an enemy’s initial attack. These strike forces are tasked with penetrating and occupying territory as far as dozens of kilometers inside the borders of an enemy state; not only is this counterattack intended to serve as India’s response to enemy aggression and egregious violations of its sovereignty, but it also serves the critical strategic purpose of creating a buffer-zone on a shared border, preventing the enemy state from conducting a build-up of additional forces proximate to that border in preparation for further and escalated hostilities.
This military strategy is dependent upon high-mobility forces, such as the light armor formations of modern day cavalry units. The Stryker is the ideal armored vehicle for this task; it enables India to quickly position strike forces in the battle-space, while providing substantial light armored power to support an initial, limited counter-strike, while India mobilizes its heavy armored combat vehicle formations stationed further in country.
Notably, one of India’s most pervasive military deficiencies, which limits the state’s ability to implement Cold Start successfully, is its present lack of mobile air-defense equipment. Yet, the United States deployed a brand-new Maneuverable Short-Range Air Defense (M-SHORAD) edition of the Stryker, in 2021. This version of the Stryker was intended to replace the United States’ legacy Avenger M-SHORAD platform, which was built atop the decidedly less survivable Humvee platform. Two Indian news sources , Mint and Business Standard, reported that the cooperative production of the Stryker is also expected to include this advanced air-defense Stryker platform. This M-SHORAD fires Hellfire and Stinger missiles – in and of itself, an upgrade, because the Avenger was lightweight and only capable of firing Stinger missiles – which enables it to defend against aircraft flying at altitudes as high as 10,000-15,000 feet. In other words, the Stryker M-SHORAD is able to defend against most helicopters and drones, but would be next to useless against fighter aircraft or other larger air-frames. However, this air-defense Stryker will provide India with more than enough rapidly-deployable air-defense capability to defend troops during the initial stages of a conflict and India’s counter-strike, allowing time for larger and more potent air defense systems to be mobilized.
Most importantly, the co-production of the Stryker is an exceptional guarantor of the future longevity of the United States’ and India’s friendship. India’s initial purchase of Soviet-era weaponry in the mid-1960s, and its continued purchase of that weaponry until the collapse of the USSR, ensured that India would remain in Russia’s orbit for three decades, because Russia was the singular provider of weapons maintenance, repair, spare parts and replacement.
India’s conscious choice to purchase weapons and military materiel from the United States is a clear statement that India would like to avoid such dependency upon Russia in the future, and perhaps it is an admission that India is far more comfortable relying upon the United States’ friendship and good faith, than it is counting upon a disgraced Russia.
Logan Williams currently studies at the University of Connecticut. He is an International Affairs Researcher; Work Published in Newspapers, Magazines, and Journals, Such As: Geopolitics Magazine, Modern Diplomacy, Tufts University’s The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Democracy Paradox, Diario Las Américas, International Affairs Forum, Fair Observer, History Is Now Magazine, UNC at Chapel Hill’s American Diplomacy, The Center for Military Modernization’s Warrior Maven Magazine,
