By Kris Osborn, President, Warrior
Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles, NLAWS, Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems, armed drones and other kinds of anti-armor weapons have massively “decimated” Russian tanks for several years now, a combat reality which seems to be immeasurably impacting concepts of operation for future warfare.
Is there still a place for heavy armor? Perhaps yes, but militaries around the world are watching and preparing for future wars with emerging lessons now being learned in Ukraine. A significant new Army Intelligence report identifies these trends as fundamental to needed preparations for future warfare environments. There are several key new findings published in the research essay, called “The Operational Environment 2024-2034 Large-Scale Combat Operations.” (US Army Training and Doctrine Command, G2), citing anticipated warfare weapons and tactics in the next decade. Key trends identified by the research, which examined emerging technologies and current conflicts throughout the globe, include the rapid “urbanization” of warfare, massive proliferation of air and ground drones, firing of mass and precision artillery, ubiquitous sensors creating a transparent battlefield and dismounted anti-armor urban warfare tactics.
The text of the report cites “anti-tank guided missiles,” “UAS combined with fires” as being used to “great effect” by Ukrainian Armed Forces. As part of its assessment, the research provides exact, previously unseen official calculations of the actual number of Russian main battle tanks destroyed by Ukranian forces.
Ukrainian Armed Forces Tank Destroying
“Ukrainian Armed Forces have used vast quantities of man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), antitank guided missiles, and FPV UAS—combined with fires—to great effect. As of July 2024, Russia has lost 3,197 main battle tanks—more than its entire active-duty inventory at the outset of conflict—and 6,160 armored fighting vehicles, forcing them to pull increasingly obsolescent systems from storage,” the text of the report states.
These are significant numbers and the military impact has been nothing less than monumental, given that Russia’s entire active tank force has been destroyed. An interesting website cataloging Russian tank and armored vehicle losses called Oryx said reported Russian tank losses to number in the 2,000s as of several months ago, yet that appeared to be based on only what had been photographed or documented. The actual numbers of destroyed Russian tanks, appears even higher according to the Army report.
The words “more than its entire active-duty inventory” from the report almost jump off the page in a way that offers convincing evidence that indeed dispersed, dismounted kinds of ambushes and anti-armor hit-and-run-strikes from hidden or strategically advantageous positions using terrain or buildings to obscure attack locations. Elevation has proved to be a useful tactic, as Russian tanks have shown to be quite vulnerable to strikes from above as protection on the top of the vehicle is much lighter. Accordingly, Ukrainian forces have used elevated attack positions to exploit this vulnerability, destroying thousands of tanks. Ukrainian forces also used urban structures such as narrowly configured passageways, bridges and other urban structures to optimize surprise attacks on advancing Russian armored vehicles. The Army intel report specifically cites these tactical realities associated with rapid urbanization, having closely studied the Ukraine war and emerging weapons. In a section titled “Dense Urban Warfare,” the Army essay explains that as much as 68-percent of the world’s population will live in urban areas by 2050.
“Normal warfare challenges will be exacerbated as urban and subterranean areas will make maneuver difficult. Road conditions, traffic, civilian populations, and building density will challenge freedom of movement and the ability to mass large formations. City blocks will create natural chokepoints, civilian vehicles become obstacles, and urban canyons will make it difficult to fly most aerial platforms. Searching and clearing will be obstructed by cover and concealment from skyscrapers, tunnels, and subterranean infrastructure,” the report states.
Future of Heavy Armor – Unmanned Platforms
The findings in the report , informed by a close examination of combat tactics and successes in Ukraine, align with approaches now being taken by cutting edge weapons developers preparing for future war. Army scientists, tacticians and acquisition experts have beenintensely exploring the art of the possible with massive groups of air and ground drones, lightweight unmanned armored vehicles, paradigm-changing networking and faster, lighter, expeditionary yet extremely lethal weapons and platforms. Will there be a need for heavy armor such as tanks in the future? The answer would seem to be a clear yes, yet tactics and platforms are continuing to evolve quickly. For example, developments in Ukraine are likely one of the reasons why the US is building “Optionally Manned” platforms for the future such as the OMFV, robotic ground vehicles to breach enemy positions such as tank ditches or armored formations. In yet another instance, the Marine Corps has divested its force of tanks, after citing developments in Ukraine in its Marine Corps Force Design 2030 strategy report.
Despite these developments, there does seem to be a lasting place for heavy armor in the wars of the future, yet tanks such as modern Abrams variants will likely be heavily fortified by forward-operating, faster-lighter-weight unmanned systems, ground drones and attack platforms. The idea is to increase lethality and survivability through manned-unmanned teaming wherein forward unmanned attack platforms conduct forward surveillance, serve as networked “reconnaissance” nodes and even launch strikes when directed by a human. There may still be a need for heavy armor years into the future, yet the concepts of operation through which it is employed in warfare are likely to be much much different.
“The human cost associated with this equipment destruction speaks directly to the lethality of LSCO. Russian casualties exceed 300,000 over two years, while Ukrainian casualty estimates suggest at least 200,000 casualties,” the report says.
