By Kris Osborn, President Center for Military Modernization
Hello Warrior Readers:
Given current significance of US-China Tensions – here is a special series including wargaming, video analysis and essays specific to China Threat.
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Center for Military Modernization Video Analysis .. Could the US Stop China From Invading Taiwan?
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US vs China 5th-Generation AirCraft
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJAQ_x-Ew8U
Could US Navy Attack Submarines Save Taiwan?
Center for Military Modernization Video Analysis…. Congressional Select Committee Discussion w/ Rep. Wittman
US vs China in Taiwan War – Video Analysis
What Does US Do If China Invades?
US vs China – Is Deterrence Working?
Kris Osborn is President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization
Chinese Weapons & Tactics Copycat – Ripping Off US Technology & Training
************ Print Essays******
One Plan to Stop China – Stopping a “Fait Accompli”
By Kris Osborn – President & Editor-In-Chief, Warrior Maven
(Washington, D.C.) The U.S. Navy is preparing to defend against and prevent what it identifies as possible Russian or Chinese attempts to accomplish a “fait accompli,” by essentially annexing, invading or taking over a particular area faster than the U.S. and its allies can respond.
Through careful consideration of the strategies and tactics likely to be employed by Russia or China in this kind of scenario, a recently published new Navy strategy document explains that one of these countries would likely seek to use surprise and rapid assault to seize territory and then quickly reinforce it with long-range fires to deter any potential response.
The strategy, called “Advantage at Sea: Prevailing With Integrated All Domain Naval Power,” says any Russian or Chinese “fait accompli” strategy would seek to quickly make any military response to their invasion “disproportionally costly” by deploying heavy firepower to defend the seized territory.
Fait Accompli Prevention
This kind of possible scenario with China is precisely why the U.S. Navy continues to maintain a large, steady “presence” of forces in the Pacific, in part so it can respond quickly and appropriately in the event that China were to try to take over Taiwan or key areas of the South China Sea.
While the risks entertained by the strategy seem quite realistic and grounded in logistical and technological criteria, it may not be entirely clear that any kind of Chinese offensive would happen too quickly for the U.S. Navy to respond.
Perhaps taking over some small islands in the South China Sea could happen quickly, but any kind of an invasion or offensive attack beyond the smallest scale would most likely be detected and therefore anticipated well in advance of any actual combat action.
This is why the Navy places such value upon forward presence, and regularly operates drones, submarines and even Carrier Strike Groups in areas within reach of any potential invasion site. This would of course include the South China Sea, Taiwan, Japan and parts of Australia or other regional areas China could potentially target.
A Chinese amphibious assault coming across the Taiwan strait would likely be detected by satellite or drone surveillance well in advance of there being any possibility of landing ashore. However, should the U.S. Navy or allied forces armed with air power, submarines, carriers or heavy combat warships not be within any reachable proximity, there may be few options available to Commanders in terms of trying to stop, thwart, block or derail any kind of offensive.
The Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps strategy highlights some broad strokes or war plan “parameters” within which a response might operate, of course without offering much detail.
“Within the most contested battle spaces, we will destroy adversary forces by projecting power from attack submarines, fifth-generation aircraft, naval expeditionary forces, unmanned vehicles, and maritime raids,” the strategy writes. As part of what could be called a general “war plan” roadmap of sorts, the Navy document adds the possibility of non-kinetic tactics as well, to include jamming, The concept is to remain capable of a rapid response by having powerful combat assets regularly operate in contested areas and, as the strategy states, operate “maneuverable strike forces—composed of multiple carrier strike groups, surface action groups, and expeditionary strike groups, and augmented by unmanned platforms— will launch overpowering air and missile attacks from unexpected directions.”
The concept is to counter the enemy with “multiple axes of attack” such that air assets on alert in the region including long-range fires from coastal areas, bomber patrols on alert, undersea attack submarines and even warships operating in coordination with air, surface and undersea drones to enable U.S. Navy forces to prevail … even if outnumbered.
“Our seaborne forces will deliver devastating offensive strikes, surviving adversary counterattacks using coordinated jamming, maneuver, and defensive systems. Low-footprint and low-signature Marine Corps elements operating from the sea to the shore will use maneuver, cover, and concealment to employ lethal long-range precision fires. Combined volleys of networked munitions, coming from multiple axes of attack,” the strategy writes.c of possible use in preventing or thwarting a Chinese or Russian “fait accompli” is to pursue something the strategy refers to as “sea control” and “sea denial.”
Yet another interesting tactic of possible use in preventing or thwarting a Chinese or Russian “fait accompli” is to pursue something the strategy refers to as “sea control” and “sea denial.”
“Where adversaries must cross open water, sea denial robs them of the initiative, impedes a fait accompli, and prevents them from achieving their objectives. We control or deny the seas by destroying an adversary’s fleet, containing it in areas that prevent meaningful operations, prohibiting it from leaving port, or by controlling sea lines of communication,” the strategy states.
Sea Control
The Navy and Marine Corps are refining their conceptual and tactical approach to an interesting strategy referred to as “Sea Control,” a kind of maritime warfare approach looking at multi-domain techn
iques of establishing land-sea-air presence, controlling choke points and strategic water ways, looking at newer kinds of approaches to amphibious warfare and “denying” a potential enemy from operating in certain high-value areas.
It is an approach that is gaining traction with cutting-edge war planners with the services and industry weapons developers made more possible with the advent of new multi-domain networking technologies, drones and long-range weapons.
As for the Navy’s emphasis upon “Sea Control,” one needs to look no further than the recently released Tri-Service strategic paper called “Advantage at Sea: Prevailing With Integrated All Domain Naval Power,” an interesting and recently published document with a dedicated section on Sea Control and Power Projection. The strategy, which integrates Coast Guard, Marine Corps and Navy thinking, is intended to “maintain persistent forward presence, conduct sea control and sea denial, and enable power projection, Naval Service investment priorities include: Surface Warfare and Air Warfare. We will increase investments in advanced, precise, long-range, and lethal fires to destroy enemy forces, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient inventory to sustain a protracted conflict,” the strategy writes.
The thinking expands into the integration and application of certain kinds of new weapons platforms, such as arming the LCS with an over-the-horizon Naval Strike Missile, architecting a new fleet of surface and undersea drones and massively prioritizing multi-domain “Integrated” Naval power.
“We will invest in a variety of weapons delivery platforms including Marine long-range anti-ship missiles, manned and unmanned surface vessels, submarines, and aircraft. We will increase investments in maritime domain awareness technologies to find, fix, track, and target adversary forces,” the strategy writes.
Anti-Access/Area-Denial
The Tri-Service strategies’ emphasis upon “Sea Control” aligns with an interesting Fall 2020 essay by Marine Corps Universities’ “Journal of Advanced Military Studies.” The essay takes up the question of advanced enemy anti-access/area-denial strategies employed to restrict maritime maneuvers intended to prevent or deny the “sea-control” necessary to operate successfully. Not surprisingly, the essay refers to long-range enemy weapons.
“Access denial strategies are not a new defensive strategy; what makes access denial challenging on the modern battlefield is the dramatic improvement and proliferation of weapons capable of denying access to or freedom of action within an operational area,” the essay writes. (Lt. Col. Michael Manning)
“Quite significantly, the essay, called SEA CONTROL, “Feasible Acceptable, Suitable or Simply Imperative,” appears to recommend strategies which support the current Marine Corps adaptation of the NSM to a land-firing contingency. Operating within the conceptual position that “Sea Control” is entirely necessary, the essay suggests “investing in low cost technology that extends the ranges of A2/AD capabilities.”
As for the application of this kind of strategy, the Navy and Marine Corps are already making considerable progress through an evolving, multi-domain centric amphibious warfare enabling “island hopping” and land-sea weapons integration. For example, the Marine Corps is advancing a program known as Ground Based Anti-Ship Missile which involves adapting the ship-fired Naval Strike Missile for transport and land-attack application, so amphibious force could for example set up on an island and stand up anti-ship attack operations. Sure enough, the strategy specifically cites newer kinds of “anti-ship missiles,” which may even be a reference to this program.
Sea Control is likely also intended to be further developed with the upcoming deployment of the Marine Corps’ now evolving Light Amphibious Warship.
“Where adversaries must cross open water, sea denial robs them of the initiative, impedes a fait accompli, and prevents them from achieving their objectives. We control or deny the seas by destroying an adversary’s fleet, containing it in areas that prevent meaningful operations, prohibiting it from leaving port, or by controlling sea lines of communication,” the strategy writes.
********* Could the US Navy Submarines Save Taiwan ********
Attack Submarines Could Save Taiwan
Surface ships are of course visible to an enemy from miles away, most drones and aircraft are also easily detectable and certainly ground-based weapons such as missile launchers and interceptors can largely be seen by satellite. This means any prepositioned assets put in place to deter or stop a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan are likely to be seen or known by attacking People’s Liberation Army forces. But what about submarines? When considering these variables, it seems reasonable to entertain the thought that submarines and the realm of the undersea might be the best way for the U.S. and its allies to stop a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
Ship and land-based sensors are now advanced to the point that it will be very difficult to position warships or even operate certain aircraft within striking distance of Taiwan which are not pretty easily seen by Chinese forces. Therefore, China might be inclined to attempt a surprise attack when U.S. carriers and other visible assets are not within range. This, however, is where submarines and undersea drones come in.
Newer quieting technologies, coupled with the rapid acquisition of undersea drones and improved torpedoes make attacks from the sea more likely to favor success. Should enough attack submarines and sub-launched undersea drones be operating in the vicinity, they would quite possibly be much less detectable and in position to attack and destroy advancing Chinese amphibious forces. Part of this equation is fortified by recent U.S. Navy advances in attack submarine technology are able to not only make them less detectable to sonar and other methods of detection, but also armed with longer-range, more precise weapons systems.
Tomahawks, Virginia-class Submarines
Maritime variant tactical Tomahawks, for example, are able to change course in flight and destroy moving targets, placing them in a position to attack surface ships on the move. The Navy is also developing its Very Lightweight Torpedo weapon which expands attack envelope possibilities. Block II Virginia-class and subsequent model attack submarines are now equipped with newer kinds of underwater antennas or communications devices, engine quieting enhancements and special kinds of coating materials intended to make them less detectable. While details regarding what these look like are unavailable for security reasons, Navy leaders talked about these advances years ago when the USS South Dakota Virginia-class Block III submarine emerged as a prototype. The South Dakota, and other submarines with similar innovations, are now operational. This might be one reason why the concepts for operation for attack submarines have evolved a little to include more undersea surveillance.
Block III Virginias also use “fly-by-wire” automated navigational controls, fiber optic cables and more advanced Large Aperture Bow sonar systems.
Attack submarines, and drones they can launch from the torpedo tubes, could likely operate along high-risk island and coastal areas conducting clandestine surveillance missions while being much less detectable than a surface ship or some aerial drones. Furthermore, the U.S. Navy is making rapid progress with a growing fleet of small, mid-sized and very large, submarine sized unmanned undersea drones. These platforms have very long endurance and can dwell, or lurk beneath the sea for weeks tracking enemy surface ships, submarines and mines. In the future, it seems possible some of them could be armed with weapons, providing undersea command and control technology evolves to the point wherein humans can remain fully “in the loop” regarding the use of lethal force. While undersea drones can already find and explode mines “autonomously” while undersea, any actual lethal firing of a torpedo would naturally need to be managed by a human, per Pentagon doctrine.
As for the force itself, this may be one reason why the U.S. and Navy continue to greatly uptick, accelerate and fast-track larger amounts of new submarines. An attack submarine “deficit” concern has been on the radar for many years now, and Congress and the Navy now plan to build as many as 3 Virginia-class attack submarines per year as opposed to two. Are there enough submarines to potential rise to this challenge? Global Firepower says China operates as many as 79 submarines, compared to the U.S.’ 69. This is yet another reason why many in the U.S. continue to call for an even more accelerated pace of submarine acquisition. However, U.S. allies have submarines as well, and should attack submarines be so difficult to find, then having slightly fewer numbers would not impair mission effectiveness to a large degree. Global Firepower lists South Korea as operating 22 submarines and Japan is cited as having 20. These boats, in conjunction with U.S. Navy attack submarines, might indeed be well-positioned to stop the Chinese Navy, given their weapons ability and stealthy characteristics.
What if China Actually Occupied Taiwan?
Should large portions of China’s 2-million strong land Army and 35,000 armored vehicles succeed in landing on and “occupying” Taiwan, what options might there be for the U.S. and its Pacific allies?
The principle impediment to a successful rapid counterattack may simply be a sheer question of geography. South Korea operates roughly 2.6 thousand tanks, Japan maintains a fleet of roughly 1,000 tanks and Taiwan itself is listed by Global Firepower as having 1,160 tanks.
However, should China land large numbers of its three-thousand-strong tank force and 1,970 self-propelled Howitzers, could any kind of countervailing ground response force get there in time? A quick look might suggest no.
Southern Japan and South Korea are, depending upon where ships depart, somewhere between 500 and 1,000-miles away. While this would possibly put Taiwan in range of tanker-refueled or sea-launched fighter jets and some long-range missiles, a heavily armored force is extremely difficult to deploy and would need to be pre-positioned.
This simple, yet clear circumstance may explain why there have been so many reports about Taiwan’s acquisition of Abrams tanks.
Could there be enough mechanized, armored resistance sufficient enough to slow-down a Chinese incursion long enough to enable allied forces such as Japan, South Korea and forward-placed U.S. forces to respond? Does not appear too likely, unless the U.S. and its allies took a measured and potentially highly controversial step to “pre-position” a large-scale armored force prior to any invasion. As contentious as that would be, could it work as a deterrent?
Training and readiness may also be a huge factor for Taiwan, as Global Firepower states the island nation has as many as 1.6 million reserves. Korea is listed as operating an extremely large reserve force of 3.1 million reserve forces. While likely prepared for a North Korean contingency across the DMZ, these forces could certainly have an impact should Taiwan need to be liberated. How trained, equipped and ready would these forces be?
Do they have weapons, equipment and training? Most of all, how fast can they get there? Australian land forces would not only be extremely far away but also quite small in numbers, as Global Firepower cites the country as operating only 60,000 active duty soldiers
How do U.S. numbers stack up? The United States INDO-PACIFC Command website says U.S. Army Pacific has approximately 106,000 personnel in theater, from one Corps and two divisions. The U.S. does operate a large number of bases in Japan and of course has troops in South Korea, but would that be even close to enough if facing a Chinese land-army cited as operating 2.1 -million soldiers?
U.S. Army Pacific also has over 300 aircraft and five watercraft assigned throughout the AOR from Japan and Korea to Alaska and Hawaii, the command said in a statement.
Extracting an entrenched Chinese Army from Taiwan would not be a small task. A look at a combined U.S., Japanese and South Korean land forces seem to suggest that, at very least, defeating China on the ground in Taiwan is “realistic,” if not even likely. A combined U.S., Taiwanese, Japanese and South Korean land force, however, should it operate with air superiority, might be well-positioned to ultimately prevail. The question for many, it seems clear, would be ..”at what cost.”
Victory, and air superiority, would almost certainly rely upon the U.S. Pacific Fleet from the ocean, as INDOPACOM says the command operates 200 ships to include five aircraft carrier strike groups and as many as 1,100 aircraft. These maritime operated aircraft could ultimately be a deciding factor in stopping a Chinese amphibious assault and establishing air superiority to support a ground counterattack.
By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization — Army China Wargame
A massive “bolt-out-of-the-blue” salvo of attacking ballistic missiles designed to overwhelm Taiwan…..a large-scale amphibious assault to surround and take-over the island…a rapid blockade of the South China Sea …..or perhaps even a surprise 5th-generation air attack on US warships in the Philippine Sea ….all seem to be realistic possibilities should the People’s Republic of China suddenly move to annex Taiwan or claim exclusive ownership of disputed island territories in the South China Sea.Would a large-scale ballistic missile attack designed to take-out Taiwanese air defenses and cripple its weapons, air fields and defenses be a most likely start to a surprise attack? Any attack is almost certain to be accompanied or even preceded by a commensurate PRC effort to “jam” US and allied GPS and communications signals in the region … to effectively blind US, Taiwanese and allied defenses in position to respond in the region.Senior members of Army Pacific tell Warrior that Commanding General Charles Flynn says the purpose of Army Pacific and its build-up is to “avoid war.” At the same time, part of the method of “avoiding war,” Flynn emphasizes, is to train, prepare, experiment and refine a “war plan.”Maybe the PLA might seek to exploit what it thinks is an overmatch or advantage in the realm of hypersonic weapons and simply seek to “deny” US warships from closing in on an area to defend Taiwan? Given the sheer size and growing technological sophistication of the PLA Navy, a massive
amphibious attack on Taiwan would be another likely avenue of approach for the PLA should it seek to rapidly “take-over” Taiwan. The likely thinking on the part of the PRC, as explained in the Pentagon’s annual reports on the Chinese military, might be to take over Taiwan so quickly that their dominion becomes a kind of “fait accompli” wherein it simply becomes too costly in terms of lives and too large-scale an endeavor to try to extricate the PLA from Taiwan. Should the US, Japan and South Korea need to mass a liberation force and fully “extricate” an occupying PLA force from Taiwan … could it be done?
Paradox of Deterrence: Peace Through Strength
While the purpose of the war game is to establish and refine an informed warplan in the event one is needed…. Army Pacific Commander Gen Charles Flynn regularly emphasizes the paradox central to deterrence…. Be ready to prevail in war if needed…. For the sole purpose of avoiding warArmy Pacific senior officials say Flynn says the Wargame is intended to train, experiment and build multinational relationships to “prevent” war…..peace through strength. As part of this, senior members of Army Pacific tell Warrior that Gen. Flynn says the purpose of Army Pacific and its overall strategy is to “avoid war.” At the same time, part of the method of “avoiding war,” Flynn emphasizes, is to train, prepare, experiment and refine a “war plan.” Army Pacific’s main concern is indeed related to the risk of a sudden PLA “surprise attack.”“While many different scenarios concern us, central is the PLA using yearly large scale exercises in the Straits to lull us into thinking the threat of invasion is low, then one year in the near future, that large training force abruptly changes course and heads straight for beaches on Taiwan. The result is a surprise invasion with very little warning,” the senior official with Army Pacific explainedA defining challenge when it comes to countering a sudden Chinese attack would likely relate to simple question of time and distance. Can US warships and their supporting 5th-generation air attack capability respond fast enough? Will enough torpedo armed submarines be in position to destroy Chinese warships crossing the Taiwan strait? Could US Navy amphibs armed with 20 F-35Bs each be close enough to quickly establish air superiority and leverage the US Navy’s massive 5th-generation air advantage? China has no sea-launched 5th-generation threat and would therefore be very challenged to succeed with an amphibious take-over of Taiwan if US F-35s could get their fast enough to destroy a PLA Navy amphibious attack from the airThese are all questions likely to be entertained by US Army Pacific commanders in a massive “theater-wide” wargame exploring a full-scale conflict with China in the Pacific. While tactical scenarios, weapons ranges and particular methods of attack are almost certain not to be available for security reasons, Army Pacific officials say this wargame is an enterprise which has not been pursued in living memory.
Army Pacific Wargame “Rehearsal of Concept”
Senior officials with Army Pacific Command tell Warrior there is now a large-scale “Rehearsal of Concept” underway as an initial step in the wargame, where participants and commanders are briefing their roles, solidifying command relationships and anticipating key tasks. Details regarding weapons, scenarios and capabilities are not available for security reasons, yet Army officials say the all-out-war exercise is today’s version of the “War Plan Orange wargaming done by the Navy and Army in the 1930s.”The idea of the ROC, senior officials explain … is to prepare for the worst and “develop an executable war plan that prepares USARPAC (US Army Pacific) for the worst eventuality.”Much attention has been focused on flashpoints in the South China Sea and the pressing Chinese threat to attack Taiwan, yet fewer minds have likely been sharpened in upon the reality of what a full-scale, Pacific-wide war with the PRC might look like. This is a complex and very nuanced question with seemingly far too many variables to consider, yet the current Army Pacific ROC seems up to the task.Specifics related to threats, ranges, combat scenarios and joint, multi-domain dynamics for the wargame are likely informed by findings from recent wargames and comprehensive Army analyses of the PLA’s reach and capability across the region. In recent months, US Army Pacific has published several research documents and studies offering findings and insights of great relevance to the Chinese threat in the Pacific. One major finding from an Army Pacific 2023 wargame called “Unified Pacific Wargame Series”Any outcome to an enterprise of this kind clearly results from a complex mixture of different variables, and of course the growing nature of multi-domain, information-driven warfare. Specifically, several Army studies are clear that there remains a “massive” need for more Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) in the Pacific theater. This need, senior Army officials and the Command’s research papers emphasize, need to me matched a commensurate improvement in data processing, or PED .. Processing Exploitation and Dissemination” of critical wardata.“We need vastly more dense and redundant ISR, yet it is not enough to just have the world’s best airborne sensors…..after collecting massive data, there is a need for “massively capable” PED,” a Senior Army official familiar with the Wargame told Warrior. The idea, the Senior Army expert explained, would be for the force to “Get quickly enough to the point where planes, drones, land troops, and ships are seamlessly passing and sharing both targeting data and BDA.(Battle Damage Assessments).”The text of US Army Pacific’s Unified Pacific Wargame Series findings aligns closely with the Senior Army officials’ comments, as it emphasizes a need for not only an increase in “collection capability” related to volumes of information but also a “parallel increase in PED capacity to conduct proper analysis and avoid “bottle necks” in the information chain.”The Army essay makes the related critical point that redundancy in the realm of information collection, analysis and transmission will be essential to ensure “joint” awareness and also mitigate against or overcome any Chinese attempt to “jam,” “derail” or “destroy” US and allied communication systems. More transport layers and secure, redundant levels of information exchange can help ensure operational functionality in the event some systems are destroyed or jammed.Scroll to Continue
****Joint Collection********
“Joint Collection requires diversified collection platforms, across all three layers – the aerial, space, and terrestrial layers….Additional sensing in the terrestrial layer provides more consistent, persistent pattern development and recognition,” the text of the UPWS Army paper states. “Federation of collection and PED responsibilities not only eases the burden on the forward-most formations, but provides for common understanding.”The need for more layers of ISR and PED would indeed make sense and seem critical given the vast-expanse of the Pacific. This is particularly true in the case of a “theater-wide” wargame exploring conflict from the Korean Peninsula all the way down beyond the South China Sea. This is why military experts refer to the Pacific in terms of a “tryanny of distance,” because conflict in the vast pacific would seemingly rise or fall on a successful ability to integrate and connect otherwise disparate operations across the theater. However, it is not enough for volumes of information to simply “get there” or “transmit” … the data must be processed and exploited quickly and efficiently, a point highlighted in the Army Pacific’s UPWS paper.“Without simultaneous improvements in the capacity and capability of PED systems,parallel improvements in collection will fail to achieve desired results,” the
Army Pacific essay writes.What might it mean in practical or operational terms to make this a reality. Clearly there would be a simple need for more nodes and assets in terms of drones, fixed-wing surveillance planes, ship and ground-based sensors and radar along with a robust air and space ISR capacity. However, of key relevance, not only would these nodes need to exist…but they would need to be engineered with the requisite “interfaces” “gateways” and technical standards to ensure information interoperability. Should time critical sensor data arrive through one transport layer format for example, such as RF or GPS, it will need to be “pooled” and analyzed in relation to data collected through otherwise disconnected sensor systems. This is where gateways come in, as they are systems described almost as translators able to receive data from one RF signal, for example, and combine it with incoming data from a GPS signal, ship-based radar or wireless datalink of some kind. Successful operation of ISR and PED, particularly when it comes to blending the two together with optimal efficiency, would require the interfaces to ensure seamless data flow and analysis across a diversified joint network.“PRC investments include digital infrastructure abroad, 5G cell networks, undersea cables, and data centers,” the Army Pacific text explained.
Chinese Expansionist Ambition
All of the studies findings and related US Army Pacific research rest upon a growing sense of urgency given the known elements of Chinese ambition. Another Army Pacific research essay published in 2023 alongside the UPWS findings is called “America’s Theater Army for the Indo Pacific.” The text of this document is clear about PLA expansionist aims, explaining that military modernization in the form of “intelligentization” may be positioning the PRC to think it can move to take over Taiwan in the near future.“PLA now sets its sights to 2027 with a goal to accelerate the integrated development of mechanization, in-formatization, and intelligentization of the PRC’s armed forces. If realized, this 2027 objective could give the PLA capabilities to be a more credible military tool for the CCP to wield as it pursues Taiwan unification,” the America’s Theater Army for the IndoPacific states.US Army Pacific’s text, “America’s Theater Army for the Indo-Pacific” details some of the specifics informing the PRC’s expansionist aims and strategies throughout the region. The paper provide summaries of China’s well known Belt-Road-Initiative. The BRI include a mix of transportation and economic alignments along the periphery of mainland China designed to expedite an ability to mass power, deploy and move resources throughout SouthEast Asia. BRI includes railways, port access and logistical support for global naval deployment, the Army Pacific text states.“Recent agreements with countries such as Cambodia on Ream Port and Sri Lanka on the Port of Hambantota provide strategic positioning and expanded access to the region’s waterways,” the Army Pacific text states.The BRI has been followed by what the Army Pacific text refers to as “Digital Silk Road” in which avenues for technology-focused investments were emphasized and added to the PRC strategy in the region.There is also China’s “nine-dash-line” claim, an assertion reportedly rooted in the Chinese Dynastic era hundreds of years ago .. claiming the entirety of the South China Sea as its own territory.
China Occupies Taiwan
What if an US-led allied coalition had to liberate Taiwan from an occupying PLA force? Could it be done? Such questions may seem impossible to answer, however a quick look at GlobalFirewpower.com in relation to improving maritime force deployment platforms seems to indicate the answer may be …”yes,” but at a huge cost.South Korea and Japan operate 1.1 million and 309,000 forces respectively and the US and Japan could together deploy an unrivaled 5th-generation F-35 force likely capable of quickly achieving air superiority. China’s J-20 exists in sizable numbers but cannot launch from the ocean and may not compete with the F-35 or Guam-based F-22s.. Furthermore, the PLA’s J-31 5th-gen stealth carrier launched aircraft only exists as a few prototypes and the PLA has no sea-launched F-35B vertical take-off-and-landing 5th-generation platform. Alongside these factors, the largest and perhaps less recognized element of any Pacific confrontation would undoubtedly rely upon a massive Army Pacific ground presence supporting a joint, multi-domain campaign. Ultimately, any effort to liberate Taiwan would require forces on the ground, a reason why the US Army Pacific continues to massively expand its presence and “joint” emphasis in terms of connecting with the other services. This is fundamental to the Army Pacific’s need for ISR and PED.“Land forces, particularly the U.S. Army, would figure centrally in de- fending national borders and preserving the territorial integrity of its Allies. This is because victory in an interstate war typically depends on control of key ground, with its corresponding abundance of resources, food supplies, wealth, and populations,” the text of America’s Theater Army for the Indo-Pacific” states.Gen Flynn explains that a growing, strong US Army presence in the Pacific theater is an indispensable and defining element contributing to a joint, multi-service effort to deter the PLA.”The People’s Republic of China holds advantages of mass, munitions depth and interior lines—operating from a central position that enables an army to move faster than opposing forces can counter—that will take the entire joint force to deny its military objectives,” Army Pacific Commander Gen. Charles Flynn writes in an April 2023 edition of AUSA Magazine.These factors and considerations are likely why the “America’s Theater Army for the Indo-Pacific” points to the growing significance of US-allied connectivity in the Pacific, as a joint US, Japanese, Korean force might well be able to liberate Taiwan from Chinese occupation. The aim would of course be to prevent that from being necessary, yet an established ability to do this figures prominently in the deterrence equation.“The United States maintains defense treaties with five Allies in the Indo-Pacific: Australia, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Treaties are binding agreements between nations and become part of international law, which, if enacted, would likely require all forms of U.S. military power,” America’s Theater Army for the Indo Pacific states.
Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization and the Defense Editor for the National Interest. Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.