By Olawale Abaire, Warrior Editorial Fellow
In a significant development, the Taipei Times reported that the United States and China held their first semi-official nuclear talks in March after a five-year hiatus. Given the heightened tensions and strategic competition between the two superpowers, particularly over Taiwan, these discussions come at a critical time. This analysis delves into the technical and strategic aspects of the discussions, providing a comprehensive overview of the evolving nuclear dynamics and the geopolitical implications.
China’s nuclear arsenal has seen substantial advancements in recent years. For instance, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s Type 094A Jin-class ballistic missile submarine represents a significant leap in China’s second-strike capability. These submarines are designed to carry JL-2 ballistic missiles, which have an estimated range of 7,200 kilometers, allowing China to hold targets across the United States at risk.
Moreover, China has been modernizing its nuclear arsenal across multiple domains. This includes the development of the DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), which can carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), and the testing of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) that can evade traditional missile defenses.
According to the Pentagon, Beijing’s nuclear arsenal increased by more than 20% between 2021 and 2023. With projections suggesting that China will field over 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, the country is rapidly closing the gap with the United States and Russia, which have approximately 1,770 and 1,710 operational warheads, respectively.
The United States has maintained a robust nuclear triad consisting of land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers. This triad ensures a credible second-strike capability, deterring adversaries from considering a first strike. The U.S. Department of Defense remains concerned about China’s growing nuclear capabilities and the potential shift in the strategic balance.
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China’s no-first-use (NFU) policy was a central topic of discussion. Historically, China has maintained that it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons in any conflict. However, U.S. officials have expressed concerns about the conditional nature of this policy, especially in the context of a conflict over Taiwan. During the talks, Chinese delegates reiterated their commitment to NFU and minimal deterrence policies. They emphasized that China’s nuclear build-up is a deterrence-based modernization effort aimed at countering advances in U.S. missile defenses and maintaining the survivability of their nuclear forces in the event of a first strike.
Furthermore, the U.S. nuclear strategy emphasizes flexibility and survivability, with a significant focus on maintaining a credible second-strike capability through its nuclear triad. In contrast, China’s strategy has traditionally centered on minimal deterrence and NFU, though recent developments suggest a shift towards enhancing their strategic deterrence.
China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal, including the development of anti-ship cruise missiles, bombers, ICBMs, and submarines, suggests a move towards a more robust and diversified nuclear force. This expansion raises questions about the future of China’s NFU policy and its broader strategic intentions.
Top U.S. arms control official Bonnie Jenkins expressed frustration over China’s reluctance to engage in substantive nuclear risk reduction discussions. She told Congress in May that Beijing had not responded to proposals raised during last year’s formal talks. The State Department echoed these concerns, stating that China’s refusal to engage substantively raises doubts about its NFU policy and overall nuclear doctrine.
