Major Nuclear Threats: Russia, China & North Korea

By Peter Huessy, President of Geo-Strategic Analysis

Much of the coverage of security policy concerns the “what” and “where” of threats. For example, this year’s major nuclear news stories confirmed: (1) North Korea launched another ICBM which was estimated to be able to reach American west coast cities with some kind of nuclear warhead; (2) Russia fired a Kinzhal missile at Ukraine, but surprisingly Ukraine’s armed forces successfully shoot down what was described as one of Putin’s “super weapons”; (3) China built three expansive ICBM fields numbering some 360 silos, that when added to the existing fixed and mobile ICBMs, gave the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) more ICBM launchers under its control then are in the entirety of the United States ICBM force of 450 missile launchers; and (4) Iran has enriched uranium to 84%, just a short distance technically from the 90% level which is considered optimum for building a nuclear warhead.

Although the “what” and “where” of these threats the US and its allies are facing is very important, there is missing an element that is more important. That is the question of “When?” and “Why?” In short, when the bad guys might use such weapons and for what reason must be answered. These are the intelligence “dots” that are often not connected. Even more worrisome these “dots” may not be on the geostrategic landscape to begin with.

It is often alleged that national security and military planners engage in worst case scenarios to artificially exaggerate the threat to support greater military production. In the 1970’s, nuclear expert Dr. Johnny Foster spent years trying to get the US intelligence and defense community to accurately estimate the percentage of the GDP that the USSR spent on defense. The official estimates varied, but generally were on the low end of competing assessments. One estimate placed Soviet spending at 6-8% of GDP, an estimate that not only the CPD but other critics such as Senator Henry M. Jackson and Senator John Stennis, both Democrats, thought was significantly lower than the real number.

Dr. Foster was successful in getting the CIA to do another analysis. But while the agency did another updated analysis, and while grudgingly admitted that Moscow was probably spending nominally more than their earlier estimates, the new estimate was simply a dodge, and as it was later confirmed, hugely off track. At that time, the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) had been created with a central goal of getting an accurate portrait of the real nature of Soviet behavior and threat, especially the extent of Soviet military spending.

One meeting that the CIA arranged between the two sides revealed that the defense budget estimate team inside the agency was adamant that the estimates of Soviet spending if “too high” even though possibly accurate, would “endanger “détente” and “peaceful coexistence” which was after all official US policy. So of course, the “official” estimated level of Soviet defense spending had to take this into account. For if the Soviets were indeed spending some 15-20% of their GDP on defense, there then would be major political pressure in the US to increase its own defense spending from the 1975 level of 5.65%. And if that occurred, détente and peaceful coexistence would have to be discarded as US policy preferences.

The key points the CPD laid out were two: (1) the ongoing buildup of Soviet nuclear weapons, particularly large, multi-warhead land-based missiles, ironically allowed by the 1972 SALT I arms control agreement between Washington and Moscow; and (2) the actual military expenditures by Moscow probably approached 15-20% of GDP which if true clearly reflected the USSR’s goal of seeking world hegemonic power, camouflaged by the ruse of “détente.”