By: Tuva Siegel, Warrior Editorial Fellow

Mass, dispersion, and tempo were three key lessons to come out of the 101st Airborne Division’s recent Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation. The exercise consisted of over 500 drones, more than 225 of which were one-way attack systems called PBAS (Purpose-Built Attritable Systems). These systems aligned directly with the “soldier-driven innovation” at the forefront of this rotation, meaning they were built by 101st Division soldiers themselves to better help them adapt as they fight. Col.  Richard "Ryan" Bel put it this way: “A 19-year-old soldier, once trained, can assemble one in a couple of hours in an afternoon.”

The idea behind this is to engineer drones in a way that matches how soldiers actually fight, building the tactics into the equipment itself. Fort Campbell has a facility called RAID (Robotics and Autonomous Integration Directorate) where they have “CNC capability, 3D printing, and can work with multiple materials, water, and laser jets to work with carbon fiber.” RAID is part of the Division Sustainment Brigade's Allied Trades and has helped accelerate the production of drones from years down to just a couple of weeks. One of these is the PBAS, or Attritable Battlefield Enabler (ABE 1.01) drone, a small Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) that costs about $750 to build with CNC-cut carbon fiber frames and additional parts purchased at a low cost from compliant items on what the Army terms the “Blue List,” a compilation of data, which outlines the standard procurement of UAS, is helping to scale production. “With multi-tier traceability, verification, collaboration, and monitoring, manufacturers can iterate faster, and warfighters get trusted equipment sooner,” claims the data from Blue List maker Atlanta’s webpage. So, when it comes to these PBAS, “the fuse, the warhead, and the airframe are all manufactured on-site,” said Bell

Mass

The importance of mass when it comes to UAS is critical, shifting the landscape from a niche capability at 1 or 2 drones to genuine combat power when supplied with many more, according to Bell. “A company that is provided 20 drones a day…has an entirely new form of combat power. We need drones at scale. We need to treat them like ammunition.” To reach this goal, Bell estimated through the JRTC combined arms live fire that the brigade would need between 1,000 and 1,500 drones a week when in sustained combat operations. Some of the first feedback to come from operators was the need for mass; in fact, drones such as the Raven made operators resistant to using it because of how much more expensive it was, approximately $260,000 per system, according to an Air Force Fact Sheet. The importance of having a high volume of low-cost drones is incredibly important when considering soldiers: “when you have a 19-year-old private who is trying to fly a drone and has been awake for 48 hours. We've got to make sure it's designed for combat utility.” What was more effective was the “hunter-killer pairing” or integration of short-range reconnaissance (SRR) drones and their PBAS. First, the Skydio X10s would scope out and find the representation of a potential enemy the Army calls its OpFOR (training opposition force), called Geronimo. This was followed by the launch of their ABE 1.01 drones designed to “humble the enemy at a distance.” The challenge wasn't finding targets; it was “making sure that we aligned the capability to the right target on our high-priority target list,” according to Bell.

Dispersion

Three dynamics are defining the new operating environment. The first is Transparency: persistent ISR means you must assume you're always seen. The second is Contested Communications: assume disruption at scale and at distance. The third is Contested Logistics: assume no safe area from port to foxhole. These three factors are exactly why dispersion is becoming necessary: “The modern battlefield punishes concentration," claims Bell. Geronimo was extremely good at identifying formations, causing the division to separate into “platoon, squad, and team patrols and ambushes”; however, they maintained “ability, using technology, to mass at the time and place of our choosing.”

Success came from the use of new waveforms with nodes for beyond-line-of-sight communications and updated camouflage. Specifically, the Multi-Functional Reconnaissance Company (MFRC) was “outstanding,” consisting of "a tactical UAS (TUAS) platoon, an electronic warfare (EW) platoon, an effects platoon, and a reconnaissance platoon." Integration sections were attached directly to battalions for built-in drone support, while the recon platoon operated 7–15 kilometers ahead of the forward line. This was enabled through the Marine Corps MV-22 Ospreys, a proof of concept for the 101st's future vertical lift capabilities. They drew enemy attention away from the main force and bridged the gap between the Army’s conventional training force and a 5th Special Forces Group Advanced Operational Base operating even further out. As the effects platoon transitions from TOW 2B missile systems to loitering munitions and the Mobile Long-Range Precision Strike Missile (MLRPSM), the brigade's ability to shape the deep fight will extend to 30–35 kilometers, making dispersion a strategic advantage, explains Bell.

Tempo

"Tempo is our advantage. Drones help us generate tempo by sensing, orienting, and striking faster than the enemy," explains Bell, summing up the payoff of mass and dispersion working together. The integration of AI trained on Army doctrines has largely contributed to the acceleration of mission analysis, red-teaming course of action, and the speeding up of order production. But tempo doesn't happen without the communications discipline that enables it. Bell's "silent, violent, silent" concept required units to go dark, maneuver undetected, and only briefly surface on the network to coordinate fires and strike before going silent again. That meant the staff had to be ready to act the moment a unit came up. With drone sensors generating over 25,000 spot reports in just 10 days, the S2 bot processed and visualized that information continuously, so when units surfaced, the picture was already clear. "All of that was processed using artificial intelligence, which helped us make sense of the battlefield and respond faster than Geronimo," Bell explains. The result was that the Army training unit referred to as the Iron Battalion (Iron (3-187 IN)) infiltrated 17 kilometers undetected, moving two companies 22 kilometers behind enemy lines. “They didn't do it because of drones. They did it because they were disciplined, well-trained, well-led infantry who had drones overhead helping them scout,” said Bell.

The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation helped soldiers verbalize their needs in the fast-paced world of drone dominance, allowing them to adapt and scale production alongside the industry. As Bell continually stated, the importance of “soldier-driven innovation” will always “enable” soldiers, rather than replace them with technology. 

Tuva Siegel is an Editorial Fellow at Warrior Maven. She studies English at Kenyon College. Tuva is the author of Drömland, a fictional collection of short stories, and is currently studying weapons and military technology.