As U.S. strikes dismantle 85% of Iran’s defense infrastructure, intelligence suggests Beijing is backfilling depleted missile stockpiles following the recent shootdown of an American Apache helicopter.
By: Tuva Siegel, Warrior Editorial Fellow
With Iran’s dwindling arsenal due to Operation Epic Fury, the Pentagon, Congress and U.S. Central Command are raising questions over China’s influence and potential role in helping it rebuild. In the meantime, strikes during the ceasefire continue, including a recent shootdown of a U.S. helicopter, which President Trump confirmed on Truth Social on June 9, saying Iran shot down an Apache helicopter patrolling over the Strait of Hormuz. This latest incident follows weeks of similar attacks.
Central Command (CENTCOM) conducted several self-defense strikes during the weekend of May 30 and 31 in response to Iran’s shootdown of a US MQ-1 drone that was operating over international waters. The US eliminated Iranian air defenses, a ground control station, and two one-way attack drones in Goruk, Iran, and Qeshm Island. Then, on June 2, CENTCOM shot down three one-way attack drones launched by Iran defending civilian mariners who were rightfully transiting international waters. Moments later, American forces successfully defeated multiple Iranian ballistic missiles and drones. CENTCOM has conducted several “self-defense strikes” over the last few days. As conflict continues to escalate during the ongoing ceasefire and the number of “self-defense strikes” becomes more frequent, it becomes critical to question what the future actions of Iran might be in terms of restoring much of its air force since the U.S’s continued destruction of it.
Admiral Charles Bradford Cooper II, Commander for U.S. Central Command, made a statement on May 14, 2026, in which he cited concerns regarding Chinese interference in Iran. As part of his Congressional testimony, Cooper described the level of destruction that the U.S. has inflicted on Iran in the last few months, stating “In the air domain, Iran’s air and air defense forces are functionally and operationally irrelevant. Before OEF, the Iranian Air Force flew between 30 and 100 sorties each day. Today that number is zero.” Furthermore, the U.S. has “damaged or destroyed 85% of Iran’s ballistic missile, drone, and naval defense industrial base,” conducted more than 1,450 strikes strikes on manufacturing facilities, and buried much of Iran’s “ballistic missiles, launcher vehicles, and long-range attack drones with more than 450 strikes on ballistic missile storage and systems and roughly 800 strikes on Iran’s drone-launching units and storage.”
All of these actions have resulted in the probability that Iran may not be able to replace its lost capabilities in the future, as nearly 82% of its air force has been “knocked out.” Perhaps most importantly, the U.S has disbanded the supply chain from Tehran to the proxies such as Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, or the Iraqi militia groups. Cooper claims that “Across more than 10,200 sorties and over 13,500 strikes,” the U.S. has set Iran back “40 years” in military investments. Now the question shifts from where the Iranian military power is to what it might become in the future.
China has long sustained itself as Iran’s top economic partner, acting as its largest oil consumer, making Iran incredibly dependent upon China’s business. However, China has always been cautious when it comes to dealing with Iran, preferring to keep one foot out the door to avoid spurring conflict with the U.S. and interfering with its sanctions on Iran. In a June 28, 2021, Congressional report detailing China-Iran relations, it was made clear that an “ anti-U.S. element” is at the core of their interactions, which has only grown as China works to “promote itself as an alternative to U.S. global leadership.” Beijing and Tehran were at the height of their relationship when Beijing supplied fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, rocket launchers, tanks, and artillery during the Iran-Iraq War. Beijing also assisted in developing Iran’s missile and nuclear programs around this time. Already, China has been able to proliferate technology that Iran has used to “improve the accuracy, range, and lethality of its ballistic missiles.” Iran has claimed to have used the “Qiam-1 and Fateh-313 missiles” in Tehran’s January 2020 attack on U.S. forces in Iraq.
Later, in March 2021, Beijing and Tehran finalized this 25-year cooperation agreement, which directly benefits “Tehran’s ambitions to attain regional dominance and keep the United States preoccupied in the Middle East.” This keeps the U.S. from fully focusing on the Indo-Pacific, a region that is much more important to China’s national interests. So, while in the past China has strategically managed its relationship with Iran to avoid attention from the US, Iran’s depleted military resources now raise the question of whether its demonstrated dependence on China will escalate and whether China will accept an “oil-for-arms” sort of deal.
“Iranian missiles developed with Chinese technology have likely already been used against U.S. forces and partners in the region," according to a 2021 Congressional analysis called "Economic and Security Review Commission." This report from 2021 certainly sets a precedent, and suggests that Iran has previously fired Chinese-made weapons.
This statement from 2021 aligns with a recently published Congressional fact sheet from March 16, 2026, which more clearly outlines that in February of 2026, several anonymous sources “indicated China was engaged in direct arms sales to Iran--offensive drones and a nearly finalized deal to sell anti-ship cruise missiles, though the two sides had not agreed on a delivery date.” While not confirmed, these reports could indicate a less constrained approach from China when providing Iran with kinetic military capabilities. Therefore, although the Congressional report says China's official public support for Iran has been limited, the text does serious questions about the possibility that the PRC is providing weapons and support to Iran in the current conflict.
In 2021, China granted Iran full military access to its BeiDou satellite navigation system to assist in its drone and missile attacks, further aiding China in testing out its weaponry in real time against Western technology. These systems are “used to support operational resilience, while reported transfers of reconnaissance assets and growing ties between Chinese commercial satellite firms and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),” according to an April 2026 report from the Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute. Additionally, “on March 2, 2026, two state-owned Iranian vessels departed China’s Gaolan Port to Iran and are believed to be transporting sodium perchlorate, a key precursor used in solid rocket fuel for missiles,” which was followed by January 2025, “when two different Iranian ships docked in China and were loaded with approximately 1,000 tons of sodium perchlorate.”
In 2019, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) left the $5 billion South Pars natural gas development project due to U.S. sanctions, which would have been the largest Chinese investment project in Iran to date. In the same year, the director of Iran’s Aviation Industries Organization reportedly claimed that “China and Russia have both proposed fighter sales to Iran (Tehran has a particular interest in China’s third-generation J-10B).” This directly aligns with suspicions around the “oil-for-arms deal” stated in a February 2026 Reuters investigation by John Irish, Parisa Hafezi, and Gavin Finch. They claim that “The deal for the Chinese‑made CM‑302 missiles is near completion,” with these systems having “a range of about 290 kilometres and are designed to evade shipborne defences by flying low and fast.” These missiles would be a huge improvement for Iran and keep it steadily relying on China to help it rebuild its weaponry supply again and again.
As U.S. strikes continue to degrade Iranian hardware, Tehran is likely becoming less of an independent military power and more of a client state dependent on Chinese technology, navigation systems, and arms transfers to function. This dependency, formalized through the 25-year cooperation agreement and deepened through oil-for-arms arrangements, BeiDou integration, and the near-finalized CM-302 deal, represents a shift in how Iran projects power rather than an end to its ability to do so.
Tuva Siegel is an Editorial Fellow at Warrior Maven. She studies English at Kenyon College. Tuva is the author of Drömland, a fictional collection of short stories, and is currently studying weapons and military technology.