By Kris Osborn, President, Warrior, Center for Military Modernization
Would any use of nuclear weapons, in any capacity or tactical circumstances, invariably lead to massive global destruction? Or is there conceptual space for a military commander to actual envision a “winnable” or “limited” nuclear exchange? This is indeed an intensely debated and critical question informing US deterrence posture, and it has at times in history led US leaders to proclaim that any use of nuclear weapons, in any circumstances, should be met with the Eisenhower-era promise of “massive retaliation.” This is no longer a formal US policy, yet the question of potential “response” to a Russian use of nuclear weapons has in recent years been again thrust into a spotlight of danger.
Ultimately, the foundation of nuclear deterrence rests upon a paradox, meaning it introduces the promise of massive, catastrophic death and destruction …. for the sole purpose of “keeping the peace.” This concept, and the fundamental juxtaposition or irony it involves, was famously articulated during the dawn of the Nuclear Era by Yale Scholar Bernard Brodie. Brodie makes the clear, unambiguous point that, unlike the prevailing approach throughout human history, weapons in the nuclear realm will be built and deployed for the specific purpose of “NOT” being used. A weapon … to not be used .. may seem like a contradiction in terms, yet the premise is the conceptual foundation of strategic deterrence.
“Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose,” Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, 1946.
Beyond Brodie? Using Nuclear Weapons
Brodie’s later work talks about the importance of “retaliatory” assurance as a key mechanism which which to avoid war, something which likely influenced the Pentagon’s creation of the undersea leg of the nuclear triad.
However, what about the possibility of nuclear weapons being developed for the specific purpose of “being used?” This is a reality Pentagon planners continue to be cognizant of, as is a very “realistic” possibility, according to top US researcher James Howe, an expert who has spent decades researching US, Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons.
James Howe is the President of Strategic Concepts and Analysis and former Director, Threats, Technologies and Future Requirements for Boeing Missile Defense Division. Mr. Howe has performed studies for OSD, DTRA, NNSA, DIA/MSIC and USA SMDC and briefed his research to OSD, ONR, STRATCOM, USSC, NSA, CIA, NIC and DIA . He recently discussed his research with Warrior and the Advanced Alliance for Nuclear Weapons in an interview about his research. Howe explained this during the inaugural episode of Warrior-ANWA’s Future Series NucleaCast PODCAST.
Russian Threat
Russia has had theater nuclear weapons for decades, and inherited many in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, yet Russia’s intense interest in building and acquiring a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, and the potential of actually using them with the idea of engaging in a limited, “winnable,” nuclear war, has a history going back to the days of Yeltsin in the late 1990s.
“This started back around 1999. Mikhailov, who then was the Minister of Atomic Energy for Russia, proposed developing a force of 10,000 highly accurate low-yield nuclear weapons to once again make them an instrument of policy. In other words, they would be usable.And Yeltsin signed off on that and so they then started development,” Howe told Warrior.
A key area of concern regarding this question of “realistic” nuclear attack resides in the potential use of “tactical,” “theater” lower-yield nuclear weapons intended to exact a devastating yet contained or limited impact.
US-Russian Tactical Nuclear Disparity
The disparity between the small, but growing US arsenal of theater nuclear weapons and the size and scope of Russia’s stockpile is as massive as it may be alarming. While it may not surprise many to some extent, given Russia’s history, it certainly helps explain why the US has in recent years resurrected its own tactical nuclear weapons arsenal. Actual specifics are debatable and difficult to discern precisely, he did say Russia operates roughly three or four times as many theater nuclear weapons as the US.
“Right now in terms of tactical nuclear weapons, the US has approximately 400 B61 bombs and approximately 200 of those are over in Europe. Conversely, Russia has approximately 2,000 according to a number of analysts….but other analysts, who are knowledgeable. believe that it’s more likely 5,000 or even 10,000. If you may recall back in 1991 at the height of the Cold War when it ended, at that point Russia had, I believe it was 21,700 weapons, tactical weapons, that they felt they needed to be able to conduct war in Europe,” said Howe.
Howe’s research identifies a key distinction between Russian “declaratory” policy and “execution” policy, meaning actual “actions” may differ greatly from rhetoric or stated intention. Russian deployment of tactical nuclear weapons is also a key element of this, as it relates directly to this question of possible “execution.”
“Russia has developed and likely deployed nuclear weapons with yields of 10s of tons (Ultra low yield); 100s of tons (Very low yield) and 10s of kilo-tons (Low yield),” Howe explained.
US Low Yield Weapons
President Trump’s 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for the US to resurrect an arsenal of tactical or low-yield nuclear weapons, and this effort has made great progress. The US now has deployed low-yield Trident II D5 sub-launched nuclear weapons and is developing a nuclear-capable Submarine Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM). The Air Force is of course progressing with its nuclear-capable, air-launched Long-Range Stand-Off weapon; this weapon address a key element of the nuclear triad, because should advanced air defenses make it impossible for bombers to drop nuclear weapons in a stand-in or closer capacity, an Air Force B-21 could launch an LRSO from ranges well beyond the reach of air defenses. This enables the air triad to hold an enemy at risk from great distances in a manner that is not otherwise possible.
During the re-introduction of US tactical nuclear weapons following the 2018 NPR, former Secretary of Defense James Mattis was asked if the addition of tactical nuclear weapons “lowers the threshold” to nuclear war. His answer aligns with what many proponents of a strong deterrence posture believe today, and that is commanders and the President need a “full-range” of options with which to execute a successful deterrence strategy.
Escalate to Win
Russia’s nuclear posture has for years been understood in terms of “escalate to win,” meaning it rests upon a realistic threat of an actual first-strike or offensive use of tactical nuclear weapons. One could argue that, in some cases, this achieves its intended effect, given that there has been no military confrontation between Russia and NATO and the West. On some level, Russia has to operate with the knowledge that they would likely be decimated in a full-scale war with NATO, particularly in the air, so a credible nuclear threat can be used to get leverage or equalize the balance of power.
As per the question of whether Putin would actually “use” or “fire” nuclear weapons, the answer likely involves a complex mixture of geopolitical, military and psychological variables. Putin is of course a survivalist and a rational figure committed to maintaining power, and on some level he must recognize that a decision to use nuclear weapons in any capacity could lead to the complete “annihilation” of Russia. Perhaps Russia’s rhetoric and consistent threat of using nuclear weapons is mere posturing, a manipulative tactic to exact influence and control. Has Putin’s threat of nuclear weapons limited, slowed down or adversely impacted US and NATO assistance to Ukraine? Some think that may be the case, yet there is also strong reason to believe that perhaps Putin’s threat is extremely “real,” meaning he “would” use them if backed into a corner or of the belief it could be “limited” and “winnable.”
“Putin is also a risk taker. And Russia is a nation that’s in decline. And so they will, in fact, be willing to accept more risk. They wouldn’t make this investment in these low-yield weapons if they didn’t feel at some point they would have to use them. This is not a demonstration force. This is a war fighting force that they’re developing. And we’ll just have to…wait and see how things develop as to what happens both with Ukraine. If you recall back in the fall of 23, we were very concerned at that point that Russia was in fact going to use one or more weapons,”
Apart from the question of sheer numbers, another somewhat mysterious element of this pertains to the actual amount of tactical nuclear weapons Russia has “deployed.” Howe said the actual deployed amount is unknown, yet he did point to Russia’s considerable nuclear weapons production capacity, saying they can build up to three thousand a year.
