byDr. Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute and Peter Huessy, Senior Fellow, The National Institute for Deterrence Studies
During his first administration, President Trump demanded to know what plan the United States military had for defeating ISIS. There was at the time no plan beyond muddling through. The President said that was unacceptable. He gave notice that the military had one year to destroy and thus defeat ISIS. The United Sates military developed a plan, carried it out and at the end of a year ISIS was destroyed. No more endless war.
The new administration under President Trump faces a similar dilemma in Ukraine. There is no apparent plan for victory and defeating Russia—armed as it is with 5000 nuclear weapons of varying ranges and yields—is a horse of a different color.
However, is the objective of restoring Ukraine’s sovereignty and with it the complete withdrawal of Russian forces from the Donbass and Crimea possible? And could such an objective be achieved relatively quickly, such as within a year and actually be caried out through the adoption of multiple lines of attack against Moscow, many of which would involve the adoption of policies on which President Trump campaigned?
The Russian economy is suffering huge losses. 750,000 young men have been killed or injured. Inflation is reaching the point of being galloping, commodities like butter are disappearing, the ruble’s value is plunging and, despite a state policy of militarizing the economy, there are numerous signs that in many areas the defense sector cannot meet state requirements. Hence the large-scale aid from North Korea, Yemen, and China without which continuation of the war would be doubtful. Meanwhile the new state budget calls for a 25% hike in an already militarized economy and represents the most closed budget in Russian Federation history.
Russia recently suffered 2000 casualties in one day in late November, and since Putin refuses to call a general mobilization, he has mobilized criminals, and sought soldiers abroad from such places as Yemen, Nepal, and North Korea. Finally, any observer of Russian television and newspapers can quickly find multiple signs of despair, apprehension, and even foreboding about this war and its likely consequences.
The Russian government depends more on energy sales for its revenue than ever before but Russian oil and gas markets in Europe, the main source of energy revenue, have largely dried up. In turn this trend has forced Moscow to devise means of skirting sanctions by selling crude oil and natural gas to China and India, using many so called “ghost ships” or “shadow” tankers carrying oil and gas abroad but selling at steep discount. Russia is also losing oil and gas revenue as it is exchanging oil and gas to North Korea in return for soldiers, a barter exchange that only a few governments are willing to carry out, but which loses Russian important oil and gas revenue.
