By Alexandra Elias, Warrior Contributor
As the Russian invasion began, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense quickly seized the opportunity to utilize civilian drones using social platforms like Facebook to call on civilian drone pilots to donate their skills–or, if unskilled, at least just their equipment–to the defense of Kiev. Small and originally intended for hobbyists and photographers, these drones are simple for those without military experience to learn how to operate.
This ease of use combined with simple sourcing–Ukranians and foreign supporters could order them easily from Amazon–made civilian drones a logical choice for asymmetric warfare. The most popular manufacturer, SZ DJI Technology Co., Ltd. (DJI), even offers a free trial of their flight simulator software for training purposes.
Civilian drones can be controlled with something as simple as an RC controller or as sophisticated as a laptop, and footage can be viewed with either a screen or a small FPV headset. Each of these is available at a variety of price points, and many have DIY options using popular hobby tech. Open source firmware originally used by the drone racing community, like Betaflight, has been adapted by Ukranian operators for more fine tuned flight control.
The least expensive DJI drone, a tiny quadcopter called the DJI Mini SE, starts at $299 and can fit into the palm of one’s hand. The most expensive, the enterprise-focused DJI Matrice, only costs $10-13,000 depending on package options. Combining these platforms with open source firmware, even high-end civilian drone systems are inexpensive compared to conventional man-portable military platforms like the RQ-11 Raven, which costs $35,000 for the aircraft alone.
The impact of civilian-sourced drones on the Ukrainian war effort is also impossible to ignore. Initially their major use was reconnaissance, flying close over Russian troop movements, cheap enough that their quick loss was worth the intel. Soon however drones were adapted to drop small payloads like grenades. Ukrainian drone pilots–with Angry Birds themed morale patches–now use a combination of recon and kamikaze drones to destroy Russian tanks. The Ukrainian Armed Forces have increased their capacity by training over 10,000 drone pilots between November and May, and pledging to train 10,000 more within months. This buzzing maelstrom of tiny technology has proven thus far impossible for Russian forces to eliminate.
Not every company wants to be associated with maelstroms. Under pressure by the Chinese government, DJI and other Chinese manufacturers have ended operations in both Ukraine and Russia to avoid their technology being used for war. This is not unprecedented–previously DJI had attempted to use geofencing to prevent drone use in Syria–and companies have many reasons to want to maintain a peaceful image. This is however complicated by the fact that Chinese state-owned military contractors have allegedly provided equipment including drones to Russia that were then used in Ukraine.
These efforts have not halted the use of civilian drones in Ukraine, but it has necessitated more creative solutions. While there are now many Ukrainian companies making drones for the war effort, these use predominantly Chinese parts that are also becoming subject to blocks. Some units are beginning to use more local components, including improvised explosives or unconventional structural materials. Other nations are also stepping in to provide inexpensive solutions. Australia has donated hundreds of cardboard drones manufactured by SYPAQ, initially created as part of an Australian Army innovation challenge. These drones are delivered flatpack, constructed with tape and rubber bands, and utilize GoPro cameras for footage.
Drones have also been an important component of American aid to Ukraine, providing capacity that civilian drones cannot. For example, the U.S. has provided AeroVironment Switchblades, a loitering munition, as part of its aid package. A loitering munition loiters–it can be launched before a target is located, stay in the air for an extended period of time, and can then be directed by the operator to detonate at its destination. In contrast most repurposed civilian drones can only be in the air for a few minutes at a time, and operators must be driven within several miles of their targets. The use of longer range drones have enabled strikes inside Russian territory.
It is no surprise that Ukraine has been asking the U.S. for more drones. This faces some obstacles. The Biden administration’s Conventional Arms Transfer (CAT) policy makes giving Ukraine more drones ideologically tricky–CAT considers potential human rights violations in arms sales, and popular YouTube videos of American drones making direct hits on Russian soldiers may be a bad look. Ukraine has frequently used drone footage for propaganda purposes, and there is little reason to believe this would not continue with American sourced equipment. Aid to Ukraine has also become a major issue in the upcoming Presidential election, which may make increasing lethal aid tricky for American politicians. This is at odds with the American electorate itself. The Brookings Institute has found that 62% of Americans support drone exports to Ukraine. While respondents were less supportive of drones being used for strikes than humanitarian or intelligence missions, Brookings found that 53% of respondents still supported sending armed platforms to Ukraine. The opposition to sending more drones to Ukraine may be louder than it is present.
In any case, Ukraine has become an active lab for drone doctrine, and those involved aren’t waiting. The Ukrainian government is continuing to use a DIY ethos, crowdfunding its naval drones and giving the biggest donors naming rights. This pushes both drone and contracting doctrine into new territory. SYPAQ, the Australian contractor, has used Ukrainian feedback to iterate its control systems and create a heavy-lift version of the drone.
