Javelin Missile Success in Russia Ukraine War Influences Future US Military War Strategy

Video Above: The Impact of Stinger Missiles, Javelin Missiles and Switchblade Drones in Russia Ukraine War

The Army’s new $9 million deal with Lockheed and Raytheon to build new Javelins will surprise no one, given the effectiveness of the weapon against Russian armored forces and President Biden’s trip to a manufacturing facility.

Much has been discussed regarding the tactical proficiency with which they have been employed by Ukrainians amid efforts to repel and destroy invading Russian forces. Not only are the weapons effective against armor, but they can also be used by mobile, dismounted units able to use buildings, terrain or intersections to attack advancing mechanized forces with hit-and-run-style ambush attacks.

Javelin Missile

News networks continue to show a steady stream of video images showing burnt, disabled and destroyed Russian armored vehicles, and the success of the Javelin and anti-armor weapons from other allied countries raises some interesting questions.

Certainly few would be inclined to suggest that the tank is obsolete or somehow likely to be rendered inconsequential by the advent of weapons such as the Javelin. The Javelin has been in use for many years and the heavily armored main battle tank is by no means obsolete. 

The prevailing thinking, in fact, is that heavily armored platforms such as the Abrams tank are here to stay, given their success in warfare and the uncertain pace at which lighter-weight composite armor materials emerge. The question is still very much alive as Army Research Laboratory Scientists research new composite materials and the Army both upgrades its Abrams and evaluates its emerging Optionally Manned Tank program for the future.

However, if employed with successful tactics, shoulder-fired weapons such as the Javelin can have a devastating impact upon armored forces and large vehicles like tanks. This is one reason why experienced combat veterans explain that tank crews very much want, or in some cases even need, dismounted infantry to operate in close proximity to them. Soldiers and networked drones, for example, can find and engage potential locations from which weapons such as Javelins can be fired.