By Kris Osborn, President, Warrior
US and Philippine warships patrolled island areas in the South China Sea with fast, shallow-water coastal surveillance and attack ships in what appeared to be a joint maritime combat littoral water war drill.
The development is by no means surprising given the pace at which intensifying Chinese threats have driven much stronger and vastly expanded US-Philippine military integration. A Navy essay explains that the USS Mobile (LCS 26), an Independence variant of the Littoral Combat Ship fleet patrolled island areas of the South China Sea with the Philippine Navy’s Gregoria del Pilar-class Patrol Ship BRP Ramon Alcaraz.
Alongside the clear tactical significance of having two fast, shallow water warships patrol island areas to ensure security, search for mines and establish a clear maritime combat presence in the region, the exercise does also seem to highlight the utility of the LCS. The Independence variant of the LCS, build by Austal USA, has performed well across a wide mission envelope to a large extend, but the ability to bring surface, countermine and anti-submarine warfare mission capability to the littoral areas of the South China Sea highlights the value and continued combat utility of the LCS. The operation shows that indeed LCS has enduring value in a way that aligns with the original concept of operation for the ship. The LCS was for years extremely controversial, in large measure because Navy, Pentagon and Congressional leaders expressed concern that the ship simply was not survivable enough to maintain relevance in a high-tech, modern blue-water warfare environment against great power adversaries. At the time, the Navy was working intensely to pivot from years of heavily emphasizing counterterrorism, counter-piracy and forward presence in international waterways to preparation for large scale “open” or “blue” water great power maritime warfare. Great power warfare on the open, blue sea, the thinking was, required a heavier, more survivable and better armed warship.
These concerns brought serious implications as former Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel reduced the planned LCS fleet size by a large number of boats, inspired the birth of a stronger-hulled, heavier Frigate and led to a number of key adjustments to the LCS such as space armor, improved deck guns and the addition of an over-the-horizon, deck-launched missile.
The original concept of the LCS was to bring a shallow-draft, high-speed engineered with integrated and interoperable weapons, sensors and technology systems called mission packages. These three packages were designed to bring surface warfare capability with deck-mounted guns, countermine technology and sonar-enabled submarine hunting systems. The concept of operation was to enable closer-in surveillance, land-attack, drone-launching for undersea and aerial sensing in areas less accessible to larger, deeper draft warships.
What this exercise suggests is that Pentagon great war planners may not have sufficiently recognized that the attributes of the LCS could indeed be relevant in major-power warfare in coastal and island areas such as the South China Sea. Certainly great power war planners were correct to plan for large-scale, heavily armed blue-water maritime combat, they might not have fully understood and island areas and coastal regions such as the South China Sea and Southern islands in Japan and the Philippines would prove vital in any great power warfare scenario in the Pacific. There are many reasons for this, as the LCS’ speed of 40 knots enables higher-speed maneuvering amidst fast-moving maritime warfare; its shallow draft allows the Navy to bring warship combat power into littoral areas inaccessible to deeper draft warships; its ability to launch and operate air, surface and undersea drones in closer proximity to enemy territory and coastline; the LCS could support recently formed Marine Corps littoral units specializing in sea-land island hopping kinds of combat scenarios. Also, should US airpower soften or disable enemy ground-fired weapons, and LCS could clear coastal areas of mine fields operating mine-hunting Unmanned Surface Vehicles to enable more survivable and successful amphibious attack.
Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization and Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics& Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
