Rustici Previously Served as a Technical Lead, Intrusion Analyst and East Asia Cyber Lead at the Department of Defense
Cyber as a Strategic Capability: How do we get there?
By Ross Rustici
We are watching you
Times, they are a regressing. The opening shot from America in what has been a long-awaited return to the information operations battlefield is tantamount to a Cold War practical joke. The implications the first publicized operation conducted under the new defend forward paradigm is an alarmingly mild rebuke that speaks to the broader subtext of the U.S. military’s planning and capacity in this domain.
During the cold war, the military churned out Russian linguists from the Defense Language Program in Monterey California. Upon graduation, in addition to new assignments and goodbyes, it was common for the individuals of the graduating class to receive greeting cards congratulating them on their successful completion of the program, from the Russian military. This sort of gamesmanship was common during the cold war. Monitoring the military organizations that were aligned against you was the presumed baseline of activity. If the U.S. military has forgotten this history because of fighting non-traditional adversaries for the last three decades, it puts our planning and capabilities at a significant disadvantage.
The Russian military generally operates under the assumption of international scrutiny. The declassified history of American surveillance efforts against the Soviet Union alone would be enough to give any government pause about their ability to operate in a clandestine manner. Combine this with the leaked information regarding allied surveillance through CCTV cameras in the facilities where hacking in 2016 was taking place and the unsealed Mueller indictments, and there is a convincing case to be made that it would be more shocking to the troll farms that they weren’t being watched.
Some argue that the implicit threat of sanctions and indictments will have a tempering effect on Russian information warfare efforts. It is also possible that the combination of direct action and the continued systematic take down of social media bots will blunt this method enough that it forces an evolution in how Russia carries out these types of operations. However, there is a substantial risk that this emboldens the adversary. If the units conducting the information operations know they are being watched and yet still deem their actions as being successful, this turns what was meant to be a deterrent into a demonstration of inept power.