By Kris Osborn, President, Center for Military Modernization
Israeli Defense Forces appear to be waiting, planning and analyzing options regarding a ground invasion, an apparent deliberation and preparation which indicates that Israeli decision-makers are likely considering lessons learned from Ukraine.
While a ground incursion may still be likely, if not ultimately inevitable as part of an IDF military campaign, it takes little imagination to recognize that a linear, mechanized incursion into Gaza with standard formations and advancing armored forces might be extremely ill advised. IDF military tacticians have likely studied previous military confrontations with Hamas and also observed Ukraine’s success against an invading Russian force, and they are likely aware that an armored ground invasion with Merkava tanks and other armored formations is precisely what Hamas has been preparing for for quite some time.
Even a cursory examination of previous conflicts between the IDF and Hamas indicate that indeed Hamas is armed with an extremely lethal amount of Anti-Tank-Guided-Missiles and has a history of using obscured attack positions using terrain, buildings and an elaborate network of tunnels and trenches to ambush, attack and cripple IDF armor. Their previous style of war has for years been referred to as “hybrid,” meaning it involves a blend of lethal conventional weapons such as rockets, RPGs and ATGMs likely from Iran with standard terrorist and insurgent tactics. These kinds of Hamas tactics and warfare scenarios were well-articulated in an interesting 2009 essay called “Back to Basics” written by the US Army Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The essay, which catalogs a detailed history of combat between both the IDF and Hezbollah as well as multiple engagements with Hamas in Gaza, explores in-depth analysis of the warfare tactics employed on both sides.
The IDF has likely studied this very carefully, as the 2009 study describes Hamas’ “hybrid” type of warfare tactics. The authors of “Back to Basics” explained that, by 2008, Hamas had indeed not only acquired large numbers of small arms and sniper rifles from Russia and Iran, but also had accumulated a formidable arsenal of anti-armor weapons such as SA-7s and RPG-29s, grenades and anti-tank-guided missiles. Given the state of commercial technology and weapons proliferation, Hamas is now likely to be armed with ATGMs with a higher-level of precision than may have been the case in 2008. These weapons, according to the study, were supplemented by an elaborate mixture of terrorist tactics to include the use of “extensive tunnels, IEDs, underground shelters and ambush points.”
Added to this equation is the fact that Gaza is highly condensed and heavily populated, a combat environment likely to require IDF armored forces to pass through narrow streets and passageways. Of course such circumstances only add to the vulnerability of IDF armor should it seek to enter and “take over” areas within Gaza defended by Hamas.
Hamas “Hybrid” War
This means Hamas fighters will be expected to deliberately hide and blend in with civilians, travel through an extensive amount of strategically placed tunnels, use IEDs and roadside bombs and seek positions of tactical advantage from which to attack IDF armor. Added to this equation, commercially available drone technology, coupled with ground robotics are have likely been acquired by Hamas from Iran or an open international market. This means Hamas fighters will likely be able to see and target incoming IDF forces much more effectively than may have been the case in 2009.
Tactically speaking, this kind of decentralized, yet heavily armed anti-armor campaign, using weapons proven to be effective against heavy formations, is not something IDF commanders should attack using traditional linear formations. Ukraine has shown that ambush-style hit and run attacks, coupled with advanced or modernized anti-armor weapons, was able to completely decimate incoming Russian forces, a war-scenario leading many to question or at least think about modifications regarding the use of heavy armor for any kind of conventional invasion.
A former Rifle Company Commander during Operation Iraqi Freedom who attacked the Iraqi Republican Guard at the Baghdad airport, ret. Lt. Col. Scott Rutter, explained to Warrior in the opening days of the Ukraine conflict…. That, during OIF, Iraqis used tactics with some success quite analogous to those employed successfully by Ukrainian forces. These tactics, Rutter explained, involved the use of cross-sections, uneven terrain, buildings, bridges and narrowly configured passageways to “ambush” and destroy Russian armored forces. Clearly Russian military actions were widely criticized and observed as heavily flawed, yet Ukraine’s tactical adeptness was also largely recognized, if not somewhat surprising to observers from around the world. Ukraine’s success was even mentioned in the US Marine Corps’ “Force Design 2030” text as evidence why the Corps might need to slightly reduce the amount of heavy armor in its force and instead evolve more fully toward lighter, more expeditionary, dispersed attacks using unmanned systems, air-ground coordination, faster vehicles and movements … all supported by increasingly lethal anti-armor weapons, air superiority and longer-range precision weaponry. Once Ukraine began receiving Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, their military was able to implement this strategy with even greater success. Without air superiority, Ukraine was clearly in need of longer-range, precision ground attack weapons such as GMLRS to destroy mobile Russian ground missile launchers, troop fortifications and equipment.
Although IDF forces are likely extremely well trained, and far more capable of Combined Arms Maneuver success than the Russians demonstrated, a direct armored invasion into Gaza is nonetheless likely to encounter a similar result and fall prey to extremely lethal, Iranian-provided anti-armor weapons. This is likely what Hamas has spent months, if not years preparing for, given Russia’s experience in Ukraine and Hamas prior success with “hybrid” war tactics against IDF armor in previous military conflicts between 2006 and 2009.
Air Superiority?
However, there are key differences, particularly when one looks at the air equation, as Israel does appear able to operate with some measure of air superiority or air effectiveness. Hamas may or may not have some Iranian-provided air defenses, as Russia is widely reported to have sold S-300s to Iran in recent years. How many might Hamas have? How modern or effective might they be? This is a critical question because, unlike attacking Russian forces, IDF attackers are likely to operate with air superiority enabled by its fleet of stealthy F-35I Adir aircraft and other attack jets. Hamas does not appear to have any kind of credible air-attack capability. This being said, while air superiority is likely to bring IDF forces a decisive advantage when it comes to supporting advancing ground units, the challenge is nevertheless still extremely complicated and quite difficult from a tactical point of view. Without ground-spotters, targeting and very accurate intelligence, aerial targeting with satellites, drones, fighter jets and aircraft sensors are likely to encounter great difficulty with targeting given that Hamas likes to operate underground, in defilade and among civilians. This makes using even the best air-fired precision weaponry quite difficult, without very precise ground intelligence.
IDF commanders are likely aware of these variables, and they may be the reason we have yet to see
a ground invasion. IDF thinking may be that it better serves their immediate and long-term military objectives to continue gathering intelligence from the ground, leveraging precision-attack from the air when targets are accurately found and leveraging surveillance from the ground and air to identify any kind of detectable Hamas movements. Intelligence and targeting are likely the best approach, as IDF forces need to find out where Hamas fighters and weapons are hiding. Any ability to truly find and destroy Hamas on the ground may best be accomplished by smaller, dismounted teams of IDF units able to clear areas, surprise attack Hamas locations and slowly destroy them in close-quarter battle without needing to rely so heavily upon tanks and armored formations, given how vulnerable they will be. Even this will prove difficult, as Hamas likely knows the terrain and building structures and likely attack from tunnels, caves and other locations in defilade. Destroying this will require counterterrorism and counterinsurgency tactics, which rely heavily upon intelligence and can take longer to generate results. Given this, however, there will likely still be a need for Combined Arms Maneuver to a certain extent. Once areas are cleared by IDF attackers, heavy armor will be needed to “occupy” terrain and hold captured territory. Any large IDF ground presence, however, will need very advanced force protection measures as Hamas is also likely to have studied Iraq and done homework on how to use terrorist-insurgent tactics to attack and destroy a larger armored force.
Even once territory is gained, IDF forces will likely remain vulnerable to insurgent tactics from a hidden force of Hamas fighters and imported Hamas sympathizers, a reality suggesting an IDF occupation of Gaza may require long-term counter-insurgency much like what was pursued by US forces in Iraq. However, Hamas is likely to have much more lethal, precise and deadly anti-armor weapons compared to Iraqi insurgents. Iraqis fired a lot of RPG-7s and of course used IEDs, yet did not seem to have the kind of anti-armor weapons likely possessed by Hamas. Also, Hamas ATGMs are likely to have been greatly upgraded in the last ten years to include much greater range, precision and targeting technology, and Hamas may also now have weapons it did not have during previous conflicts with the IDF.
What all of this suggests is that the IDF is likely focused on ground and air intelligence gathering, precision strikes when and where civilian casualties are avoidable and other kinds of reconnaissance efforts. Once sufficient progress is made, perhaps then and only then will it make sense to launch a larger incursion. Small hit-and-run teams of elite IDF units, supported by greatly advanced aerial and hand-held ISR such as small drones, supported by fast-moving smaller ground units are likely to have more success with precision strikes against Hamas forces.
Kris Osborn is the President of Warrior Maven – Center for Military Modernization and Osborn previously served at the Pentagon as a Highly Qualified Expert with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army—Acquisition, Logistics & Technology. Osborn has also worked as an anchor and on-air military specialist at national TV networks. He has appeared as a guest military expert on Fox News, MSNBC, The Military Channel, and The History Channel. He also has a Masters Degree in Comparative Literature from Columbia University.
